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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
Child Welfare Decision-Making in Context  
 
 Child welfare decision-making is a high-stakes task. When decisions about 
whether child maltreatment has taken place are incorrect; children left in homes 
who should have been removed can die or experience further abuse. Separations 
between children and their primary caregivers can cause lasting disruptions in their 
social, emotional, and cognitive development (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1979, 1980; 
Wilkes, 1992) as well as be deeply traumatic to caregivers, especially when they are 
unwarranted. Once children have been removed from their families, the simple fact 
of the separation itself can make reunification difficult. Figuring out how to do 
decision-making well is just as highly fraught as the actual decision-making itself. 
Silver bullets and new policies wrapped in powerful epistemological frameworks 
come in and out of fashion, capturing and then losing, the attention of researchers, 
advocates, and policymakers when they fail to be the corrective originally claimed. 
At the center, are children and families whose lives often hinge on how decision-
making about them is collectively understood and organized.   
As a home-visiting social worker working with families with children at risk 
for removal and as a psychological consultant at the Child Advocacy Law Clinic at 
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the University of Michigan, I experienced first hand how difficult it is to make 
sound decisions about whether maltreatment is taking place, how severe the 
maltreatment is, if it is indeed occurring, and what to do about it. What is obvious 
on paper and in theory, is perpetually messy, inchoate, and ambiguous in practice. 
Navigating the complex realities of intersecting social issues: poverty, a failing 
mental health system, a troubled economy with few employment opportunities for 
those on the lowest rungs of the socio-economic ladder, and limited long-term 
treatment options for families makes decision-making about already complicated 
cases even harder. With so few modes of intervention that seem capable of 
addressing the systemic issues that have brought a family to the attention of Child 
Protective Services (CPS), what to do and how to do it is almost never clear. 
In my work, I have witnessed what happens when mistakes are made and 
have made some of those mistakes myself. I have also worked with many dedicated 
people across professions who are committed to making the best decisions that they 
can for children and families. Yet, I am often left with the sense that we are 
collectively failing to do our job as well as we can.  Qualitative research is guided by 
sensitizing concepts that are deployed as orienting frameworks (Blumer, 1979) 
1979). Such concepts are starting points for a grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 
2007) The sensitizing concepts motivating my dissertation research are drawn from 
my experience in the field and shape the outlines of this work.  
 In the past 15 years, the field of child welfare has seen a revolution in the 
technologies and practices related to how decisions are made. Actuarial-based 
assessments, now in use in the majority of states, are designed to make child welfare 
decision-making more scientific, fair, effective, and cost-efficient (CRC, 2008). These 
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are important goals when the weaknesses of clinical decision-making are well 
known, when decades of racial, ethnic, and socio-economic disproportionality 
challenge all claims to a system that is equitable and when research has consistently 
highlighted the inconsistency of decisions themselves (Dettlaff et al., 2011; Dettlaff 
& Rycraft, 2010; Fluke, Yuan, Hedderson, & Curtis, 2003; Gambrill & Shlonsky, 
2000; Lindsey, 1992; Lu et al., 2004; Rossi, Schuerman, & Budde, 1996; Schuerman, 
Rossi, & Budde, 1999; Wulczyn & Lery, 2007).   
Despite the popularity of actuarial-based risk assessments, we know 
relatively little about how these new technologies are playing out on the ground.  
Research about actuarial-based risk assessments has predominantly been through 
validation studies, which have lauded the ability of actuarial-based assessments to 
improve decision-making. Over 100 studies have shown that empirical decision-
making models are superior to clinical judgment (Baird & Wagner, 2000; Baird, 
Wagner, Healy, & Johnson, 1999; Grove & Meehl, 1996). Studies specifically about 
actuarial-based risk assessments in child welfare are optimistic, overall, about their 
capacity to facilitate better decisions (Baird & Wagner, 2000; Baird, et al., 1999). 
What concerns there are about actuarial-based risk assessments in the child welfare 
community are often not about the concept itself but either methodological (e.g. 
appropriateness of the measures risk assessments employ) or practical (e.g. 
overconfidence in their ability to make perfect decisions by those who use them) in 
nature (Camasso & Jagannathan, 2000; Gambrill & Shlonsky, 2000, 2001; Munro, 
2004; Wald & Woolverton, 1990).  
While structured decision-making models have not explicitly been the 
targets of critiques themselves, larger challenges to the Evidence-Based Practice 
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Movement of which actuarial-based risk assessments are a part, apply. This set of 
scholarship raises questions about the consequences of removing contextual 
understanding and practice-wisdom from social work interventions and challenges 
the prudence of translating a model that began in medicine to the very different 
kinds of problems that social work addresses (Staller, 2006; S. Witkin & Harrison, 
2001; S. L. Witkin, 1996).    
Beyond theoretical debates about the strengths and weaknesses of Evidence-
Based Practice in social work, research in implementation science has demonstrated 
that any intervention is only as valid and reliable as its deployment on the ground 
(Durlak & DuPre, 2008; NIH, 2013; Powell et al., 2015). Yet we know almost 
nothing about how actuarial-based decision-making in child welfare has been 
implemented. To date, there are only three qualitative investigations of actuarial-
based risk assessments as they are used in practice and they raise serious questions 
about whether workers use these tools as intended. Lyle and Graham (2000) found 
that workers in Illinois inflated risk scores to obtain services for their clients, 
transforming the actuarial-based risk assessment from a neutral process for 
decision-making into a tool to advocate for clients (Lyle & Graham, 2000). The 
second found that hospital risk assessments were ignored when psychiatrists made 
decisions about which psychiatric patients to transfer and discharge from a 
maximum security hospital in favor of the information gathered during clinical 
interviews (Hilton & Simmons, 2001). A third study of court counselors revealed 
that they did not utilize their risk assessment when making probation decisions 
(Krysik & LeCroy, 2002). As a whole, these studies are not encouraging about the 
ability of actuarial-risk assessments to address the very issues that they are designed 
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to conquer and highlight the need for more sustained work on the role that 
standardized decision-making models have on decision-making in practice.   
The very limited qualitative work on actuarial-based risk assessments raise 
more questions then they answer: (1) Why do workers ignore risk assessments? (2) 
Under what conditions to they ignore them? (3) When do workers use them as 
intended? (4) How does office policy intersect with workers actions and inactions 
regarding actuarial-based risk assessments? And (5) what is on the actuarial-based 
risk assessment itself that might influence a workers response to it? While the 
research cited above suggests workers to be homogenous in their responses to 
actuarial-based models, sociological theory would expect us to see heterogeneity in 
both worker and organizational attitudes about, and approaches to, actuarial-based 
risk assessments. Leading me to ask: (6) Are there variations among worker and 
organizational responses to risk assessments? (7) If such variation exists, how do we 
understand it? It is in this context that I ask the central questions that inform this 
dissertation: How do structured decision-making processes play out on the ground? 
What are the intended and unintended consequences of using them to frame 
decision-making? 
My Approach 
This dissertation applies a sociological lens to understanding how child-
welfare decision-making is practiced in the context of standardized tools. In the 
three articles that comprise this work, I extend existing scholarship in social work 
on actuarial-based risk assessments to foreground how child welfare workers and 
the organizations in which they conduct their work, make-meaning of decision-
making in a structured environment. Understanding the meaning-making processes 
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provides insight into what becomes salient as workers conduct their investigations 
and how larger organizational processes impact these considerations. Looking at the 
implementation of actuarial-based assessments at multiple levels also allows for a 
complex reading of the different variables that shape the adaptation of an 
intervention on the ground.  
“According to Mantzoukas (2004), it is essential that researchers conducting 
qualitative research begin their work by presenting their epistemological stance, 
demonstrating “the rules by which they have agreed to play” (Bringewatt, 2013; 
Mantzoukas, 2004). As a sociologist, I do not assume that an actuarial-based 
approach or a clinical one is better.  Rather, I take a constructionist and 
constructivist stance, focused on understanding how both individuals and 
organizations make meaning of the actuarial-risk assessment through every day 
work routines and through the creation of organizational practices and policies 
(Crotty, 1998). I view individual and collective responses to the actuarial-based risk 
assessment to be dialectical in nature, shaping and changing each other. Individuals 
must negotiate and square their views of the world with the organizational rules 
they are asked to follow and organizations must manage the individuals that 
comprise them. I understand the actuarial-based risk assessment itself to be both a 
scientific tool and a socially constructed practice whose dual technical and 
ontological nature must be interrogated. In this way, this dissertation follows in a 
long tradition of ethno-methodological sociology, which seeks “to discover the 
things that persons in particular situations do, the methods they use, to create the 
patterned orderliness of social life”(Garfinkel, 1984).   
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Debates about the ‘correct’ way to practice and the utility of actuarial vs. 
clinical approaches have been at the center of social work for the last 20 years. At 
their core, they are about nothing less than what it means to be a social worker, the 
values the profession holds, and the legitimacy of the field. These debates have 
played out with the passion and vigor one would expect of discussions that touch on 
such foundational concerns. By using sociological theories and methods to 
understand how individuals and organizations use actuarial-based risk assessments, 
my goal is, in part, to understand how these distinct and powerful frames are 
negotiated on the ground.  
Given the primacy of both epistemologies and the intensity that discussions 
about each one engenders, one would expect a certain amount of confusion and noise 
as these opposing ideas are operationalized by social workers in the field. 
Throughout the dissertation, I have attempted to reframe actuarial and clinical 
epistemologies from mutually exclusive to co-existing and co-occurring with the 
goal of demonstrating how these views of social work practice are opposed, 
reconciled, or ignored (sometimes all at the same time) in the every day performance 
of social work by child welfare workers.   
The Dissertation 
The first paper from my dissertation investigates how and to what extent 
CPS workers have incorporated standardized methods like the Structured Decision 
Making Model (SDM) into their everyday work practices and then analyzes whether 
standardized assessments control for bias and subjectivity or encode bias and 
subjectivity in new ways. My research demonstrates that workers’ ways of utilizing 
the SDM are associated with their socio-demographic characteristics, including 
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those related to gender, race, and years of experience. White male workers and 
workers with over 8 years of experience reported that they adjusted the SDM to 
ensure that its outcome reflected a decision they had already made. In contrast, 
African-American, female, and relatively inexperienced workers reported that they 
relied on the SDM to tell them what to do in cases and “did not make decisions.” 
Contributing to a larger debate about the utility or limitations of actuarial risk 
models for the reduction of bias in decision-making, these findings contradict claims 
that SDM tools are neutral objects that facilitate objective conclusions about which 
families should maintain custody of their children. This work challenges the idea 
that standardized tools are able to eliminate subjective processes in decision-making 
by demonstrating that standardization alone cannot correct for differences in social 
power and standing that are embedded in any social system. 
In response to findings like the ones describe above, disparities in child 
welfare outcomes are often investigated and then addressed at the level of the 
individual worker. Implementation science and Quality Improvement (QI) initiatives 
recommend better training to improve workers’ ‘fidelity to the model,’ on the theory 
that the discrepancies between the desired and actual outcomes of an intervention 
are the result of workers’ poor implementation. The second paper of my dissertation 
demonstrates that differences in decision-making are not confined to individuals but 
also occur at the organizational level. Comparing work practices in two states, I find 
that there are significant policy differences related to the meaning, implementation, 
and use of the SDM. These differences suggest that whether a standardized tool 
achieves a standardizing function is not only a consequence of the validity or 
reliability of the tool itself but also of the social and structural context in which a 
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tool is introduced and utilized. By re-framing standardization as a social rather than 
technical process, this paper challenges the idea that well-implemented, evidenced-
based interventions with close fidelity to the model will necessarily be able to 
eliminate the messiness inherent in the complex work of child welfare decision-
making. In doing so, I show that both tools and evidence-based practices are not 
self-actuating. My findings here have implications not only for Quality 
Improvement initiatives in social work practice but also for standardized tool-based 
approaches in other domains, such as education, medicine, and law. 
In the third paper, I examine the construction of one state’s actuarial-based 
risk assessment. In attempting to avoid errors where children are left in the homes 
when they should have been removed, I argue that both the risk assessment and the 
policies surrounding its use may set the stage for more unwarranted separations and 
punitive consequences for families. Using sociological theories of commensuration to 
examine how a ‘trust in numbers’ have come to organize how cases are evaluated 
and sorted, this paper closely examines what has been selected to be a part of the 
risk assessment and what gets left out (Porter, 1995). My research reveals that an 
explicit focus on demographic characteristics such as the number of children in the 
home, the age of the children, the number of past investigations and whether the 
parents were abused as children weight the risk assessment heavily in the direction 
of classifying a case as high-risk before the dynamics between the child and parent 
or the present circumstances have been considered. I argue that while the risk 
factors cited above have been well validated in the literature, in practice, their 
presentation on the risk assessment removes a contextual and interactional form of 
assessment from the evaluation process. State policies that prevent workers from 
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overriding risk assessment scores to de-escalate cases, make clinical judgment 
suspect in cases where risk may have been overestimated. Conversely, state policies 
that encourage, and at times, require workers to override risk assessment scores 
emphasize the importance of the ecological context for cases where risk may have 
been underestimated.  
Throughout each paper, I take up the broader policy and practice 
implications of this research. Breaking away from rigid dichotomies that pit clinical 
and actuarial decision-making as mutually exclusive methods, I propose an 
integrative model that capitalizes on the strengths of both clinical and standardized 
processes. I argue that it is critical to understand and recognize how reflective 
practices and subjective assessments are incorporated into the processes for using 
standardized decision-making tools. Acknowledging these practices in actuarial 
processes whether in the form of narrative recommendations, reflective supervision 
about use of the tools in each case, or clinical case reviews, creates a space for 
unconscious, subjective, or biased assessments to play out. I find that when workers’ 
subjective assessments are intentionally excluded from case decision-making 
processes, they find alternative ways to influence case outcomes regardless of the 
formal procedural mechanisms in place. The solution is not to find new ways to 
exclude caseworkers’ judgment but to offer a place for it alongside other approaches 
to improving case decision-making. In the dissertation, I propose revising questions 
on the risk assessment to highlight relational and dynamic processes and suggest 
implementing structural opportunities for clinical review.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Same Difference: Structured Decision-Making in Practice 
 
Introduction 
 
The introduction of actuarial based assessments into child welfare practice 
represents an attempt to create a more objective framework for decision-making, 
reduce bias from subjective assessments, and increase the consistency of case 
evaluations across child protective service workers (Baird, Wagner, Healy, & 
Johnson, 1999; English & Pecora, 1994; Gambrill & Shlonsky, 2000; "The 
Structured Decision Making Model: An Evidence-based Approach to Human 
Services," 2008) While there is a general consensus that standardized assessments 
outperform clinical judgment (Baird & Wagner, 2000; Baird, et al., 1999; Dawes, 
1999; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Grove & Meehl, 1996), limited research on 
their utilization in the fields of psychiatry and juvenile justice suggests that actuarial 
based risk assessments may be ignored in practice, restricting their value (Krysik & 
LeCroy, 2002; Schwalbe, 2004; Hilton & Simmons, 2001). These provocative 
findings raise questions about the utilization of actuarial based risk assessments in 
the field of child welfare. To date, there has been little research that examines how 
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child welfare workers integrate these decision-making aids into their every day 
work.   
In this paper, I examine how child protective service workers understand 
their role as decision-makers within the context of standardized work procedures in 
order to build theory about the relationship between workers' conceptualization of 
actuarial risk assessments and their utilization. Specifically, I ask: How do structured 
decision-making aids influence decision-making in the context of every day work routines?  
How do Child Protective Service workers make meaning of their work when much of it is 
guided by structured tools? The goals of this research are to fill a gap in knowledge 
about how actuarial assessments are used on the ground and the factors that impede 
or promote their implementation. 
Moving away from dichotomous understandings of standardization that 
frame clinical and actuarial decision-making as mutually exclusive processes, I find 
that workers decision-making strategies fall on a continuum. Workers perceptions 
of their ability to take action in a case both influences, and is influenced by, their 
understanding of standardized decision-making aids. Drawing from sociological 
theories concerned with the way that power and privilege affects a person's approach 
to the world, I contend that how workers make meaning of their decision-making 
capabilities is rooted in social factors as well as individual ones. I observe that 
workers who occupy social positions of higher status in terms of race, gender, and 
years of experience are more likely to frame their decision-making as autonomous 
within the context of standardized tools. The converse is also true: child welfare 
workers who occupy positions of lower social status in terms of race, gender, and 
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years of experience are more likely to frame their decision-making as less 
autonomous and more restricted.  
Case accounts demonstrate that no matter how workers understand or 
construct their authority to take action, all workers maintain some level of 
discretion in their casework. In doing so, workers utilize a diverse set of strategies 
to influence case outcomes regardless of their social position or conceptualization of 
their professional authority. This work challenges the idea that standardized tools 
are able to eliminate or entirely flatten subjective processes in decision-making, and 
demonstrates that standardization alone cannot correct for differences in social 
power and standing that are a part of any social system.   
In this paper, I briefly review the extant literature on decision-making in 
order to contextualize the challenges related to case assessment and the 
introduction of actuarial tools into child protective service work. I then problematize 
the assumption that actuarial risk assessments can be entirely neutral objects.  
Following this, I describe the research study and findings. This paper concludes 
with a discussion of the implications of this research for child welfare decision-
making. 
Theoretical Framing 
Assessing Assessment  
The difficulty of making accurate decisions in child welfare work has been 
well documented and represents a major concern for the improvement of the field 
(Dawes, et al., 1989; Gambrill, 1990; Gambrill & Shlonsky, 2000; Grove & Meehl, 
1996; Lindsey, 1992; Munro, 1996). Errors in judgment can have fatal or lasting 
consequences for the children the system intends to protect and the families it is 
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charged to serve. At their most severe, flawed assessments lead to unwarranted 
separations between children and their caregivers or allow children to remain in 
unsafe situations. At an institutional level, the aggregate effects of subjective 
understandings of risk, maltreatment, neglect, culture, and safety as well as 
individual bias, lead to disproportional placement rates of children from ethnic and 
racial minorities in the child welfare system (Dettlaff et al., 2011; Dettlaff & Rycraft, 
2008, 2010; Dworsky et al., 2010; Fluke, Yuan, Hedderson, & Curtis, 2003; Gambrill 
& Shlonsky, 2000). 
Using case vignettes, studies have empirically demonstrated that child 
welfare decision-making can be surprisingly variable when workers are given an 
identical set of facts. Lindsey's research on the reliability of decision-making among 
child welfare workers found that they agreed on a case trajectory only 25% of the 
time (Lindsey, 1992). In separate studies, Rossi, Schuerman, and Budde (1996) and 
Arad-Davidzon and Benbenishty (2008) also found large levels of disagreement 
about placement decisions among child welfare workers evaluating the same case.   
There is little overlap between the criteria that child protective service workers base 
their decisions on and the risk factors that researchers have identified as being 
relevant to the risk of future harm (Davidson-Arad & Benbenishty, 2010; Dorsey, 
Mustillo, Farmer, & Elbogen, 2008; Osmo & Benbenishty, 2004). When workers are 
unsure about what to do, they are more likely to make decisions that escalate cases, 
interpreting the risk for future maltreatment as higher than it actually is (Davidson-
Arad & Benbenishty, 2010; Dorsey, et al., 2008; Osmo & Benbenishty, 2004). Even 
when research exists to guide difficult assessments, workers are unlikely to 
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integrate this information into their decision-making (Davidson-Arad & 
Benbenishty, 2010).  
Addressing these issues in decision-making remains a complex task. 
Describing the "uncertain context" within which judgments are made, Gambrill & 
Shlonsky (2000) summarize the "barriers to good decision-making as:  
"(1) Limited knowledge; (2) limited information processing capacities; (3) 
personal obstacles such as lack of perseverance, reliance on ineffective 
problem-solving strategies and lack of familiarity with problem-related 
knowledge; and (4) the task environment" (Gambrill & Shlonksy, 2000) 
Child welfare cases are often messy, filled with conflicting data, and difficult to 
resolve. Heuristic strategies that make complex information more manageable in 
everyday life can lead to poor decision-making in the context of child welfare cases 
as they invite biases in reasoning (Gambrill & Shlonsky, 2000, 2001; Munro, 2004; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 2002). Case characteristics, the personal characteristics 
of the worker, the relationship between the worker and family, and the larger 
institutional context have all been shown to influence child welfare assessments, 
underscoring that these decisions are 'judgment' calls shaped by individual and 
organizational variables as well as by powerful normative ideas about 'what children 
need' and 'what parents should do.'  (Holland, 2000, 2001; Osmo & Benbenishty, 
2004; Portwood, 1998; Rose, 1999; Rose & Meezan, 1996; Walsh, Bridgstock, 
Farrell, Rassafiani, & Schweitzer, 2008). 
The complexity of decision-making is further complicated at the institutional 
level by lack of definitional agreement about what constitutes maltreatment, 
particularly neglect. Since the mid- 1960s, researchers have noted that there is little 
shared understanding among child welfare workers about what necessitates social 
service intervention and what criteria should be used for the home removal of a child 
  19 
(Barnett, Manly, & Cicchetti, 1993; Coulton, Corbin, & Su, 1995; Giovannoni & 
Becerra, 1970; Hutchinson, 1990; Jones, 1993; Rose & Meezan, 1996; Young, 1964; 
Zuvarin, 1999). Variability in decision-making should not be surprising when there 
is so much conceptual heterogeneity about what maltreatment "is" as well as 
widespread contentions about how and when to intervene when it occurs. Agency 
culture can make decision-making harder as workers must find a way to balance 
competing directives, obligations, time pressures, role requirements that call for 
both surveilling and supporting a family and an environment that can reward 
conformity in thinking over critical evaluation (DePanfilis, 1996; Gambrill & 
Shlonsky, 2001). The sum total of this research suggests that case decisions are 
more likely to be dependent on which worker a family receives and the larger 
institutional context in which it is processed than the objective facts of a case. 
Risk Assessments in Child Welfare 
In response to research documenting these inconsistencies, efforts to 
improve decision-making have focused on standardizing child welfare practice with 
the dual goals of (1) creating objective measures that will yield identical results for 
similar cases and (2) producing data that the child welfare system is working, 
evidence-based, and cost effective. The development and introduction of actuarial 
risk assessments represents a major intervention in child welfare decision-making.  
By aggregating the factors related to the child, caretaker, family, and environment 
that have been empirically demonstrated to be the most influential for potential 
maltreatment, actuarial risk assessments create a probabilistic measure for the 
likelihood that maltreatment will occur in the future. Transforming decision-making 
in child welfare from a relatively personal process to a systems-level task, structured 
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risk assessments standardize the criteria child protective service workers use to 
make determinations about their cases. In doing so, actuarial risk assessments also 
attempt to mitigate the racial and ethnic disparity that comprises and compromises 
the child welfare system. If each measure applies equally to every family no matter 
what their race, class, or ethnic background, then the assumption is that families will 
be evaluated fairly and bias will be reduced. 
Actuarial risk assessments are designed not only to reduce disparities in 
child welfare but also improve the accuracy and consistency of child welfare 
decisions by ensuring that workers use the same criteria for judgments in every 
case; make predictions about whether child maltreatment will reoccur based on 
statistical models and empirical research; and to guide decisions about which 
families substantiated for child abuse or neglect would most benefit from services by 
distinguishing between families at high, moderate, and low risk for reoccurrence of 
maltreatment (Baird & Wagner, 2000; Baird, et al., 1999; Dawes, 1988; Dawes, et al., 
1989; "The Structured Decision Making Model: An Evidence-based Approach to 
Human Services," 2008).  
Structured risk assessments are understood to be more accurate than clinical 
decision-making, with over 100 studies finding that they perform better than 
decisions made using intuitive or clinical reasoning (Baird & Wagner, 2000; Baird, 
et al., 1999; Dawes, 1988; Dawes, et al., 1989; Grove & Meehl, 1996; "The 
Structured Decision Making Model: An Evidence-based Approach to Human 
Services," 2008) Dawes asserts:  
In the last 50 years or so, the question of whether a statistical or clinical 
approach is superior has been the subject of extensive empirical 
investigation; statistical vs. clinical methods of predicting important human 
outcomes have been compared with each other, in what might be described 
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as a "contest." The results have been uniform. Even fairly simple statistical 
models outperform clinical judgment. (Dawes, 1993) 
 Over the last 15 years, these findings have led to the widespread adoption of 
actuarial risk assessments by child welfare agencies, the most prominent of which is 
the Structured Decision-Making Model (SDM), currently in use by over 30 states.  
Despite the widespread adoption of actuarial risk assessments and the 
general consensus in the field of child welfare that these are evidence-based 
practices, methodological concerns about their construct validity, predictive ability, 
reliability, and implementation remain (Gambrill & Shlonsky, 2001; McDonald & 
Marks, 1991; Munro, 2004; Schwalbe, 2004; Wald & Woolverton, 1990). Response 
to these concerns focus on building better, more accurate, actuarial models; 
increasing the training of workers using them, and introducing more attentive 
implementation strategies.   
Embedded within each of these strategies is the assumption that when 
designed and implemented 'right,' standardized decision-making aids can largely, if 
not completely, mitigate the subjectivity that impedes consistency in clinical 
decision-making. This paper questions the assumption that structured decision-
making aids can entirely obscure the independent judgments, perspectives, and 
quirks that individuals bring to their decision-making in general, and their use of 
these decision-making tools in particular.  
Research Methods 
Sample 
The data for the present study originates from over 70 hours of semi-
structured, qualitative interviews with 35 Child Protective Service Workers (CPS), 
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who worked in 3 different area offices in one state. Part of a larger comparison 
project on how CPS workers make decisions, this paper draws from a sub-set of the 
total data collected in one state. Interviewees were identified in two ways. First, I 
recruited an initial sample through 3 continuing education trainings for child 
welfare workers held at a school of social work. At these trainings, I introduced 
myself, described the study and passed around a sign-up sheet for study volunteers. 
I then scheduled and conducted interviews with those who indicated interest. 
Additionally, an area director introduced my research to staff and allowed workers 
to sign-up for interviews at an all agency staff meeting. Following a similar 
procedure, I contacted volunteers and scheduled interviews with those who 
demonstrated interest. I also recruited participants using a snowball sample as other 
CPS workers heard about the study from colleagues and asked to join. Participants 
were offered a $25 Visa gift card to compensate them for their time. 
Interviewees ranged in age from 24-62. Participants were comprised of 17 
White women, 8 African-American women, and 6 White men. Workers interviewed 
had a variety of experience. 15 had worked in their current position less than 2 
years; 8 worked in their current position between 2-5 years, and 7 had over 5 years 
of experience on the job. All participants were front line Child Protective Service 
workers tasked with either making decisions either about substantiation and 
severity of child maltreatment (Investigators) or, in the case of substantiated cases 
whether a family was complying with treatment and recommended services 
(Treatment Workers). For decisions about the latter group, Child Protective Service 
workers were responsible for either discharging or escalating cases as families 
wound their way through the child welfare system.  
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Interview Content 
The interview protocol for this study was designed to capture the world-
view of the participants through their common practices and actions (Charmaz, 
2006). Semi- structured and open-ended, the protocol begins with a discussion about 
the everyday work routines of the respondents. I began the interview by asking how 
the participant came to be either an investigator or treatment worker and about the 
challenges of the job as well its pleasures. Following this initial discussion, I asked 
participants "to walk me through" the process in a neglect case from the time they 
received it to when they transferred or closed it (Weiss, 1995). This question is 
intended to collect a procedural accounting of casework, the 'how it should go' or the 
'what I typically do.' I then asked the participant to walk me through his most recent 
completed child neglect case. The logic of this question is to use recent completed 
cases as a proxy for typical cases. These descriptions gave me a baseline for what 
kinds of actions or inactions were conceptualized as common in a particular office 
and what course these cases normally took. The next question centered on 
challenging cases and I asked participants to describe a case where they had a 
difficult time determining what actions or recommendations they should make. I 
then asked participants to walk me through a case where they felt confident in their 
decision-making or where it was easy to know what to do.  
After collecting these accounts, I asked workers about the Structured 
Decision-Making (SDM) tools (if they had not yet mentioned them at other points 
in the interview). Questions about the SDM tools centered on how workers used 
them in their every day work routines as well as assessments of their usefulness to 
aid decision-making. This line of questioning ended with the worker walking me 
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through the Safety, Risk, or Reunification Assessments for each of the three cases 
they described. During this process, I was able to collect data on how the worker 
understood the questions on the SDM tools and how this understanding unfolded in 
practice. These questions also allowed me to collect data on the weight that these 
assessments were given in the final disposition of the case and how they influenced 
decision-making about legal or social service involvement. Throughout the 
interview, I followed up every question with probes specific to the conversation.  
Common probes focused around further elucidating the logic at decision-
making points and case detail. Interviews ranged from 60-180 minutes with a 
median interview time of 90-100 minutes. Interviews were audio taped and 
transcribed. I conducted interviews at neutral locations such as local libraries and a 
community center with offices available for sign-out. Interviews also took place in 
an available room at one area Child Protective Service office.  All names of offices, 
agencies, and people are pseudonyms. 
Data Analysis 
Following grounded theory protocols, I began data analysis immediately 
after the initial interview through detailed memoing (Charmaz, 2006). Interviews 
were coded using an open coding strategy with individual transcripts using NVivo 
10 qualitative data analysis software (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). I developed 
concepts and categories reflecting recurring themes in the data. Interviews were 
then analyzed at the aggregate level. After initial open coding, two Research 
Assistants analyzed the data deductively based on the themes and categories I 
initially identified. The data presented below represents larger themes found in the 
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data, except where noted. Quotes from the data are edited for clarity (e.g. repeated 
"Ums" removed), but no words have been changed or re-ordered.  
Why Here 
State A offers an ideal site in which to conduct this research. Currently, State 
A's legislature mandates the use of the Structured Decision-Making Model (SDM) 
an actuarial-based approach for child welfare decision-making in all casework. The 
Structured Decision-Making Model is one of the most prominent actuarial based 
assessments and is in use in over 30 states. As an early adopter of the SDM, State 
A's risk assessment serves as the basis for a number of other state's risk assessment 
instruments. In addition to the SDM, State A has also adopted a category system 
where Child Protective Service workers are required to rank a case based on level of 
severity from 1-5.  The ranking system further standardizes caseworker action and 
discretion by specifying the specific protocols that follow each ranking. Case 
categories are explicitly linked to the risk assessment with scores on the RA 
correlating with the case category. The chart below outlines the category system 
and their connecting designations from the risk assessment:  
State A Child Protective Services Category System 
Category V  Following a field investigation, the department determines 
that there is no evidence of child maltreatment or is unable 
to locate the family. No action taken. 
Category IV  Cases where there is no preponderance of evidence that 
neglect or abuse has occurred. If the risk assessment 
demonstrates any risk Voluntary Community Services 
are Recommended. 
Category III  A preponderance of evidence that child maltreatment has 
occurred. The risk assessment scores as low or moderate. If 
the family does not voluntarily participate in services or 
does not progress CPS may reclassify as a Category II. 
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Community Services are Needed. Moderate Risk 
Category II  A preponderance of evidence that abuse or neglect 
has occurred. There is a high level of risk for future harm 
as indicated by the risk assessment.  The perpetrator is 
listed on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect.  
Child Protective Services are Required in Conjunction 
with Community Services. High Risk 
Category I  A preponderance of evidence that child maltreatment has 
occurred with the risk assessment scoring as high or 
intensive. Child Protective Services determine that a court 
petition is either needed or required. Perpetrator is listed 
on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect. CPS 
petitions for the immediate removal of child(ren). 
Services Provided by Child Protective Services or 
Foster Care in Conjunction with Community Services.  
Intensive Risk 
 
Autonomous Workers 
It’s An Art Not a Science 
Even within the context of the highly protocolized policy environment in 
State A, a subset of workers (11 out of 35) experienced themselves as having a 
degree of autonomy and discretion in their casework.  For the purposes of 
shorthand, I will refer to these workers as autonomous throughout this paper. 
Describing their decision-making in authoritative terms and actively emphasizing 
their ability to make judgments about the merits of cases, autonomous workers 
understood themselves as able to influence the trajectory of cases and their 
outcomes independent of the actuarial based risk assessments that they were 
required to use. For this group of workers, the actuarial risk assessments were a 
bureaucratic tool that they had to manage but not heed. Autonomous workers’ 
conceptualizations and critiques of the Structured Decision-Making Model (SDM), 
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particularly the limitations of the risk assessment, informed their view of decision-
making as more of an art than a science.  
Autonomous workers viewed the decision-making process, even in the 
context of the SDM, as highly variable. Citing differences in worker and supervisor 
attitudes, these workers regularly observed that case decisions and outcomes were 
highly associated with the personal traits, interpretations, and perspectives of their 
colleagues rather than measures like the SDM. Workers who observed this 
variability did not trust the SDM to be an equalizer across cases. Instead, they 
viewed the risk assessment as an administrative tool that recorded rather than 
mitigated diverse perspectives. Without confidence that the SDM worked 
effectively, workers felt that they had little reason to align their work practices 
around it. Decision-making about cases proceeded engagement with the SDM.   
Autonomous workers reported that they first came to a decision about the 
case and then utilized the SDM at the end and only because that was what was 
required. Because the results of the risk assessment in State A mandate case 
trajectories, workers in State A who disagreed or disregarded its results still had to 
negotiate a strategy for the SDM that would preserve their intentions for a case. 
These workers described calibrating their answers on the risk assessment to reflect 
decisions they had already made or relied on familiarity with the risk assessment 
itself to interpret questions in ways that would either raise or lower the final risk 
level. Interpreting questions with an eye toward the final risk level, in turn, affected 
the category at which a case is substantiated. Compared to workers with a more 
restricted sense of autonomy, workers who understood themselves to possess 
discretion in cases, viewed themselves as having multiple points in the investigative 
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or treatment process during which they could intervene to shape the way a case 
unfolded including the actual filling out of the risk assessment itself. 
 Workers who both doubted the reliability of the SDM and also felt free to 
make case judgments independent of the information contained within it, generally 
were in a position of privilege in terms of either race, gender, years of experience or 
a combination of the three relative to other workers who shared their critiques of 
the SDM but who nonetheless understood themselves to be restricted in their ability 
to influence case outcomes. 
An Extremely Poor Tool 
Autonomous workers repeatedly described the risk assessment as an 
inaccurate and/or ineffective tool that did not play a part in their decision-making.  
Rob explains how little he relies on the risk assessment during his routine casework:  
E:  Can you tell me about the risk assessment and how the risk 
assessment works to influence or sort of how it impacts decision-
making? 
R: Well I hate to start by saying it's an extremely poor tool. It's an 
extremely poor tool that...(looking at risk assessment)...Yeah I could 
do these in my sleep.  We see those forms so many times.  You 
breeze through them.  You're not paying attention...You know the 
other day, it was like probably the first time in a long time, I had a 
case and I wanted to know; it's either a Category 2 or a Category 3.  
My boss was like, well do the risk assessment as completely and 
thoroughly as you can and see what it spits out.  You know it came 
back as a 2.  So, that was like the one time I relied on the risk 
assessment to give me kind of what CPS thinks is a Category 3 or 
Category 2. (White, Male) 
For Rob, the risk assessment rarely impacts his decision-making as evidenced by the 
fact that he can only remember one time that he used the RA to determine the 
category for a case. Having seen the RA "a thousand times," Rob can accurately 
gauge how to fill it out so that it reflects decisions he believes are justified. Instead 
of being a powerful factor in case outcomes, the risk assessment is relegated to a 
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bureaucratic tool, which requires little thought and functions without much merit.  
Rob goes on to detail how he understands decisions to be made:  
R: I'll give you the off the cuff. When I do a case and I put together a 
packet, we have a case conference. I know sometimes the workers 
will read the 154. Nobody reads these [the risk assessment].  
Nobody reads these. They're in the file.  It's just a piece of paper 
that the state can say 'hey that we did this.' The workers will read 
the 154 and they will take the information we give them. So 
whatever they're doing, they're basing it off of what they read in my 
154 or whatever I tell them in that meeting when we're transferring 
the case.  Me and my supervisor and them and their supervisor.  So, 
these have no; I mean yeah the risk may give us some guide about 
whether it's going to be a 2 or a 3.   
E: Do you find that helpful ever? 
R: What, the risk? 
E: Yeah. 
R:  No.  (White, Male) 
Not only does the risk assessment provide little useful guidance about case decision-
making but also, according to Rob, it is not used reliably by others to interpret 
information about the case. Instead case narratives, case conferences, and 
supervisory discussion are the methods through which a case trajectory begins to be 
framed and a course of action takes shape.  
Other workers share Rob's experience of the risk assessment as an inaccurate 
tool and in doing so, come to similar conclusions about whether it should factor into 
decision-making.  Skeptical of the RA's accuracy, Jennifer does not refer to it when 
formulating her decisions about her cases:  
J: ...because the risk.  I mean yeah, sure you have to have a risk and a 
safety assessment but I don't know how really accurate they are.  
They're really general questions and they're really, um, they're just, 
I don't know, they almost like seem like they're too generic... I'm 
not a big fan of them.   
E: So when do you do them in the course of your investigation?  
J: You're supposed to...Well you're supposed to do the safety 
assessment once you commence your referral and figure out the 
safety to the child, (short laugh) but someone like me, I do them at 
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the end once you know, so once I'm ready to dispo my case, (short 
laugh)  
E: So you do them at the end?   
J: Yeah I do. I'm not going to lie about that cause I can't... 
E: No, and you're not alone either.   
J: Yeah I'm like oh I got to dispo my case, I'm like doing the safety, I 
do the risk, well FANS [Family Assessment of Needs and 
Strengths] and CANS [Child Assessment of Needs and Strengths] 
is only when you have to do an open case, but yeah I generally... 
E: So do they impact or influence your decision making in any way?  
S: No. (White Female)  
Like Rob, Jennifer sees the risk assessment as a poor proxy for clinical decision-
making. Lacking nuance or complexity the risk assessment and other parts of the 
SDM do not satisfy Jennifer's criteria for the kind of information she needs to make 
informed decisions about her cases. William shares Jennifer and Rob's assessments 
noting that  "I would be very, very hard pressed to prove if we want to talk stats for 
a second... it [the risk assessment] is not valid and it is not reliable." Without 
confidence in the accuracy of the risk assessment or confidence in its ability to 
meaningfully inform cases, workers like Jennifer, Rob, and William feel justified in 
using other methods for decision-making than the protocols or policies the 
Department of Health and Human Services requires.  
Objectivity is a Subjective Experience 
What makes the risk assessment a poor tool in the eyes of some workers?  
State A workers who understand themselves to maintain professional authority and 
discretion share the same set of critiques about the SDM namely that: The risk 
assessment (1) lacks nuance; (2); is unable to effectively distinguish between 
moderate and high risk cases; (3) penalizes families for past history rather than 
current issues; (4) functions primarily as a bureaucratic tool for management; and (5) 
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and is easily open to multiple interpretations which undermine its claims of 
objectivity. It is this final factor that workers who maintain a sense of professional 
authority and discretion focused on the most when explaining their resistance to the 
SDM and their approach to decision-making. Rob sees the risk assessment as just 
another place in case work where individual interpretation guides decision-making:  
You know I tell people this all the time.  If you had one CPS case and it has 
a borderline complaint, you know could be, couldn't be.  And you gave it to 
50 different workers, all throughout the state with different supervisors, 
you'll probably get 20 Cat 4s, 20 Cat 3s, a couple Cat 2s and then maybe one 
or two guys will give it a Cat 5.  So it's like, so you say how do you come to 
a decision?  You know it depends on what worker you got, what supervisor 
that person is under because the supervisor sets the tone for what kind of 
mindset the worker is going to have.  You know some supervisors are more 
aggressive and less trusting and you know, more aggressive when it comes 
to I guess punishing a parent or what have you. (White Male) 
Concurring with this assessment, William enumerates how the questions on the risk 
assessment themselves invite multiple readings, which leads to disparate risk levels 
for the same case: 
 Primary caretaker currently has a substance abuse problem.  One could 
read that one of two ways. There are workers that will say, "Okay, 
they're in treatment."  They still have a substance abuse problem 
because they're in treatment.  So that's a yes, which is immediately 
going to make the risk higher.  But they voluntarily went in 
treatment and they've completed treatment; so is it still a problem?  
I mean and you know, okay part of that could be a little semantical, 
but if you really read that; I mean the way I read it would be; yeah, 
they did have a problem, but they voluntarily have participated and 
the worker says they're doing absolutely fantastic and there's no 
problem with that at all.  So, I would answer that "no" but others 
would answer it "yes" and that's immediately going to skew things.   
Oh this one's beautiful; primary caretaker views incident less seriously 
than the department. That is so wrought with lack of objectivity; it's 
not even funny.  You know and then that's where the worker has to 
really deal with their own personal feelings and their own biases. 
(White, Male)  
Rob and William both see the risk assessment as capturing the diversity of workers 
opinions rather than as a tool for preventing variability. Consciously or 
unconsciously workers own perspective on norms related to parenting, child care, 
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substance abuse, substance abuse recovery, exposure to domestic violence, parental 
insight, and a family's cooperation with the department influence how a worker will 
approach the interpretation of questions on the risk assessment. Diverse 
understandings of what constitutes risk come to light as each worker deciphers each 
individual question. As a result, cases with the same factual evidence can follow very 
different paths based on how a worker interprets the questions on the risk 
assessment.  
Workers who understand the risk assessment to encode subjectivity rather 
than objective levels of risk then felt free to approach the risk assessment as a place 
to document rather than uncover decision-making. Workers described how both 
they themselves and their colleagues adjusted answers to alter the final score of the 
risk assessment. Because these workers understood the RA to capture variability, 
they felt they were not doing anything differently than their colleagues when they 
used flexible and distinct interpretations of questions to guide case outcomes.  
Disputing the idea that an actuarial approach successfully eliminates subjective 
responses, Jackie stated: "I get that this is numerically based.  But, clearly you can 
manipulate it." Matt describes both the rationale for altering the risk assessment 
along with a description of how such manipulation takes place:  
E:   How do you use those tools [the SDM] in your, when you're 
working on a case? 
M: They're just blockades, I mean I just get 'em done and it doesn't 
even mean anything to me, because I know what the risk is. I'm not 
going to finish the thing and look and go, oh it's moderate. I mean, I 
know, and frankly just about everything comes out as moderate 
anyway unless you got some severe stuff happening. And in that 
case you already know it. So I don't use those for guidance at all.  
And surprisingly, when I do those, and I don't even look to see what 
level category it comes out at. I just start working on the 
disposition the first sentence is, this is a category 3 case. And guess 
what, 99.9% of the time it's exactly what I thought it was gonna be. 
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E:  And what happens that .1% of the time when it's not? 
M: Well then I've got to go back and fix it.  (Laughter) 
E: Oh okay, and then you've got to go back and fix it. 
M: Yeah, either I will change the risk assessment 'cause I will go 
through it again and say, you know what that  might have been a 
problem, but it's not that big of a problem.  Or I will change 
category 4 to category 3 or category 3 to a 2. (White, Male) 
Matt performs his professional acumen by demonstrating how often his 
understanding of risk aligns with the understanding of risk encoded within the risk 
assessment. The risk assessment is a blockade precisely because he believes he 
assesses risk as well, if not better, than the SDM. However, when Matt's 
understanding of risk conflicts with that of the risk assessment it is not a cue that he 
got the information wrong but an error within the risk assessment itself. Matt 
"finagles" the results because of his confidence in his professional authority. William 
too notes that the risk assessment often needs refinement and sees adjustment of the 
risk assessment as an issue not only of professional expertise, but also of morality:  
E: How often would you say that you have a case where your 
assessment of what the risk level is or the category should be is in 
conflict with what the risk assessment has scored?   
W: I would say right now; actually in my experience, literally 60 
percent of the time.   
E: So more than half you're doing something different than what the... 
W: These [the RA] are making decisions on people's lives and I want 
to make sure that it's going to reflect what I know and what I've 
observed and what I've assessed. (White, Male) 
Because William understands the risk assessment to be inaccurate, it is important 
that he amend his interpretations on the risk assessment so that its outcome reflects 
his assessment of the risk level for the case. As William points out, the stakes for 
families are too high to proceed with a finding that ignores his clinical experience. 
For William, being a professional means using the SDM interpretively, privileging 
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his years of experience as a social worker over what he sees as an ineffective form. 
Doing so is not unethical, but rather the only ethical course of action.   
Workers consistently cited the serious consequences of an inaccurate (or 
even an accurate) risk level for families as the primary reason that they revisited and 
reformulated the risk assessment. Jackie explained that the placement of a parent or 
caregiver on Central Registry was one area that she and other workers took into 
consideration in how they scored each case: 
J: I think that with cases where you know it's gonna be substantiated, 
I think that you do think about Central Registry and I think that's 
probably one of the most manipulated areas and that you can 
manipulate it. Because while it's based on the risk, and what you put 
in for the risk, what you don't put in for the risk or just the way 
different people view, you know if, one of the questions is something 
like; is there domestic violence I could say in their current 
relationship, no. But, mom was beat by her former husband twenty 
times and the police have been out there, so I mean technically I 
could mark yes. So, I mean some of those things can be 
manipulated; they really can.   
E: Is it something that you think about when you have a case that you 
know could approach a level 2 or a level 1? 
J: Absolutely (White Female). 
Jackie understands manipulation to take place because the risk assessment itself is so 
open to subjective understandings of events and the circumstances of a family.   This 
experience of the SDM as well as an awareness of its consequences facilitates 
workers critical attention to the relationship between the facts of the case, the score 
of the risk level, and how the worker believes she should proceed. Like William, 
Jackie believes that adjusting the risk assessment to reflect her understanding of the 
case is an important professional act that she preforms in the course of her everyday 
work. Being able to use her assessment skills to decode the risk assessment is a part 
of the work that Jackie has been hired to do.  
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Ultimately, the workers that act to maintain a high level of professional 
autonomy in their work despite policies explicitly designed to constrict it, have 
constructed their role as professionals in terms of their ability to make decisions. As 
William put it: "I mean in all my years, my conclusion has always been that this field 
requires a ton of experience, learning from your mistakes, and it's much more of an 
art than it is a science; period." These workers reject quality improvement measures 
like the SDM because they do not believe that quality decision-making can be done 
without privileging clinical reasoning.  
Workers' assessments of the limitations of the SDM mirror concerns about 
methodological weaknesses of actuarial based approaches. Static variables on risk 
assessments such as number of children, age of children, etc. are often rated the 
same by different workers evaluating the same case but items that require more 
interpretation such as determining whether a parent is cooperating with the worker 
or the complaint of maltreatment is being taken seriously are often rated variably 
depending on the analysis of the person filling out the risk assessment. Beliefs that 
the risk assessment is not valid or reliable reflect concerns about the external 
validity and predictive power of actuarial based assessments in use in the field. 
 Suggestions to address these issues have focused around digitizing the 
decision-making aids, increasing training related to the meaning of each question, 
and providing examples that highlight the kind of clinical reasoning that the 
question attempts to encode (Gambrill & Shlonsky, 2000; Shlonsky & Gambrill, 
2001). In State A, all of these suggestions have been enacted: Risk assessment are 
completed and calculated on the computer using the SWSS system; workers have 
access to definitions and examples of case thinking for each of the items on the risk 
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assessment; and workers are trained extensively in use of the risk assessment. In 
practice, attendance to implementation issues has done little to mitigate the 
challenges of standardizing diverse thinking and experiences among child welfare 
workers who argue that the flaws they see in the risk assessment justify ignoring it 
when the results do not match their understanding of the case.  
Implementation issues are often framed in the literature on evidence-based 
practice in general, and risk assessment utilization in particular, as related to 
workers not understanding the importance of using evidence-based methods or 
valuing practice-wisdom and intuitive reasoning over scientific methods. It is 
important to note that, here, issues of implementation are, in part, related to 
concerns about the validity and reliability of risk assessments and that some of these 
concerns have also been raised by experts in the field. Workers' critiques of the risk 
assessment and stated reasons for subverting its intentions invite a more nuanced 
conceptualization of implementation issues than simply improving training can 
address. Without direct attention to workers concerns about the limitations of the 
risk assessment, it is unlikely that any intervention that only addresses the process 
for using the SDM will succeed. 
 
Restricted Decision-Making 
The majority of workers in State A constructed their decision-making in 
restricted terms (24 out of 35). These workers felt that they were not in control of a 
number of choices that were directly tied to the score a family received on the risk 
assessment (RA) such as determining whether to place a perpetrator of child 
maltreatment on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect, the severity of a case, 
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and the intensity of treatment needs. Workers who experienced their decision-
making to be restricted fell into two groups: those who also conceptualized the RA 
as an ineffective tool but who felt they had no choice but to comply with the policy 
and those who believed the RA was an important aid to decision-making. Compared 
to workers who conceptualized themselves as having autonomy over their casework, 
workers with a restricted view of decision-making (whether positive or negative) 
tended to be in minority positions with respect to race, gender, and years of 
experience.   
Workers who experienced the SDM negatively and who also conceptualized 
their decision-making to be restricted (11 out of 24), felt that this lack of control 
greatly diminished their professional identity. I will refer to these workers as 
negatively restricted. For these workers, limitations imposed by the SDM meant 
that their cases could unfold along trajectories with which they disagreed and which 
almost always undermined their professional authority. Among negatively restricted 
workers, there was a fatalistic sense that  'nothing could be done' to correct 
outcomes to which they objected.   
For workers who held a positive view of the Structured Decision-Making 
Model (13 out of 24), there was little conflict about restrictions in decision-making .I 
will refer to these workers as positively restricted.  These workers expressed relief 
that there was a scientific process for making case judgments (the risk assessment) 
that relieved them from the burden of responsibility, making mistakes, and making 
choices that could alter the construction of families. Characterizing their restricted 
authority as being necessary for carefully carrying out their work and reducing bias, 
these workers accepted the risk assessment unquestioningly. As they did so, 
  38 
positively restricted workers redefined the meaning of being a professional from a 
person able to make autonomous decisions and take action to a person that is in 
charge of following established rules and executing policy properly. Utilizing a 
standardized protocol for decision-making allowed these workers to manage the 
uncertainty and risk inherent in their choices without being overwhelmed by the 
responsibility these choices entailed.  
 However, all workers with a restricted sense of discretion (whether positive 
or negative) were not entirely without autonomy. Finding places to exercise 
discretion in their casework outside of the SDM and the risk assessment, restricted 
workers preserved other spaces in the life of a case to guide its trajectory. These 
workers described using the 30-day investigative period as the site where they were 
able to influence case outcomes. During this period, workers evaluate whether there 
is a preponderance of evidence necessary to substantiate a charge of child 
maltreatment. Decision-making related to case substantiation gave restricted 
workers a place to exercise professional judgment and offered opportunities to take 
action outside the scope of the SDM. Interventions occurred in two forms either  (1) 
helping families that they did not want to see enter the child welfare system correct 
issues that otherwise left unattended would mean a substantiation; or (2) by 
separating a child from their family through informal safety plans before the 
investigative period concluded. In this way, discretion was not entirely restricted; it 
just shifted form as workers exercised their authority in an area of case decision-
making not guided by standardized tools 
  39 
I Don't Make Decisions, The Computer Does  
Workers, who experienced their own decision-making power as restricted, 
consistently constructed case decisions guided by the risk assessment to be entirely 
outside their own power and dictated by another entity. Asked to explain how they 
make distinctions between categories when evaluating cases, workers who 
understood their discretion to be restricted described being removed from the 
process. Maddie's explanation of decision-making typifies how workers constructed 
decisions as outside of their control:  
E:  How do you understand the difference between Category 3 cases 
and Category 2 cases?  
S:  You know, and the crazy thing is too, we don't even make the 
determination, the computer makes it for us so it's like... (White, 
Female) 
The computer here is the digitized version of the risk assessment, which is calculates 
scores based on the answers a worker provides to its questions.  Maddie sees herself 
as separated from the decision-making process without any sense of where the final 
determination actually comes from. Decision-making is not attributable to Maddie 
or another person (e.g. a supervisor or administrator) nor is it related to the 
information provided by the risk assessment. Instead, Maddie conceives of case 
decisions tied to the risk assessment as emerging from a machine, lending decision-
making a mechanistic quality rather than a processual or agentic one.  In this 
formulation, the worker is a bystander rather than a participatory actor.  Dorothy, 
Casey, and Tia also describe decision-making in these terms: 
Dorothy:  
E: And how do you assess that it's like a Cat 3?   
D:  When you go to your dispo it'll ask you; you know is there a 
preponderance of evidence?  Usually when you do that one, if you 
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click yes, it'll do it as a Cat 1 or a Cat 2 depending on the risk level; 
the risk assessment. (African-American, female) 
Casey: 
C: Yeah.  We have this computer program that's in our SWSS 
program that somebody created and it asks questions that they feel 
are risk and safety assessments; and we just check boxes yes or no, 
and we answer why we answer yes or no; then out pops a number 
that says what level of risk they have and that is what it's based on. 
(White, Female, My Emphasis) 
Tia: 
E: Right, got it.  So, it sounds like for all other cases to determine the 
severity level, you really use the forms [the SDM tools]. 
T:  Yeah, the forms. 
E: Like the forms will guide you and sort of will help you figure out 
what...  
T:  Well, we really don't have a choice; it does it automatically for us. 
So once we press disposition, its done, it pops up with this thing; 
well this is a high risk case and it's a Category 2 and the person will 
be put on Central Registry (African-American, Female, My 
Emphasis) 
Each of these women conceptualizes her role in relatively big investigative decisions 
as deeply restricted. The computer (or the risk assessment) doesn't take into account 
what the worker has heard, felt, experienced, and thought about the case.  Instead 
the worker feeds information related to the risk assessment into a computer and 
waits for a final result to "pop" out, telling them how to proceed without offering an 
opportunity to present their own understanding of the case or the ability to change 
course if it's a decision with which they disagree. While Casey presents a slightly 
more nuanced understanding of the way the case categorization is determined by 
joining her Yes or No answers on the risk assessment to the outcome, she still see 
herself as outside of the final process.  
The computation of the risk assessment leads workers to feel as if they don't 
have a say in the trajectory of their cases and to experience their decision-making 
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capacities as inherently limited. Workers, who construct case decisions emerging 
from the risk assessment to be automatic, de-emphasize the connection between how 
they interpret the questions presented on the RA and the final result. In this way, 
decision-making is decontextualized and the choices that a worker makes 
throughout the investigative process become obscured or are not perceived to be 
choices at all. As a result, decision-making becomes conceptualized as highly 
restricted. 
Negatively Restricted: Undermining Professional Identity 
For negatively restricted workers, the restrictions on decision-making 
encoded within the risk assessment are understood to be an impingement on their 
ability to carry out their jobs effectively. Casey describes how hard it is for her to 
move forward with case decisions that she opposes: 
C:  I guess to say how many times it happens where it changes what I 
would do because with the computer program; I would say probably 
it only happens like once every other month for a case. But when it 
does, it's just, I don't know; it's very difficult for me to sign my 
name on it when I don't agree with it. (White, Female) 
Even though conflict with the SDM does not often emerge for Casey, when it does, 
she does not resolve it by "finagling" the result as some of her coworkers with a 
greater sense of autonomy and discretion have done. Instead, the decision informed 
by the risk assessment stands and the trajectory of the case becomes difficult to 
accept, challenging Casey's sense of professional autonomy.   
Negatively restricted workers feel that there is very little that they can do to 
influence or alter the outcome because of the constraints imposed upon them by 
policy. Lila recounts her actions on a case where she believed that the caregivers 
should be substantiated for neglect but felt that the category to which they were 
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assigned (based on the score of the risk assessment) was more severe than the 
evidence warranted. Concluding that the family did not need as high intensity an 
intervention as their case categorization dictated, Lila frames her decision-making 
about how to proceed in terms of a moral dilemma with a clear answer:  
L:  ...so but it came out like based on these [the risk assessment] and 
the Safety Assessment, it was... 
E: ...that's very high...  I'm just looking [at the score]. 
L:  I couldn't... Listen, I won't lie you know what I mean or fudge it.  
Like based on my interpretation of that [the facts of the case] and I 
went through that thing [the risk assessment] like three times, but 
there is nothing that I can do to avoid the truth. (Non-White, 
Female) 
Despite her efforts to "redo" the risk assessment, Lila is left with an outcome with 
which she ultimately disagrees but which she feels cannot be disputed.  Lila does not 
feel free to privilege her own clinical judgment over the conclusion of the risk 
assessment as some of her colleagues do, so instead she must privilege procedure.  
Lila's commitment to following procedure means making sure that the truth or the 
facts of the case are accurately represented, even if her interpretation of the meaning 
of those facts for the risk of future harm to the children is qualitatively different than 
the conclusion the SDM draws. Angela offers a similar perspective:  
Sometimes you just feel bad. That's all...you just feel bad and you try to 
look...like you try to go over the risk assessment again and see maybe if you 
did something wrong if you clicked on the wrong button.  And it's like I 
don't...'cause it was a case that I opened for a dad and the mom is the one 
who had this previous history and you know he just married this woman 
and he did give the kid a whipping and they got a bruise; or something like 
that.  And I felt like, "Oh well he'll be a Category 3 since it's just him.  But 
even though I did a separate risk assessment for him, they still made him a 
Category 2 because the mom had all this previous history.  And so 
he...[ended up on the Central Registry](African-American, Female) 
Like Lila, Angela may disagree with the outcome of a risk assessment and its 
attendant consequences but adherence to procedure requires that she go along with 
the outcome. Even though Angela believes that the father in the case does not 
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represent a high risk of being a repeat offender of maltreatment, she feels that there 
is nothing she can do to change the course of the case without violating policy. 
Unlike their colleagues with a greater sense of autonomy and discretion, Lila and 
Angela do not adjust their answers to questions on the risk assessment to change 
the final risk score and trajectory of the case. Instead, their strategy is to revisit the 
risk assessment again to make sure that they have not missed any information that 
could alter the final outcome.  ` 
Workers who understand their decision-making capacities to be restricted 
and who feel undermined as a result, often shared critiques of the ineffectiveness of 
the SDM with their colleagues who felt entitled to change the results of RA. Jade 
explains that her sense of professionalism is challenged by a decision-making aid 
that she feels lacks nuance and a clear ability to accurately distinguish between 
moderate and high risk cases. 
E:      I just wanted to note for the recorder that you sort of rolled your 
eyes a little bit.  
J:  I think the system is really stupid and I don't understand who 
created it and there's no discretion whatsoever involved [in 
decreasing a category] downwards. You can increase it on your 
own if you think that. But for instance the risk assessment.  The 
things that make you high risk, some of them have nothing to do 
with you, like you can be a victim of circumstance and things are 
completely out of your control. 
E: Can you give me... 
J:  And you have a high risk, for instance if you have, I guess having 
kids.  But just for argument's sake: If you have more than 3 children 
you get a point.  If you were a victim of child abuse, you get a 
point.  If you are a victim of domestic violence, you get a point.  If 
your child has a mental health issue, you get a point.  If your child 
has behavior issues, you get a point.  Just things that it happened to 
you or your child has or there's things that can make you have...  I 
mean obviously there's other things such as if you don't think that 
this is serious and you deny the seriousness of the case or if you 
refuse to cooperate with services or if you yourself have a criminal 
history. Things that you have done that affect it.   
  44 
But I've had cases in the past where, only the boxes that the victim 
of circumstance were checked or the kids had mental problems; and 
they ended up being a high risk case and I would like to just you 
know offer services and deny the case, but instead I have to make it 
a CAT 2 and put them on Central Registry.  
And this woman in this particular case had a job with children so 
she was at risk of losing her job because somebody created a 
program that said, because she was raped as a child, had a bad 
husband that beat her, and because her child had serious mental 
health issues and she has four kids, that she's a risk to other 
children. (African-American, Female) 
Jade understands the SDM risk assessment may deem a person at a higher risk for 
future child maltreatment based on factors that may or may not influence the 
current risk level, such as demographic information, past history with violent 
relationships and whether a child has any developmental delays or mental health 
issues. Many workers identify these factors as being outside a person's control and 
not always, if ever, relevant to the need for services and/or the likelihood that a 
person will abuse or neglect a child in the future. When a number of items that a 
worker believes to be unrelated to a caregiver's behavior are endorsed on the risk 
assessment, the results are interpreted as being artificially inflated. For Jade, the 
lack of connection she sees between certain items on the risk assessment and the 
actual severity of a case means that she does not trust the risk assessment itself to 
always be correct or to accurately distinguish between moderate, high risk and 
intensive cases. The gap between how Jade would proceed with the case 
(substantiate but offer voluntary services) and the trajectory the case follows 
(substantiate, require intensive services, and impose a punitive consequence) 
reinforces a feeling of lack of professional discretion that is ultimately experienced in 
deeply negative terms.   
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In the case that Jade describes, the mother looses her job as a result of Jade 
clearly reporting the information she has been given during her investigation, 
making Jade an unwilling participant in the outcome. Like Casey, there is nothing 
that Jade feels she can do to change a result that she sees as unfair. Angela similarly 
both critiques the external validity of the risk assessment and explains how 
powerless she feels when the risk level is high based on factors that she believes are 
unrelated to either current or potential child maltreatment:  
A:     Well sometimes with the outcome of the risk assessment I don’t 
agree with; like cause you know when it comes to high and it's open, 
it's gonna be a Category 2.  And sometimes I feel like it shouldn't be 
'cause sometimes it's just for having four or more kids in the home... 
then that throws it over the edge to make them be a Category 2 and 
puts them on the unfit list; even when  it's like a first-time 
offense.   
E:     What do you do in those situations?  'Cause it sounds like... 
A:      There's nothing you can do. (African-American, Female) 
Like Jade and Casey, Angela has no way to resolve the conflict between what the 
risk assessment constructs as true and the truth that she uncovers during her 
investigation. Angela possesses a fatalistic assessment of how this discrepancy 
impacts her cases, understanding that her restricted discretion prevents her from 
influencing the trajectory of cases where the risk assessment scores higher than she 
believes is justified.   
This fatalism extends to situations where workers with a restricted sense of 
discretion see a potential to change the policy to allow other outcomes in similar 
circumstances. Lila describes a case where the Risk Level is high and as a result she 
is required to file a petition with the court to remove the child from the home. While 
Lila believes that the mother should not be caring for the child, she also believes 
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that court involvement could be avoided since there are many other adults to care 
for the child at home:   
L:  Yes, yeah like getting court involved and removing the child.  I 
really didn't like there was no,  how do I say it, with autonomy? 
E: Go for it. 
L:  Well, no because the issue is, there was potential for harm or risk, 
but he was surrounded by a plethora of adults, honestly mom was 
not really left alone.  Great grandma was there, grandma was there, 
dad was there, aunts were there, her brother stepped in, like mom's 
brother so uncle came along.  Like there was enough family support 
that we could, you know continue to try safety planning before 
involving that [the court] and giving dad an opportunity to get 
something in order... (Non-white, Female) 
Lila's professional assessment of the mother's ability to care for her child is aligned 
with that of the risk assessment. However, the risk assessment is unable to 
accommodate the other information that Lila possesses about the family and the 
child's risk for future maltreatment while in the care of his extended family in a 
home his mother also shares. Lila's sense of her lack of autonomy does not permit a 
solution that she feels both is reasonable and minimally disruptive.  
The limited opportunity for nuance available on the risk assessment 
combined with a worker's inability to make decisions that are reflective of their 
assessments contributes to this set of workers negative experience of the SDM. Not 
only do negatively restricted workers feel that their authority is limited but they 
ultimately do not have faith that the risk assessment accurately captures the 
information that is truly necessary to make sound child welfare decisions. Casey 
highlights the implicit conflation built into how child welfare decision-making in 
State A is structured:  
C:  ...we lose discretion, I feel like, by this assessment program. I’ve 
explained... you know I've had this conversation with my supervisor 
before and they often explain to me how it's suppose to figure out 
the child abuse risk potential and I understand that idea, that this is 
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the potential for being a child abuser.  But I feel like our overrides 
should be able to able to go both ways.  I feel like, cause I know 
people, you know in my own personal life that meet a lot of these 
things, and maybe they'll be a high intensive risk, but you know, 
just because you're a victim of domestic violence or because your 
children have issues or because you have, you know four children or 
mental injury, you know things like that; you don't always have to 
fall into the statistic of what's likely to happen.  You know you can 
overcome those odds and be a good person and be a good parent.  
So I just wish that we had the ability to override both ways, that's 
all. (White, Female, My Emphasis) 
By tying the risk assessment to determinations about the severity of a case (the case 
categories), risk level becomes a proxy for the seriousness of the maltreatment that 
has already occurred (and which was the impetus for the investigation itself).  There 
are multiple problems inherent in such a conflation: neighborhoods where 
maltreatment investigations are more likely to occur are also more likely to possess 
the demographic features that would inflate the formal risk assessment (e.g. more 
than 3 children in the home, previous history of domestic violence, previous history 
of substance abuse, higher incidence of children with mental health issues). This 
means that in specific populations or neighborhoods, risk levels are likely to be high 
and in turn, the consequences are more likely to be severe, no matter what the initial 
complaint for maltreatment was or what a worker believes the potential for future 
harm is likely to be. The risk assessment itself is not predictive of future behavior, 
and as Casey points out not all people with specific risk factors, even those who have 
been substantiated for an instance of child abuse or neglect, are necessarily going to 
go on to maltreat their children again.  
The sense from workers with a negative understanding of their restricted 
autonomy is that the risk assessment itself is not a fair tool either because it lacks 
nuance, is not accurate, or too closely ties the past to the future. Without the belief 
that the risk assessment effectively measures the risk for future harm, accurately 
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defines the severity of the current case, and then properly metes out punishment or 
corrective actions in response; workers cannot experience their restricted decision-
making in anything but negative terms. In this way, how workers understand the 
SDM to function on the ground influences how a worker responds to structured 
decision-making, which in turn, affects how she makes meaning of her decisions.  
Like their autonomous colleagues negatively restricted workers articulated 
concerns about the predictive validity of the risk assessment that are shared by 
researchers.  Gambrill and Shlonsky (2000) note that in the development of actuarial 
risk assessments the factors intended to be predictive of the likelihood for future 
maltreatment may not be reliable or valid or particularly sensitive. A validation 
study of a risk assessment used by Minnesota raised questions about the ability of 
the assessment to clearly distinguish between low and high risk cases (Loman & 
Siegel, 2004). Workers insight into the limitations of the risk assessment informs 
the larger theoretical debates about their validity, sensitivity, and reliability.   
 By design; a worker in State A is allowed to initiate an override to raise a 
risk level they deem to be too low but is not permitted to lower a risk level they 
believe to be too high or unreflective of the actual risk. Because case categorizations 
are tied to the risk level, mitigations for the risk of future harm do not have a place 
to be captured in the formal protective services assessment process.  
Positively Restricted: Re-Defining the Meaning of Being a Professional:  
Some workers with a limited sense of discretion do not feel that restrictions 
on their professional judgment are inherently problematic (13 out of 24). I refer to 
these workers as positively restricted. Positively restricted workers frame these 
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limitations to be both important and necessary to carry out the work they do well.  
LaTonya explains why such restrictions are valuable:  
We don't choose the categories so, and that's the good thing because I know 
some people think that "Oh, she didn't like me, so she did this."  And, 
actually its computer generated.  Like, so we don't set it. It's based off of 
their risks and the allegation so it's not based off of our own personal 
feelings um, so as far as if we set it at a higher level or not, it's really based 
off of the risk to the children and the family.  (African-American, Female) 
LaTonya echoes the language of evidence-based practice to make a case for the 
SDM being necessary to eliminate potential sources of subjectivity and bias that 
stem from "personal feelings." By having the responsibility for certain case decisions 
(such as the selection of the case category) taken out of her hands, LaTonya feels 
more credible in her position. LaTonya can assure clients and herself that her 
decisions are professional rather than personal, that they are based on objective 
evidence about risk for abuse and neglect rather than her own interpretation of how 
a family is doing. Keisha's description of how she completes the risk assessment 
makes a similar point:  
I can have parents that are totally assholes and didn't even want to 
cooperate with me; I still take that same 30 minutes to 2 hours sitting there, 
doing that risk assessment because they're just mad because I'm out there.  
They just mad because I'm in their life.  But does that mean that you know 
they doing this, really, to this child?  I don't base it on none of that. 
(African-American, Female) 
Keisha underscores her commitment to fairness and objectivity by explaining how 
she approaches the risk assessment with challenging caregivers.  Keisha trusts the 
risk assessment to offer an accurate view of the family's risk level and service needs, 
so she makes sure to fill it out carefully no matter how the family has treated her 
during the course of the investigation. In doing so, Keisha defines her 
professionalism in terms of how precisely she handles the SDM. Keisha understands 
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that the risk assessment carries with it an enormous power in the investigative 
process for determining the trajectories of cases. She told me that 
 "My risk assessment, 9 times out of 10, is gonna be the most accurate out 
of my whole report... I don't play with that. That's serious. That's someone's 
life.  That can mess up somebody for the rest of their life." Because Keisha 
views the risk assessment positively, she organizes her case decision-making 
around it, which in turn, is aligned with agency policy. 
Positively restricted workers often frame their professional role in terms of being 
able to execute policy properly rather than impose their own judgments and 
opinions on a family. Explaining how she approaches her investigation, Gabrielle 
frames her professionalism in terms of her ability to evaluate a case without 
imposing her own clinical judgment on the situation at hand:  
If there's a bruise we don't say that that bruise is inappropriate, we say "go 
to the doctor and get evaluated" and that doctor makes a decision. So I 
never go in and say what I think. I say I'm gonna take a picture of this 
home, look at it with my supervisor and we'll determine... Basically I talk 
about policy. There's a policy for everything, so I know the policy, I have 
the policy and I basically read them the policy. This is not [Gabrielle] this 
is the policy that states that if we find this, then this has to be taken care of. 
If I feel like the house is not up to my standards I don't judge it, I go by 
policy. If policy says you know, if there’s feces on the floor or wires hanging 
or no water, then that's what I deal with. I could care less if it's clothes all 
over the floor. Is there a path where you can walk? That's what policy's 
says, so that's my position on it. (African-American, Female). 
Gabrielle not only understands her professional role to be tied to how well she is 
able to know policy and execute it, she actively frames herself as lacking in 
discretion and autonomy when it comes to her cases. For Gabrielle, none of the 
decisions she makes come organically from her ideas, opinions or evaluation of the 
circumstances of the case. Others verify the evidence (a doctor, her supervisor) in 
accordance with their professional judgment. By making others responsible for the 
decision, Gabrielle redefines her professional role in terms of being an arbiter of 
fairness. Acting only when the policy requires and not before, Gabrielle sees her 
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work as important in that she is able to eliminate a subjective assessment from her 
investigation. In this way, Gabrielle redefines professionalism for an investigator in 
terms of the absence of autonomy and discretion.   
At the heart of each of these constructions is a formulation of professionalism 
that is in conscious opposition to critiques of caseworkers as biased, subjective, and 
out of touch with the evidence that forms the heart of any case decision-making. 
These workers instinctually or purposefully move away from descriptions of work 
practices that might open them to censure for 'not knowing enough' or for being too 
emotional in their casework. The lack of discretion in the work environment 
becomes an asset rather than a liability as workers perform their authority by 
having a clear command of the rules.  Defining a new space within which to engage 
their work these caseworkers refashion not just the meaning of their investigative 
process in the context of the SDM but also their work practices.  Shannon notes that 
she organizes her interviews to make sure that she captures all the information on 
the risk assessments:   
With the risk assessments I do, not all the time, but on most of my cases I 
take the risk assessment and I print out this and I take it out with me and I 
just go over; like I ask parents  questions like deemed towards this.   
Shannon, like Gabrielle makes sure that her work practice aligns perfectly with 
work policy, letting the policy guide how she approaches her investigation, what 
information is the most important to obtain, and how that information is processed. 
Shannon's attention to detail in this area communicates that her performance as a 
competent professional is tied to her incorporation of work policy into her own work 
practices. 
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Other Avenues for Professional Authority 
The workers discussed above all experienced themselves to have limited 
discretion in their work practices and in relationship to case outcomes.  While it 
would be easy to draw the conclusion that these workers had no ability to work in 
ways that reflected their own beliefs and judgments, I find that the picture is much 
more complex than simply 'the SDM restricts workers ability to influence their 
cases.' While the workers above all perceived their options for response to the SDM 
as inflexible, workers in this sample, whether they constructed their restricted 
authority in positive or negative terms, all were ultimately able to maintain some 
measure of professional autonomy when it came to their cases. Discretion did not 
completely disappear but instead found other permissible avenues for expression. 
According to DHS policy, the outcome of the risk assessment does not 
determine whether an accusation of maltreatment is substantiated and a case 
opened, it only establishes the case category. The decision to substantiate a case is 
based on whether a preponderance of evidence exists, a determination that is largely 
left to workers and supervisors to conclude. Workers who felt they had few 
opportunities to influence the trajectory of a case once it was substantiated (read: 
those with a restricted sense of authority) used the 30-day investigative period as 
the site to exercise their own judgment and offer the kind of professional 
intervention they believed were most likely to alter the course of a case. Angela 
explains that she doesn't have any control over the risk assessment and the Case 
Categorization but that she does have control over whether a case opens:  
E:  So then how do you make a decision?   
A: But if we do substantiate it, then it'll come out as like you know.  
Like if I know I'm gonna open the case then it'll come out as like 
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they're gonna be put on the registry even if I don't think they 
should be. 
E: Okay, so you don't have any control over what happens. 
A: Yeah, but if I deny the case... if we open the case...it gives us our 
category. But it really doesn't determine if we're opening them or 
not. (African-American, Female) 
In a moment where she is explaining her lack of discretion, Angela takes care to 
emphasize that there are other spaces in her work where she possesses decision-
making power. Workers' descriptions of how they intervened during the 
investigative period provide insight into how workers who felt their autonomy 
restricted in one area were able to take charge in another. Keisha recounts:  
K:  I had a home that I was supposed to substantiate. I should have. 
The mom had two children; one was developmentally disabled. The 
other child, she never diagnosed him [he was also impaired] but 
she homeschooled him the whole time and he's like 16 to 17. This 
house, literally, I wish I had my phone. I could show you. Trash 
stacked five feet high in the home; every single room. They had it to 
where they couldn't even get into their bedrooms and they had 
made a small path to the bathroom and they were all sleeping on 
the couch in the living room. 
E: So why didn't you substantiate it? 
K:  'Cause where was this child gonna go?  And it was two children in 
the home and that boy was 17. So with my supervisor's permission, 
I stayed in this house for six months. I literally cleaned it up. 
E: Yourself? 
K:  I went and got the dumpster. She stayed in the trailer homes, but 
she had a doublewide trailer 
E: So you kept the investigation open for six... 
K:  To help her clean it.  t took three months to get the trash out of 
there. 
E: And the supervisor didn't know? 
K:  She knew. I communicated with her. But when she was telling me 
that I need to do it, I requested for this to stay open a little longer. 
(African-American, Female) 
By all accounts, there is a clear preponderance of evidence to substantiate the 
mother in this case for physical neglect as the house does not meet the policy for 
being safe nor does it meet the requirement that children have beds to sleep in. 
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Keisha possesses ample reason to conclude her investigation and move forward with 
the case. However, Keisha knows that if she were to fill out the risk assessment at 
this time, the case would likely be categorized as intensive and require a removal as 
indicated by her statement that the children do not have anywhere else to go.  
Keisha clearly does not want the situation to be out of her control and goes 
about fixing the problem before the investigative period concludes. Cleaning the 
place up, Keisha is able to make the situation safe by staging the home so that it does 
not add points to the SDM score before she finalizes the investigation. In this way, 
Keisha exercises an extreme amount of discretion and professional autonomy even 
though she posits that she does not have much control over case trajectories. While 
this is an extreme example (keeping a case open for that amount of time is in no way 
normative), Keisha's actions highlight the creative ways that investigators who 
understand their autonomy to be limited can influence the trajectory of their cases.  
Gabrielle explains how this process can work in a less extreme way:  
People, you'll find have their own judgments come in to play when they go 
to people's homes. So that's why I focus on the policy... You could have feces 
all over the floor if you want to, you know, I mean it shouldn't be like that 
bad, but I mean they there's no need for removal, in that case. All you do is 
give the family a few days to clean it up, that's it. (African-American, 
Female)   
During the investigative period, Gabrielle offers families a chance to change the 
conditions of the complaint.  If a family has cleaned up the house by the end of the 
investigative period, Gabrielle will have a clear rationale to deny cases that could be 
classified as high risk if they were opened.  
The decision to substantiate a person for child abuse or neglect is a powerful 
one and workers report considering the impact of substantiation on family life when 
making it. Dorothy told me about her decision-making process regarding whether 
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to substantiate a charge of medical neglect against two parents. In this case, a 
cognitively impaired school age child was riding her bike when the back end was 
clipped by the neighbor's car and she fell. The child's therapist heard the story, 
spoke to the parents about her concerns, and then reported them to Child Protective 
Services:  
So she [the therapist] talks to mom.  Why didn't you take her to the 
hospital?  You're medically neglecting your child.  And so mom is like, well 
we used our best decision.  She didn't have any bruises.  The car did not hit 
her, it hit her bike tire and she fell to the ground.  She had a scraped knee.  
We thought it was the equivalent of your child just falling off of her bike, so 
we didn't feel the need to take her [to the hospital]. 
Dorothy went on to explain that during the investigative period she had the child 
examined, with the doctor finding that no serious injuries resulted from the 
accident. The only physical effect was bruising on the child's abdomen. Dorothy 
described her thought process about substantiating this way:  
Like I mean if it was me, personally, if it was my kid, I probably would've 
taken her to the doctor just to be safe, just because...you know what I mean?  
You weren't out there and actually saw what happened.  The neighbor 
walked her home and then you found out.  But listening to both mom and 
dad, you know they did what they thought was right.  And so I just felt like 
there's no reason to open this for medical neglect and tarnish their record 
when they really weren't being malicious about it you know (African-
American, Female).   
Dorothy has enough cause to substantiate for medical neglect but did not feel that 
such an action would be justified based on the parent's good intentions and 
reasoning (that the child had no visible injuries). By choosing not to substantiate, 
Dorothy actively works to protect the parents from any consequences that could 
arise from having a substantiated charge of medical neglect. In this way, Dorothy 
exercises control over the trajectory of her case even though she experiences her 
discretion as relatively hindered in other areas of the process.   
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Like Dorothy, Angela uses the investigative period to influence outcomes for 
cases.  Angela detailed a neglect case that she denied when she also had enough 
evidence to support opening it:  
A:  So when I talked to the mom about her history and things like that, 
she was telling me about her husband being very abusive and she 
left.  He cut the cable wires, he would not let her wear dresses, he 
didn't want her to work.  She was like, you know I left him once 
before, but he threw a vacuum cleaner at my head and hit me in the 
head with it and that was the last straw.  They had had some 
history where the 7-year-old had called the police on  dad for like 
fighting with mom.  So and I said, well is he paying child support?  
She said, no, he told me that I get food stamps and that's my child 
support and that he's not willing to help me out.   
So this mom was going through a lot. I mean she's doing 
the best that she can to provide for her five kids.  She has some of 
the kids in counseling because they weren't coping well with dad 
not being there.  So she's doing everything.  You know what I 
mean?  So I felt really confident about denying that case.  And what 
ended up happening is, I said, what do you need?  You know 
anything that I can help you get?  She's like, well my kids don't 
have beds and they had mattresses on the floor. I got them five new 
beds.  
I was trying to be sure that my supervisor understood why, even 
though yes, the kids don't have coats all the time; okay, yeah maybe 
the food has poor nutrition.  But I'm you know, letting her know 
what's going on; like how this working mom is trying to be a single 
mom and be a good mom and trying her best to...some of these kids 
got poor behavior you know.  Like the 12-year-old was like cursing 
at her.  So...[I was] trying to make sure my supervisor understood 
why I was recommending that it be denied. 
E: Do you remember what the risk level was for that case?   
A:  I think it might have been moderate. (African-American, Female) 
While there was enough cause to open a case against this mother, Angela uses the 
discretion granted her during the investigative period to protect a mother that she 
does not believe deserves to be in the child protective services system because she 
has been a victim of abuse and has "good intentions."  
These examples indicate that discretion and professional autonomy are not 
an all or nothing experience for workers with a more restricted understanding of 
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their decision-making abilities. Debates about the place of practice wisdom, intuitive 
thinking, clinical judgment, and discretion in social work practice tend to frame 
these approaches in opposition to evidence-based practices.  Critics argue that 
"social work has been transformed from a self-regulating professional activity into a 
managed and externally regulated set of tasks" (Evans & Harris, 2004). However, I 
find that the picture is more complicated in practice.  Rather than characterizing 
discretion as  'all or nothing' or 'good or bad,' discretion should be conceptualized as 
taking place on a continuum (Evans & Harris, 2004).  
I have demonstrated that even workers who do not understand themselves to 
have autonomy in their casework still find ways to influence the direction of cases in 
areas that have not prescribed how action can be taken. Conversely, I have also 
found that workers who experience themselves to have a high degree of autonomy 
still follow the actuarial based models, even though they may not use them as 
intended. By conceptualizing discretion on a continuum and by acknowledging that 
workers make case judgments alongside and within protocoled environments, an 
understanding of the utilization of standardized decision-making emerges that 
neither romanticizes the ability of actuarial based risk assessments to eliminate 
subjective assessments in casework nor overly emphasizes the role that discretion 
plays in the context of structured decision-making models.  
Privilege, Power, and Protocols 
Distinct patterns emerge when examining which workers felt that they had 
autonomy over their decision-making and which workers felt more restricted.  
Workers who articulated a strong sense of professional autonomy and discretion 
tended to be white men and/or workers with extensive experience at CPS. In 
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contrast, workers with a restricted sense of professional autonomy and discretion 
tended to be women who are racial and ethnic minorities, men and women of any 
ethnicity who have 0-2 years of experience at CPS, and/or women for whom 
maintaining order is a central part of their work professional identity.  
How are we to understand these patterns in the context of a highly 
structured decision-making environment? These patterns suggest that the 
Structured Decision-Making Model assessments are not neutral objects; rather their 
use is socially situated as well as relationally contingent. An intervention that is 
intended to reduce the impact of individual positionality cannot and does not fully 
blunt the force of social power and privilege issues that are at play in everyday life.  
Sociological research has consistently demonstrated that power and privilege 
mediate and inform approaches to the world. People in positions of power and 
privilege often look at the same situation differently than those in less privileged 
positions. For example, Lareau (2003) finds that social class determines how parents 
approach the project of raising their children with people from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds articulating a strategy of natural growth and parents from middle and 
upper socio-economic engaging in "concerted cultivation" where they actively 
structure their family life to influence achievement. Bell (2014) compares class 
experiences of infertility demonstrating that women of lower socioeconomic status 
want pregnancy to be a natural process compared to women of higher socio-
economic status who engage in technological solutions to achieve pregnancy. In 
each of these examples, social class shapes both the perception of and response to a 
particular phenomenon. Numerous sociological investigations confirm that power 
and privilege in the form or race, gender, class, and sexual orientation inform how 
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specific situations are conceptualized and authored (Allan, 2006; England, 
McClinktock, & Shafer, 2011; Klinenberg, 2003; Martin, 1998; Pugh, 2009). 
A sociological view of power and privilege informs our understanding of 
differential conceptions and uses of the SDM on the ground. While one of the 
primary goals of actuarial based assessments is to even the playing field for both 
workers and families by neutralizing subjective interpretations of specific situations 
through the administration of an objective inventory, my findings raise questions 
about the ability of these assessments to do just that. It is clear that the participants 
in this study each bring their own views of the SDM to bear on their work and that 
these views, in turn, shape how they respond to structured decision-making aids. In 
this way, power and privilege shapes how workers in distinct status groups use 
actuarial decision-making aids differently. 
A Shield or A Sword? 
Autonomous workers tended to use the SDM as a sword through which to 
represent their own views of a case. If the SDM did not reflect their own 
interpretation of the facts of the case, these workers would either reinterpret 
questions on the SDM to change the outcome or "finagle" their response to ensure 
that the official record reflected their personal and professional judgments. 
Autonomous workers possessed some permutation of privilege in the workplace 
whether based on race, gender, or seniority or some combination of these social 
categories. Workers who possessed more institutional or cultural power found 
maintaining their autonomy and discretion to be a particularly salient aspect of 
preserving meaning in their professional work. As Espeland (1997) in a review of 
Porter's Trust in Numbers writes: "Savvy bureaucrats know that even when 
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decisions are obvious, it is often far better to send superiors a range of plans to 
choose from since displays of discretion are as important as symbols of power as 
they are symptoms of power” (Espeland, 1997).  Here, the display of discretion and 
options is not necessarily for the benefit of a bureaucratic supervisor but for the 
worker himself. Men in the field of social work are often underrepresented and the 
lack of prestige that is attached to the position may make demonstrations of 
authority more important in a field where masculinity, intelligence, and expertise 
are questioned.   
 The performance of discretion is also the performance of authority. It may 
be that autonomous workers not only felt more entitled to exercise their judgment 
but that they were the only group that felt entitled to make a judgment at all. 
Workers in this group tended to frame subverting the findings of the SDM as the 
only moral choice given the high stakes nature of their work.  Opposition to the 
SDM, in cases, they believed the SDM to be incorrect was presented as the ethical 
thing to do. Workers with either high levels of experience or those who were men 
trusted their judgments to begin with and did not feel that they needed the 
assistance of a tool, particularly one that they did not trust. These findings confirm 
tropes of gender in the workplace, namely that men feel more entitled to make 
decisions and pursue autonomous practices. In this case, those workers that felt 
more entitled to having an opinion were more likely to rely on their gut or intuitive 
reasoning than workers who occupied positions of lower social status, particularly 
were gender was concerned.  
Many workers who reported having a limited sense of professional autonomy 
and discretion used the SDM as a shield for their decisions.  Positively restricted 
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workers described feeling that the SDM provided a framework from which to make 
objective judgments that protected the families they were evaluating from their own 
personal biases. Because the SDM was based in scientific fact, these workers saw the 
SDM as providing cover from the enormous responsibility that comes with making 
decisions about whether children are safe to remain in their homes or whether they 
must be removed. The SDM and a more limited sense of professional autonomy also 
protect workers from experiencing the profound consequences of being "wrong.”  
Encouraged to both minimize contact with the legal system as well as make 
accurate assessments of risk that err on the side of caution, child welfare workers 
face frequent, countervailing pressures as they formulate their recommendations for 
families. It is no surprise then that more inexperienced workers (workers with less 
than two years experience) might place an enormous amount of faith in the SDM or 
be more accepting of the limits that following a standardized protocol places on 
their decision-making capacities. This is one way to understand why the only white 
man in my sample embraced the SDM, as he had less than one-year experience on 
the job.  In this case, being a new worker might be a more salient than identification 
with a more powerful group based on race and gender.   
More inexperienced workers, or workers who were in less powerful social 
positions based on race and gender, also used the SDM as a shield when challenging 
decisions that supervisors made and with which they disagreed. Restricted workers 
often used the SDM to advocate for the closure of a case that they believed was 
being kept open unfairly. The SDM provided a space through which they could 
challenge a case's trajectory without necessarily directly challenging their 
supervisor’s expertise or judgment. Often this was a successful strategy that not 
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only facilitated the changes that a worker had desired but preserved the sense that a 
worker was cooperative rather than "difficult"--a label that proves particularly 
threatening to a workers professional trajectory in a highly bureaucratic 
organization.    
Racial and ethnic minorities may have been more likely to follow the SDM or 
see the SDM as a positive tool because they have either experienced bias themselves, 
which was detrimental in many aspects of their personal lives or because they saw 
the SDM as protecting them against accusations of bias or unprofessionalism.  
Aware of the role that bias can play in decision-making, racial and ethnic minorities 
might be more willing to accept the trade off of more limited professional discretion 
and authority for a system that they may have viewed as more fair or just and which 
they hoped would protect themselves and their clients from discrimination, 
ignorance, or bias.  
  Or racial and ethnic minorities might understand the SDM and the more 
limited sense of professional autonomy that accompanies its use as important to 
follow because their work and decision-making was more likely to be scrutinized 
and questioned. Racial and ethnic minorities must find a way to continually 
demonstrate their capacity and professionalism when their abilities might presumed 
to be less than other workers. Closely adhering to the SDM and other departmental 
policy is a formal and routinized way to display one's competence and 
professionalism in a manner that is difficult to dispute. Racial and ethnic minorities 
that disagree with the SDM or do not see it as a valid and reliable professional tool 
might be more willing to accept the limitations on their professional autonomy and 
discretion because they either feel more closely examined in the workplace or 
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because they believe that they have more to loose than other workers who feel more 
comfortable with answering the SDM in a way that reflects decisions that they have 
already made. Whichever the case, following protocols and policy was a deeply 
salient part of the experience of being a CPS worker for this group. 
 
Incorporating Reflective Practices Into Standardized Assessments 
As this paper demonstrates, even within a highly structured and 
standardized environment there exists a wide range of responses to and utilization 
of an actuarial based risk-assessment. How agentic a worker feels in her professional 
role combined with a worker's stance on the validity of the SDM, impacts how she 
will integrate the model into her actual decision-making. Workers, who understand 
themselves to have professional authority and discretion, report making the risk 
assessment fit their case decision-making rather than basing their case decision-
making off of the risk assessment.  These workers are able to satisfy the formal 
requirements of state policy without actually utilizing the intervention.  
Restricted workers take special care to complete the SDM as intended but 
even within this group there is no uniform opinion about whether the SDM is 
effective, valid, reliable, and fair.  While restricted workers attempt to engage with 
the intervention in the "right" way, the intervention itself may not be able to 
completely control for workers subjective ideas about the case either. First, the same 
subjective processes that workers with discretion employ to alter the outcome of the 
SDM might be occurring here as well but without conscious intent. Second, workers 
in this category deploy other strategies for maintaining autonomy in their casework, 
such as using the investigative period to affect outcomes that become obscured when 
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one only looks at how these workers recount they use the SDM in their everyday 
work.  
Thinking about how the intersection of years of experience, race, and gender 
influences workers' response to the SDM invites a deeper exploration of the 
meaning of cultural processes in Implementation Science. When researchers and 
practitioners call for changes in workplace culture to ensure that interventions are 
effective, we need to think more explicitly and more carefully about the meaning of 
cultural change.  Whose cultures are we changing? Whose viewpoints are we 
privileging? Which ideas and from which workers are we bringing to the forefront? 
Which normative frameworks are being called into action and which are being left 
behind? Unpacking the construction of interventions is a key and often overlooked 
task in policy, model development, and evaluation research. Yet, the normative 
frameworks on which interventions are constructed and how they are then 
responded to are likely critical factors in how an intervention is performed, 
integrated, or received by the population at which it is aimed.  
Here, power plays a very real role in the construction, adoption, and 
deployment of an evidence-based intervention. In the data presented above, workers 
who occupy what have been traditionally more marginalized positions in society are 
the ones attempting to ensure that their work has "high fidelity" to the SDM model, 
while workers in more privileged positions consciously choose to subvert it. 
However, it remains unclear whether workers who occupy more marginalized 
positions would act in similar ways to their colleagues if they felt that they had the 
power to do so.  Therefore, it is not evident that simply changing the culture of 
more experienced workers and making them act more like less experienced ones 
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would really be sufficient to improve implementation of the SDM, especially given 
that one of the issues at play is workers belief in the utility of the intervention itself. 
In this way, cultural, individual, and intervention related factors collide in messy 
ways to challenge traditional thinking about the implementation of interventions.  
These findings suggest that workers’ positionality, social standing, cultural location, 
and individual subjectivity cannot entirely be eliminated from practice innovations 
meant to contain them.  
At the same time, these findings emphasize how important cultural factors 
are in the deployment and experience of interventions. Social demographics, years of 
experience, power, and attitudes about work clearly shape individual responses to 
the SDM, patterning both attitudes about effectiveness and how workers apply the 
SDM to their decision-making. Normative frameworks about what work means, 
what being a professional means, what it means to be a "good employee," what it 
means to be fair, and what is safe for a child, all play out in relationship to how 
workers choose to approach the SDM. While the SDM was developed, in part, to 
respond to how diverse ideas are about each of these concepts, it is not wholly 
successful in being able to always control for, objectify, or flatten workers individual 
views on these ideas. Subjective assessments, which were, in part, rooted in cultural 
locations were always present in workers application of the evidence to the risk 
assessment.  
 Common suggestions to improve the implementation of interventions such 
as changing the culture of the office to increase compliance with the SDM; creating 
a highly structured environment within which the SDM is deployed (as State A has 
already done); introducing implementation strategies to improve individual 
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performance such as more detailed education about how to perform a model; or 
increasing oversight to improve model fidelity are unlikely to be effective strategies 
when there are such a diversity of approaches to the SDM. Individual ideas, 
locations, and subjectivities produce strong viewpoints that impact an intervention's 
implementation and which must be addressed when there is a large gap between 
how an intervention is intended to be performed and how it is being performed in 
practice.  
Introducing opportunities for workers to reflect on how their own 
viewpoints intersect or challenge the findings of the SDM might be a more 
successful strategy. Dealing directly with the unconscious or conscious beliefs that 
every individual has about cases in the general and in the specific, creates a space for 
actively engaging what workers now either find a way to subvert or ignore. Instead 
of assuming that we can develop new and better methods for eliminating subjective 
assessments and processes, we should assume that subjective assessments and 
processes are not only an essential component of human experience and interaction 
but an important part of what many more experienced workers understand to be a 
central part of what makes them seasoned professionals. Rather than engaging in a 
tug of war between control and subversion of these subjectivities, it makes more 
sense to engage them openly on the assumption that they are in fact ineliminable.   
Throughout my fieldwork I find many examples of instances where workers 
employ their subjective assessment to combat what seem like illogical decisions 
made in a rote or punitive systematic context. Simultaneously, I observed other 
examples were workers decisions to act outside policy based on their subjective 
assessment of a case were simply quite terrifying to me. A catch all approach that 
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conceptualizes subjectivity and discretion in decision-making in binary terms (bad or 
good) misses three key points (1) that discretion can be a positive or negative 
practice depending on the case, the worker, and the organizational environment; (2) 
policies that attempt to either limit or encourage discretion must be effective for the 
full spectrum of workers from the most inexperienced and unsophisticated to the 
most practiced and wise; and (3) even in a highly structured and protocoled work 
environment, workers find a way to maintain some level of authority and discretion 
in their casework. Power struggles about how much of workers ideas or knowledge 
can play a role in decision-making are likely to have a Wile E. Coyote and Road 
Runner feel to them--an endless chase where the terms may change but the outcome 
stays relatively similar, if not the same.   
These power struggles echo epistemological debates about whether social 
work is an art or a science continuously play out with little resolution. It is clear 
that evidence-based practice and more standardized policies and procedures are here 
to stay. However, more standardized procedures do not have to mean, as it does 
now, that reflective practices, clinical judgments and assessments need to be left by 
the wayside.    
Reflective practices could be incorporated into State A’s current Child 
Protective Service policy by requiring a narrative response to the risk assessment by 
workers; review and discussion of each case with an experienced clinician; and 
opportunities to raise or lower the risk assessment after thorough case conferences. 
These actions would create a system to address, upfront; cases were there is a 
tension between the formal policy and workers findings. Airing these differences in 
the open and then actively engaging them in the context of a layered or team review 
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creates a system for taking seriously and being respectful of the professional 
autonomy and training of CPS workers. Actively seeking worker's thoughts about a 
case is likely to spur a more honest and open conversation among all workers and 
could do much to even out some of the power differentials based on worker 
positionality described in this chapter.  
At the same time, incorporating reflective practices as a part of standardized 
work will be useful to the entire spectrum of workers that CPS employs. Clinical 
case reviews and reflective narratives both enable the most sophisticated workers to 
challenge policy that does not make sense for a specific case while also having the 
potential to catch subversions of policy that are based on strong transference or 
countertransference of the worker and which are likely inappropriate given the facts 
of the case.   
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Chapter 3  
The Goldilocks Problem: The Local Context of 
Standardization 
 
“On the ground, every standard is simultaneously over determined and incomplete.” 
      Timmermans and Epstein, 2010 
Introduction 
In the last decade, Evidence-Based Practice (EBP) has become the new 
paradigm for social work research, practice, and education in the United States 
(Adams, Matto, & LeCroy, 2009; E. Gambrill, 1999, 2001; Eileen Gambrill, 2010).  
Derived from the Evidence-Based Medicine movement (EBM) and paralleling 
similar movements in psychology, education, nursing, and criminal justice, EBP 
seeks to offer a systematic and empirical way for making decisions about which 
treatments and interventions to use with social work clients (Eddy, 2005). The goals 
of the Evidence-Based Practice Movement are to ground social work practice in 
empirically tested interventions, to standardize a framework for selecting 
interventions, to “demonstrate [e] that treatment decisions are transparent and 
justifiable,” and to provide evidence of the cost effectiveness of interventions 
(Gambrill, 2006,). Embedded within these goals is the idea that an intervention can 
and should be standardized across contexts. While debates about the epistemology, 
goals, use, and merits of EBP in Social Work abound, these debates tend to focus on 
whether systematized ways of knowing should trump practice-based wisdom or 
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clinical and professional judgment (Atherton, 1993; Brekke, 1986; Fischer, 1973; 
Franklin, 1995; Fraser, Taylor, Jackson, & Ojack, 1991; E. Gambrill, 1999, 2001; E. 
D. Gambrill, 2002; Gibbs & Gambrill, 2002; Ivanoff, Blythe, & Briar, 1987; 
Longhofer & Floersch, 2012; Peile, 1988; Staller, 2006; Thyer, 1994; Wakefield & 
Kirk, 1996; Witkin, 1996; Witkin & Harrison, 2001) or on the limitations and 
complications that accompany the implementation and translation of Evidence-
Based Practice in real world settings (Adams, et al., 2009; Ammerman, Smith, & 
Calancie, 2014; Berger, 2010; Bergstrom, 2008; Brekke, Ell, & Palinkas, 2007; 
Chorpita, Becker, & Daleiden, 2007; Flanagan, 2013; Green, 2006; Longhofer & 
Floersch, 2012; Mullen, 2014; Palinkas & Soydan, 2012; Parsonson, 2012). 
Whether framed within ideological or practical terms, discussions about the 
utility of standardized work products often accept the premise that these products 
actually do create uniformity in work practices. The assumption of standardization 
granted, disagreement centers on whether uniformity facilitates or impedes good 
work, whether standardization is a value neutral or value laden process that can lead 
to objective results, and how standardization could be improved to create ‘better 
fidelity to the model’ on the ground. While these are important debates, this line of 
intellectual inquiry elides a more basic question: Can we expect standardized tools to 
function as intended across practice settings?    
 This paper examines the deployment of a standardized procedure in two 
different states to investigate whether a standardized tool for child welfare decision-
making equalizes performance across contexts. Demonstrating that the local policy 
and administrative context of each state structures the meaning and use of the tool 
by child welfare workers, I argue that standardization is both a social and a technical 
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process. This work contributes to a growing literature in implementation science 
that calls for contextual concerns to be a primary part of translational science and 
challenges the idea that simply engaging in better training of a particular model will 
necessarily improve the deployment of an intervention. The predominance of 
standardized interventions as a paradigm for social work intervention at both a 
policy and practice level makes an investigation of whether standardized practices 
actually create practice uniformity across settings both necessary and timely.    
In this paper, I briefly contextualize the Structured Decision-Making model 
within the Evidence-Based Practice movement. I then problematize the assumption 
that standardization is a technical process and that lack of fidelity to a model can be 
addressed only through training and education. Following this, I describe the 
research study and findings. This paper concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of this research for the diffusion of interventions and for pursuing 
adaptive vs. restrictive implementation strategies. 
Evidence-Based Practice and The Structured Decision-Making Model 
The belief that social work interventions must be based on empirically 
validated outcomes is widely accepted. Delivering efficacious treatment is a social 
work value embodied within the professional code of ethics calling for social workers 
to “base practice on recognized knowledge, including empirically based knowledge.” 
(NASW 1999, sec. 4.01.c). The accreditation body for social work education now 
requires programs to train their students in evidence-based practices.  
Clearinghouses such as the such as the National Registry of Evidence-Based 
Practices and Programs (NREPP, 2007; the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration) have emerged to assist practitioners in utilizing validated 
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interventions, while national funding streams for research emphasize the 
development and translation of empirically based interventions in all aspects of the 
funding process (Adams, et al., 2009). Not only is EBP considered a critical part of 
good social work practice and the gold standard for research but the converse is also 
true: social work interventions that are not evidence-based are understood to be 
“bad practice.” With this understanding, policy-making bodies have begun to link 
social service provision to Evidence-Based Practices with many states mandating 
that all state funded interventions be grounded in this model.  
The Structured Decision-Making Model (SDM) is one evidence-based 
practice intervention that has proliferated in the last decade as social work has taken 
a turn toward empirically tested practices. Currently in use in over 30 states, the 
SDM is designed to address issues in decision-making among child welfare workers.  
Research has consistently demonstrated that child welfare decisions are extremely 
variable, even when workers are considering the same set of facts (Davidson-Arad & 
Benbenishty, 2010; Lindsey, 1992; Rossi, Schuerman, & Budde, 1999). Developed by 
the Children’s Research Center, the Structured Decision-Making Model is intended 
to eliminate some of the most glaring difficulties in inconsistent decision-making 
such as subjectivity, bias, and the lack of stable criteria for case evaluations. Built 
around a series of assessments including an intake assessment, a safety assessment, a 
risk assessment and reassessment, a family strengths and needs assessment, a child 
strengths and needs assessment, and a family reunification assessment, the SDM 
delineates the key decision-points in the life of a child welfare case into a discrete set 
of manageable tasks.  Grounded in actuarial science, the SDM guides decision-
making through probabilistic appraisals based on the presence (or absence) of a 
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series of well-validated risk factors. In doing so, the SDM transforms decision-
making in child welfare from a relatively personal process to a systems-level task.  
Further, the SDM seeks to reduce the racial disproportionality that comprises and 
compromises the child welfare system by creating consistent evaluations of families 
using empirically validated criteria. If each measure applies equally to every family 
no matter what their race, class, or ethnic background, then the assumption is that 
families will be evaluated fairly and racial and ethnic disproportionality in the child 
welfare system that result from unfair evaluations will be decreased. The core 
principles of the SDM are: (1) reliability; (2) validity; (3) equity; and (4) utility. The 
table below details these principles as the developers describe: 
Reliability: SDM assessments systematically focus on the critical 
decision points in the life of a case, increasing worker consistency in 
assessment and case planning. Clients are assessed more objectively, and 
decision-making is guided by facts rather than individual judgment.   
 
Validity:  The actuarial research-based risk assessment, which 
accurately classifies families and clients according to the likelihood of 
subsequent outcomes, enables agencies to target services to clients at highest 
risks for negative outcomes, such as maltreatment recurrence or difficulty 
finding and maintaining employment.  
 
Equity:  SDM assessments ensure that critical case characteristics, 
risk factors, and domains of functioning are assessed for every client, every 
time, regardless of social differences.  Detailed definitions for assessment 
items increase the likelihood that workers assess all clients using a common 
framework.  
 
Utility:  The SDM model and its assessments are easy to use and 
understand. Assessments are designed to focus on critical characteristics that 
are necessary and relevant to a specific decision point in the life of a case. By 
focusing on critical case characteristics, workers are able to organize 
information gathering and case narratives in a meaningful way. Additionally, 
the assessments facilitate communication between worker and supervisor, 
and unit to unit of the status of each case. 
(http://www.nccdglobal.org/assessment/structured-decision-making-sdm-
model) 
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  Embedded within every principle of the SDM is the concept of 
standardization. By unifying each aspect of the decision-making process around a set 
of common criteria or actions, the SDM enables decision-making to be done at two 
levels: (1) across workers with different sets of experiences and training and (2) 
across policy environments. The Children’s Research Center unequivocally states 
the overall benefits to a standardized approach, claiming that the SDM is not only 
the most accurate form of assessment available in child welfare but also a system 
that will improve child welfare outcomes across a number of dimensions.  
In this article, I argue that the Structured Decision-Making model is not 
only sensitive to organizational contexts but that the organizational context in 
which it is deployed also structures the SDM’s meaning and use. Rather than 
standardizing work practices across all child welfare workers and policy 
environments, how workers understand and then utilize the SDM reflects a variety 
of organizational factors and orientations. As a practice technology, the significance 
of the SDM becomes socially created in every setting in which it is implemented. In 
turn, how professionals manage their own subjectivity in the face of new tools like 
the SDM becomes highly dependent on the meaning these tools possess in a specific 
environment. By unpacking how informal variation in standardized work practices 
occurs at the organizational level, this paper frames standardization as adaptive 
rather than technical work (Dixon-Woods, Bosk, Aveling, Goeschel, & Pronovost, 
2011). In doing so, I argue that the process of standardization itself is in no way 
standard. 
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Methods  
Sample 
The data for the present study originates from over 150 hours of semi-
structured, qualitative interviews with 66 Child Protective Service Workers (CPS), 
in two states. Interviewees were identified in multiple ways. First, I recruited an 
initial sample through 3 continuing education trainings for child welfare workers 
held at a school of social work. At these trainings, I introduced myself, described the 
study and passed around a sign-up sheet for study volunteers. I then scheduled and 
conducted interviews with those who indicated interest. Additionally, area directors 
introduced my research to their staffs and passed around a sign-up sheet at several 
staff meetings. Following a similar procedure, I contacted volunteers and scheduled 
interviews with those who demonstrated interest. At these area offices, I also 
recruited participants using a snowball sample as other CPS workers heard about 
the study from colleagues and asked to join. Participants in State A were offered a 
$25 Visa gift card to compensate them for their time while state regulations in State 
B prohibited me from offering an interview incentive. States have been de-identified 
to protect participant confidentiality. 
Participants 
Interviewees ranged in age from 24-62. Participants were comprised of 50 
women, and 16 men. Workers interviewed had a variety of experience. 16 had 
worked in their current position less than 2 years, 11worked in their current 
position between 2-5 years, 7 worked in their current position between 5-8 years, 
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and 26 had over 8 years of experience. 6 participants declined to note their years of 
experience on a survey.  Workers had a variety of educational experiences. 34 had 
received a Bachelors degree, 21 held a Masters in Social Work, 7 held a 
postgraduate degree in a field other than social work, and 4 declined to note their 
degree. Fields of specialization ranged from criminal justice, to psychology, to 
sociology, to social work, with the latter representing the majority of the sample. 
Participants were front line Child Protective Service workers tasked with either 
making decisions either about substantiation and severity of child maltreatment 
(Investigators) or, in the case of substantiated cases whether a family was complying 
with treatment and recommended services (Treatment Workers) or Supervisors 
who oversaw the decision-making of front line workers.  The sample was almost 
evenly split between workers based in State A (35 out of 66) and State B (31 out of 
66). 
Interview Content 
The interview protocol for this study was designed to assess participants 
conceptions about their work and how they translated these conceptions into every 
day work routines (Charmaz, 2006). Semi-structured and open-ended, the protocol 
begins with a discussion about how workers go through their day. I began the 
interview by asking how the participant came to child welfare work. Following this 
initial discussion, I asked participants "to walk me through" the process in a neglect 
case from the time they received it to when they transferred or closed it or in the 
case of supervisors “to walk me through how they supervise a case from the time a 
worker receives it until a disposition has been made"(Weiss, 1995). I collected 
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information on recent cases, challenging cases, and cases where workers felt 
confident in their decision-making. These questions allowed me to collect 
information on what workers 'typically' did and why as well as how their actions 
unfolded in relationship to each case they described. These descriptions gave me a 
framework for understanding what the everyday work routines were for individual 
workers in aggregate and how these routines varied based on the specifics of 
individual cases.  
After collecting these accounts, I then asked workers directly about the 
Structured Decision-Making (SDM) tools (if they had not yet mentioned them at 
other points in the interview). These questions were also procedural in nature. I 
wanted to know the how not the why or what during this part of the conversation. 
To ground our discussion in fact, I generally asked workers to walk me through the 
Safety, Risk, or Reunification Assessments for the cases they described. As they did 
so, I was able to collect data on how workers used the Structured Decision-Making 
model in practice. After getting the how, I asked about the why, which enabled me 
to collect data on workers attitudes and beliefs about the SDM as well as the weight 
they gave them in their decision-making.  
Throughout the interview, I followed up every question with probes specific 
to the conversation. Common probes focused around further elucidating the logic at 
decision-making points and case detail. Interviews ranged from 60-180 minutes with 
a median interview time of 90-100 minutes. Interviews were audio taped and 
transcribed. I conducted interviews at neutral locations such as local libraries and a 
community center with offices available for sign-out. Interviews also took place in 
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an available room at area Child Protective Service offices. All names of offices, 
agencies, and people are pseudonyms . 
Data Analysis 
In keeping with grounded theory, I began data analysis at the same time that 
I was collecting data. (Charmaz, 2006). Using an open coding strategy and aided by 
NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software, I coded interviews without a particular 
schema to see what themes emerged (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). I developed 
concepts and categories reflecting recurring themes in the data and then made sense 
of how these concepts and categories connected across interviews. After initial open 
coding, two Research Assistants analyzed the data deductively based on the themes 
and categories I initially identified. The data presented below represents larger 
themes found in the data, except where noted. Quotes from the data are edited for 
clarity (e.g. repeated "Ums" removed), but no words have been changed or re-
ordered. 
Why Compare States?  
State Aand State B offer ideal sites for investigating whether a standardized 
process achieves a standardizing function.  Currently, State A's legislature mandates 
the use of the Structured Decision-Making Model for child welfare decision-making 
in all casework. In addition to the SDM, State A has adopted a category system 
where Child Protective Service workers are required to rank a case based on level of 
severity. The ranking system further standardizes caseworker action and discretion 
by specifying the specific protocols that follow each ranking. ⁠1 Case categories are 
explicitly linked to the risk assessment (RA) with scores on the RA determining the 
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category a case is assigned. In contrast, while State B does use the SDM model to 
guide decision-making, the state legislature has not mandated its use. Rather, state 
child welfare policy incorporates the SDM into the decision-making process without 
explicitly requiring decisions to be tied to it. Comparing the utilization of the SDM 
in State A’s tightly controlled decision-making environment to State B’s fairly open 
system for determining case actions allows for a deeper investigation into how 
standardized processes unfold on the ground. Taken together, these differences 
create rich sources for analysis of how and when standardized processes interact 
with organizational and policy differences.  
The SDM in State A: A Formula for Decision-Making 
State A Child Welfare Policy 
Structured Decision-Making in State A intends to standardize all points in 
the child welfare process, establishing the context for a tightly controlled decision-
making environment. Mandated for use in child welfare decision-making by the 
state legislature, the SDM is the method by which Child Protective Service (CPS) 
arrive at their decision. The legislature’s codification of the SDM from a suggested 
practice into law can be understood as an example of the tight integration of EBP 
with policy in order to transform practice. Policymakers demand that actions taken 
by bureaucrats be sanctioned by scientific evidence and to which state agencies can 
be held accountable. The SDM answers that call.   
State A has further formalized child welfare decision-making by adopting a 
category system for classifying child abuse and neglect cases. Rankings standardize 
caseworker action by assigning specific protocols to each category, which are 
outlined in the chart below:  
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State A Child Protective Services Category System 
Category V  Following a field investigation, the department determines 
that there is no evidence of child maltreatment or is unable 
to locate the family. No action taken. 
Category IV  Cases where there is no preponderance of evidence that 
neglect or abuse has occurred. If the risk assessment 
demonstrates any risk Voluntary Community Services 
are Recommended. 
Category III  A preponderance of evidence that child maltreatment has 
occurred. The risk assessment scores as low or moderate. If 
the family does not voluntarily participate in services or 
does not progress CPS may reclassify as a Category II. 
Community Services are Needed. 
Category II  A preponderance of evidence that abuse or neglect has 
occurred. There is a high level of risk for future harm as 
indicated by the risk assessment.  The perpetrator is listed 
on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect.  Child 
Protective Services are Required in Conjunction with 
Community Services. 
Category I  A preponderance of evidence that child maltreatment has 
occurred with the risk assessment scoring as high or 
intensive. Child Protective Services determine that a court 
petition is either needed or required. Perpetrator is listed 
on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect. CPS 
petitions for the immediate removal of 
child(ren).Services Provided by Child Protective 
Services or Foster Care in Conjunction with 
Community Services.  
  
Working within this framework, professional autonomy becomes more limited as 
child welfare workers follow precise directives for case actions according to the 
assigned category. To determine the category for a case two things are required: (1) 
a preponderance of evidence (a 51% chance or more that child abuse or neglect has 
transpired) and (2) the risk level which is established by the score on risk 
assessment, a component of the SDM. This policy in and of itself requires the SDM 
to be a critical part of the investigative process and grants the risk assessment 
formal decision-making power for how a case will unfold.  
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A Formula For Decision-Making 
 Workers in State A consistently reported that the SDM does indeed drive 
formal and informal decision-making practices. The majority of workers 
(approximately 2/3) described utilizing the risk assessment to establish case actions 
such as whether a child needs to be removed from the home; the level of service 
provision a family requires; whether a caregiver should be placed on the Central 
Registry of Abuse and Neglect; and the level of severity for a particular case.  The 
distinct rules and procedures that link the SDM to case trajectories create an 
organizational environment that makes it difficult for workers to use any other 
method for making case judgments. Early in each interview, I asked child welfare 
workers to describe the general process for neglect cases. A typical account 
discussed the required response time, the people questioned during the course of 
their investigation, and their engagement with the Structured Decision-Making 
model to determine case trajectories. Casey, an investigator characterizes a routine 
neglect investigation this way:  
E: Sure.  So I was wondering if you could tell me, walk me through the 
process in neglect cases from the time the family is referred until 
you dispo the case? 
C:  Okay.  Well they’ll get referred, usually neglect is considered a 
Priority 3 case so we have 24 hours to commence it, which just 
means to find somebody that might have knowledge to whether or 
not the children are in immediate risk or not.  And then you have 72 
hours to make face to face with the children so usually I don’t see 
the kids until the next day.  I usually don’t wait 3 days unless I’m 
super busy. And then after I interview all the... I’ll interview all the 
children and mom and dad or whatever household members there 
are.  And if dad doesn’t live in the house then I have to find dad and 
go interview him.   
And once I’ve interviewed everybody I conduct a risk and safety 
assessment to try and figure out what the needs of the family are 
and what the risk levels are and then we try to address those 
needs.  And as long as they’re not imminent risk we’ll just refer 
them to services, either voluntary if it’s low risk or tell them we’re 
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going to get court involved if you don’t do these things.  And then if 
it’s high risk then we obviously would start filing a petition with 
court proceedings.  
Casey succinctly explains the typical way that a neglect case unfolds. The SDM as 
symbolized by the risk and safety assessment form an ordinary part of Casey’s work 
process and she relies on the SDM to make case judgments, matching the stated 
policy goals to the actions she takes. Debra, another investigator, offers a similar 
perspective: 
Okay.  Yep, like we receive a complaint from out centralized intake unit so if 
we receive it like in the beginning of the day we, depending on what type of 
complaint it is like a P1, P2 or a P3 depends on how quickly we get to 
it.  But typically you are supposed to commence the case or make contact 
with somebody that has knowledge of the wellbeing of the child within 
either 12 to 24 hours.  And then you need to see the child within 24 to 72 
hours face to face.   
So typically, you call the reporting person back, you get as much 
information as you can.  And then if you can’t call like a teacher or someone 
else in the community that knows the child’s wellbeing, you need to go out 
on the case immediately.  Make face to face with the victim; interview 
‘em.  And then you interview the biological parents, any like living together 
partners, relatives that may know information, community members that 
may have contact with teachers, you know counselors things like that may 
have contact with the family.   
And I guess once you interview all those people and kind of get all the 
evidence, medical records, police records things like that, then you make a 
determination whether abuse or neglect occurred.  If there is a 
preponderance of evidence you determine what category it falls into.  Like 
Category 3 is you either open or close with just like a service provider 
referral or you can open it and monitor the case.  Cat 2 is a higher intensity 
risk level where it needs to be monitored by either the original CPS worker 
or ongoing worker and then Cat 1 is where they’d be removed from the 
home and placed into foster care.  Then you dispo your case, you close it out 
depending on what category it is.  It may take a couple of months to close 
out the 2’s and 3’s.  If it’s denial it’s closed out within 30 days and then on to 
the next case.   
In this long account, Debra uses authoritative language to describe the way she 
makes her case decisions e.g. “You determine the category” and it is unclear whether 
the SDM plays any role in shaping the trajectory of a case. In order to assess how 
much weight (if any) Debra gave the SDM in this process, I asked her to walk me 
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through a case where it was difficult to resolve which category to assign.  Debra 
answered not with a detailed description of a specific case but of the risk assessment 
itself:  
But with the risk assessment, it’s pretty much self-explanatory.  When you 
do the risk assessment that determines the category.  Well, it determines 
between a 2 and a 3, I mean 1 is legal involvement and you choose that and 
4 and 5 are denials.  So between 2 and a 3 is the risk assessment determines 
that, so as long as you objectively answer the questions that the risk 
assessment is asking you, when you answer ‘em, then I usually don’t 
question what the risk assessment says.  
The active decision-making process that Debra describes is in fact a rather technical 
task: that of filling out a risk assessment and then using that score to render case 
judgments.  The formal and informal narratives for decision-making have merged to 
form Debra’s process. Keisha, also an investigator, exemplifies how formal policy in 
this tightly controlled environment can come to structure not only how workers 
proceed with their case but how they conceptualize it:  
E:  Okay.  When you’re going about making decisions about what 
services to use, what level to substantiate at, sort of what helps you 
figure out what to do? 
K: Our risk assessment does.  It goes on like if there’s disabilities in the 
home; and that’s including the kids and the mom; previous CPS 
involvement including Mom ‘cause it could’ve been that Mom was a 
product of CPS when she was young, which is a high risk.  Because 
if she was used to that then she doesn’t know anything different and 
9 times out of 10 she’s gonna keep that behavior going with her 
own children.  So that’s a major fact.  It all depends on how many 
children are in the home and what’s the ages.  And within those 
ages are any children with any disabilities or anything.  So all of 
that plays a key role.  
Ann offers a similar assessment 
And the safety and the risk I think play a big role.  Because sure they’re 
telling you everything, but it’s not until you really go through and you’re 
like reading because they go like, you know they’re numbered questions, so 
when you're going through you’re like; yep that applies and yeah that 
applies and that applies.  And it’s like okay, this stuff is kind of adding up 
now.  And you know when you're going through the risk because they’re 
asking you about domestic violence and substance abuse and you know past 
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history and discipline; and when you’re going through there you’re like; 
yeah the child said that, and oh yeah, the child said that; and you know mom 
admitted to previous DV.  So as you’re going through there again, it helps 
you really put things into perspective of; wow this is a lot more than what I 
had thought or; oh, it’s not quite as bad as what I had thought it was going 
to be.  So I mean those really help you factor in.  
Both Ann and Keisha identify the items on the risk assessment as the major factors 
in their decision-making. Formal policy becomes informal practice as Keisha views 
the items on the risk assessment as not merely probabilistic indicators but as 
determinative behaviors.   
 The Safety Assessment is another place where case thinking becomes 
difficult to separate from formalized case actions.  The designation on the Safety 
Assessment (based on a numerical score of the safety factors present) often acts as a 
proxy for whether there is a preponderance of evidence in a case. As Justine notes, in 
doing so, the Safety Assessment then determines whether a case is opened or closed: 
The safety assessment is, I would say, I don't know, I think it's like 15 
questions I believe and if there's any safety factors present.  If you click, let's 
say it's a denial and you are saying that there's a safety risk or a safety factor 
present, I mean you have to basically, there's usually a preponderance if 
there's a safety factor.  So if there isn't a preponderance, there is no safety 
factor present.  If there is a safety factor present then you have to put like, 
what you are going to do…  
This description of the Safety Assessment is consistent with Debra, Keisha, and 
Ann’s descriptions of the role that the risk assessment plays in decision-making.  
State A’s policies create little room for other formal means for making decisions and 
shape how many workers come to understand the kind of evidence they need to 
evaluate to form a decision about a case.   
More Exclusive Than Mutual: The Role of Clinical Judgment within Actuarial-Based 
Decision-Making 
The Children Research Center’s (the developers of the SDM), assert that the 
SDM should be integrated with investigators’ and caseworkers’ practice wisdom and 
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clinical judgment to reach a final conclusion about the disposition of case.  The 
Children Research Center states that: 
By design, SDM assessments do not MAKE decisions (their emphasis). The 
recommended result of an SDM assessment should be tested against family 
perspective and worker clinical judgment. When all are aligned, the 
direction is clear. When there are differences, the SDM model provides a 
framework for dialogue until there is resolution ("The Structured Decision 
Making Model: An Evidence-based Approach to Human Services," 2008)  
However, State A’s legislative requirements to base child welfare decisions off the 
results of the SDM create a system where both family perspectives and workers’ 
clinical judgments are marginalized in the decision-making process. While the SDM 
model is technically supposed to offer a platform for integrating clinical case 
judgment with the results of the actuarial based assessments, in practice, the formal 
linkage of the risk assessment with the case categories makes it very difficult to 
leave a space for clinical judgment in the formal decision-making process. When 
workers disagree with the score on the risk assessment, they often find that policy 
does not allow a space to incorporate this assessment into the final decision. Angela 
describes just how little room there is for balancing clinical judgment against the 
technical judgment of the SDM:   
Sometimes you just feel bad. That’s all…you just feel bad and you try to 
look…like you try to go over the risk assessment again and see maybe if 
you did something wrong if you clicked on the wrong button. And it’s like I 
don’t…’cause it was a case that I opened for a dad and the mom is the one 
who had this previous history and you know he just married this woman 
and he did give the kid a whipping and they got a bruise; or something like 
that.  And I felt like, “Oh well he’ll be a Category 3 since it’s just him.  But 
even though I did a separate risk assessment for him, they still made him a 
Category 2 because the mom had all this previous history.  And so 
he…[ended up on the Central Registry] 
Notice that Angela redoes the risk assessment to see if she “clicked on the wrong 
button” not because the risk assessment might be incorrect itself. In this way, policy 
can make the risk assessment appear to be infallible. While workers are permitted to 
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raise the risk level in cases where they believe this action to be warranted, they are 
prohibited from lowering it. So even though Angela believes that the father in the 
case does not represent a high risk of being a repeat offender of maltreatment, she 
knows that there is no official avenue to reflect this interpretation of the facts of the 
case. Angela tries to alter the outcome within the rules (by filling out multiple risk 
assessments) but is ultimately unable to change the final disposition of the case. 
Casey describes a similar situation for a case that she would like to simply offer 
services to but where the risk assessment prompts a removal of the children from 
the home: 
And when, you know I looked at the case because of mom’s mental health 
issues, because she has three children and one of, her youngest baby was 
special needs.  She was in a domestic violence victim, she had CPS history as 
a victim; all of these things made her have a high risk and made us have to 
go to the point where we had to file in-home.  But she was completely 
willing to work with services.  She was so happy to have someone to help 
her get out of the domestic violence situation.  To help her get her own 
housing because she’s always relied on her mom or a man and this was her 
first opportunity to support herself and we were helping her and she went 
to counseling and you know, she went with Families First and this was all 
before we filed. And just because her risk assessment was so high; we had to 
file.  
Casey goes on to say that she plans to ask for the court to dismiss this particular 
case but is frustrated by a system that makes it impossible to incorporate the 
nuances of the information captured on the risk assessment into the final decision.  
While the risk assessment accurately captures the presence of domestic violence and 
mental health issues in the family, it does not account for the ways in which the 
client is working to address these areas of concern that might mitigate the risk of 
maltreatment reoccurring. Casey summarizes her concerns about the Structured 
Decision-Making model as it is practiced in State A stating that “…we lose 
discretion, I feel like, by this assessment program.”  The formal policy in State A 
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creates an implementation of the Structured Decision-Making model that does not 
allow for the integration of clinical judgment alongside it. 
The supervision process in State A reinforces the critical role that the SDM 
has in determining the outcome of a case. While the supervision process might be 
the ideal space in which to resolve the kind of conflict that Angela experiences, some 
workers described this space as a place where the authority of the SDM was reified. 
I asked Dorothy directly about what happened in a case where she opposed the 
outcome of the SDM. Dorothy described approaching her supervisor to review her 
concerns:  
What happened with that one is I had asked my supervisor, I said, I 
don’t…”My initial thought was, after doing it [was] I don’t think the risk 
assessment came out right.  I don’t think this case should be opened.  I did 
not want to open it because I didn’t think that mom needed that much help.  
But when we went over it together and she’s like, no, you have to rely on 
your system… 
But she went through and she’s like, no, you answered the questions very 
appropriately and the SWSS [the computer system that administers the 
SDM] did it right.  It needs to open because of all the risk factors there and 
because mom is saying she’s overwhelmed.  She’s telling you she’s 
overwhelmed so something’s there.  You need to open it and help the family 
out.  
In this case, the Supervisor’s message to Dorothy is that the risk assessment has 
more merit than her clinical judgment. This kind of exchange reinforces the idea 
that a worker’s own discretion is of little value and that decision-making in State A 
means being able to accurately document and implement case decisions according to 
the policy.   
However, it is important to note in this example that Dorothy and her 
Supervisor conflate the outcome on the risk assessment with the requirement to 
open or substantiate the case. While the risk assessment is meant to determine the 
case category based on the potential for future maltreatment, it is not supposed to be 
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used to establish the conditions for substantiation as it is used here.  The sense that 
the risk assessment is the most accurate tool for understanding a case not only 
overrides this worker’s judgment but also overrides the official policy itself, 
redefining for everyone (not just the two people described here) what kinds of 
decisions have room for clinical discretion within the context of a structured 
assessment. In this way, a highly structured official policy for decision-making leads 
to an informal culture that may make decision-making even more standardized than 
the original tool intends.  
Out of Sight, Out of Mind:  
 In interviews with participants in State A, the main focus of discussions 
related to the SDM were descriptions of and reflections on the meaning and use of 
the Safety and risk assessments for case trajectories. However, the SDM contains 
multiple components including a Family and Strengths Needs Assessment (FSNA) 
as well as a Childs Strengths and Needs Assessment (CSNA) for cases that have 
been substantiated.  The FSNA structures the service plan for open cases.  
Following a similar format to the risk assessment, The Family Strengths and Needs 
Assessment scores items on a continuum related to family and parental challenges 
such as substance use, parenting skills, social or community support, and household 
relationships. The issues that receive the highest number of points are identified as 
‘priority needs’ and determine which services should form the bulk of the service 
plan. In State A and State B, service plans are required to address the three highest 
scoring categories. The Child Strengths and Needs Assessment (CSNA) follows the 
same model as FSNA. As indicated by the name, this assessment focuses on 
identifying the strengths and needs of the children in the household with the goal of 
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ensuring that no glaring issues related to the children are left unattended such as 
developmental delays, untreated medical conditions, or mental health issues.  
Despite their required use, the majority of participants in State A did not discuss 
these standardized forms unless prompted to do so.  When asked about how they 
were used in decision-making, workers expressed a range of opinions from 
“redundant” or “repetitive” to extremely helpful.  Keisha describes how theses 
components of the SDM can be useful in the decision-making process:  
This is our key of what we’re actually helping them. This is our services.  
That’s how I look at it.  Because whatever the issue is on here, ‘cause it’s 
gonna tell you; it’s gonna pop up; either housing, substance abuse or you 
know parenting or something like that.  It’s gonna show up in plain so you 
know what you have to deal with.  And that helps you when you do the 
FSNA and the CSNA. You also do the services after that ‘cause you know 
where you gonna go and how you’re gonna service them.  
While these tools have formal decision-making power in the sense that they 
structure which serves are prioritized or required for families over others, workers 
generally did not discuss these tools using the same intensity that they reserved for 
the Safety and risk assessment (whatever the valence of their assessment to the 
SDM’s utility). For substantiated cases, the Safety and risk assessment holds formal 
decision-making power over what happens but not formal power over whether 
something will happen (or not). In this way, use of these tools contain much lower 
stakes for both the child welfare workers and the families involved in their use. As 
such, it is likely that they warranted less notice and take up less emotional real 
estate in discussions about participants’ work practices. It makes sense that the tools 
that hold the most weight for decision-making are the ones that are most likely tone 
engaged with by workers at a conceptual, practical, and emotional level.   
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Exceptions to the Rule 
It is important to note that not all workers followed the official policy for 
decision-making in State A. In Same Difference: Standardized Decision-Making in 
Practice (Bosk, In Progress), I demonstrate that a subset of State A workers 
(approximately one-third) reported scoring the SDM tools so they captured a 
decision that they had already made or changing their answers on the SDM to align 
with their case judgment. Workers who had a more flexible approach to the SDM 
and who felt entitled to deviate from the SDM tended to have more social privilege 
in terms of some combination of years or experience, gender, and race.  
Understandings of the SDM as an effective tool for child welfare decision-making 
were not necessarily correlated with using the SDM as prescribed. While the 
majority of workers interviewed used the SDM as intended (approximately two-
thirds), only one-third of the workers felt positively about it as a tool for decision-
making. Those who felt negatively about the tool tended felt that it was a blunt 
instrument that did not allow for the integration of tacit and clinical judgment.  For 
a more detailed discussion of these issues, please see Bosk, Same Difference: 
Standardized Decision-Making In Practice, In Progress).   
The SDM in State B: An Administrative Imperative Without Teeth 
State B Child Welfare Policy 
While State B's legislature mandates the use of Evidence-Based Practices in 
all social services delivered by the state, it does not currently mandate the specific 
use of the Structured-Decision-Making Model in its child welfare cases. 
Additionally, State B has several approaches to assessing and servicing families 
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referred to the child welfare system. The Differential Response System (DRS) 
creates a different track for families that appear to be at lower risk for future child 
maltreatment or where the maltreatment being investigating is not considered to 
severe. The goal of the differential response system is to engage families in a process 
that is intended to be supportive and strengths-based. Child welfare policy in State 
B requires investigators to complete the risk assessment from the Structured 
Decision-Making model to form an opinion about the disposition of the case. 
However, unlike State A, this policy does not explicitly require investigators to 
utilize the score on the risk assessment to determine the trajectory of a case once it 
has been substantiated. Rather, child welfare workers in State B are asked to 
evaluate multiple sources of information when making their decision in consultation 
with their supervisor. The official steps conducted prior to the conclusion of the 
investigation as described in the Handbook for child welfare investigators are as 
follows: ⁠ 
"The investigator shall take the steps below to follow-up the field response and 
conclude the investigation: 
 
• document information gathered during the investigation 
• complete a risk assessment 
• submit a request for a State Police criminal record check on the alleged 
perpetrator, adults in the home and other adults who have child 
caring responsibilities or access to the child(ren) in the home, if not 
done previously 
• refer family members for a drug and/or alcohol screen, if needed 
• contact collaterals 
• discuss the case with the supervisor, taking into consideration all 
facts that were collected during the investigation, to determine 
the plan of action 
• determine with the supervisor if child abuse or neglect is 
substantiated or unsubstantiated 
• determine appropriate Juvenile Court action (see below – Use of 
Juvenile Court) 
• take removal actions, when indicated 
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• determine case disposition 
• provide notification of the results of the investigation to those specified 
below 
• utilize the “Investigation Checklist” (DCF-2075) as a guide to ensure that 
all required actions have been completed." 
(State B Department of Children and Families Handbook) 
 
These steps characterize a much looser context for using the Structured Decision-
Making Model to inform child welfare decision-making. Workers are required to 
complete the risk assessment but the policy does not make explicit how the results 
of the risk assessment should factor into workers case judgments. As the official 
investigative process outlines, multiple steps (represented in bold) in the decision-
making process leave room for caseworker discretion as well as supervisory 
consultation. In this way, the SDM is implemented within an adaptive framework.  
This adaptive framework allows for a flexible application of the Structured Decision-
Making model that explicitly seeks to integrate the SDM into local culture, office 
policy, and individual worker and supervisory judgments. However, as the data 
presented below demonstrates, the flexibility of this process combined with workers 
negative views about the SDM render it an all but meaningless part of the decision-
making process.  
An Administrative Imperative Without Teeth 
A majority of the 31 respondents in State B reflected a fairly uniform 
response to the SDM: that it had little to no impact on case decision-making. In 
initial descriptions of the procedure for investigating or working (in the case of on-
going treatment or adolescent treatment workers) a neglect case, the majority of 
workers did not recount including the SDM as part of their routine. While 
completing the SDM certainly is a requirement for any case, its lack of salience as 
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part of the process was an early indication of its relatively limited role in decision-
making.  
Following the same interview protocol as in State A, I asked participants to 
walk me through the general process for investigating or working a neglect case.  
Answering this question, participants were more likely to report aspects of their 
practice other than the SDM such as: following the priority code (when they needed 
to make contact with a family), recording their interactions with families and other 
providers or people relevant to the case, documenting their work through the 
drafting of case narratives and case reports, and recounting their process for 
investigating and visiting families, which often included detail about decision-
making (e.g. When I visit the house, I make sure the child is safe by “laying eyes on 
the child” or “I interview the child to find out what is going on”).  
Participants did include administrative requirements in their descriptions of 
their work process but the SDM, even as a clerical duty, did not warrant a mention 
as a central part of their efforts. These descriptions of other administrative duties 
signaled that participants’ conceptualization of the process for working a case 
included the elements of their job governed by paperwork. Worker’s omissions of 
the SDM are therefore unlikely to be attributable to a desire to hide the less 
glamorous details of their jobs. Nor are they likely to be indicative of worker’s 
desires to present themselves as always in charge of the direction of a case (Young, 
2004; Zerubavel, 2006). The silences around use of the SDM as a decision-making 
tool suggests that the SDM is not a significant part of the process of a case but 
functions more as an afterthought, an obligation folded into many other 
administrative tasks. As such, the SDM is unlikely to be a critical factor in decision-
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making for State B’s frontline workers. 
While omissions about the SDM in work descriptions signaled its lack of 
decision-making power, direct questioning about the use of SDM in practice tended 
to confirm this view. When workers were asked how the SDM influenced their 
decision-making, many articulated that it did not.  Consider the following exchange: 
E:       How much do they [the SDM tools] drive decision-making?  
F:       They say that, (short laugh) it…(trails off, long pause) 
E:        I'm looking for the real, not what they say. But yeah what do they 
say and  
            then what happens?  
F:         This is all confidential right?  
E:        It is totally confidential. 
F:        I know, I know, I'm doing the same thing now with getting my 
Master's and everything, but I don't see it.  I really don't think they 
really drive a  case or the   determining factors to you know to 
move the case along for closure or stay  involved. Yeah. Are we 
closing the case, no, no, not at all.  I can probably say on half of my 
caseload right now, like I said the risk level is low and we're staying 
involved.  
Felicia, an African-American investigator identifies with the perspective of the 
researcher through her status as an MSW student. She understands the theoretical 
purpose of standardization, noting, “she is doing the same thing now with getting 
my Master’s” but in practice does not observe that the actual benefit of the SDM 
tools lines up with their promise. Felicia assumes that researchers, like myself have a 
positive view of the SDM. Despite her implicit acknowledgment that the ‘right 
answer’ is that the SDM is effective, Felicia reports that the SDM does not act as 
intended and is not part of the decision-making process.  Seeking reassurance that 
the content of the interview will not be passed on to her superiors, she 
acknowledges that the informal work practices related to the risk assessment do not 
align either with formal departmental policy or with the explicit justification for 
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caseworkers to utilize the tools. The informal practice may predominant caseworker 
actions but the official narrative of what the SDM achieves remains an important 
part of its presentation. Christiana an on-going treatment worker echoes this 
perspective:  
Oh when this tool first came out it was more so like yes, if you have a case 
that is low from, I don’t know, two consecutive times or whatever the case 
might be, then you should just close, but now I think that has kind of like 
been like slipped under the rug or somewhere.  
Christiana reports that the way the RA is currently handled in every day practice 
conflicts with its intended use.  The SDM itself has not been slipped under the rug, 
it is a key requirement of the work for every case, what has disappeared out of plain 
view are the ways that the SDM could or would impact case trajectories.  
The Role of Supervision 
While official policy may dictate use of the SDM in guiding case decisions, a 
critical part of its implementation is the weight that the SDM carries in dialogues 
between supervisor and caseworkers. If the SDM held much sway in the 
conversation about case outcomes, then we would expect that the SDM would be a 
regular part of the supervisory process. Both caseworkers and supervisors reported 
that the SDM was more likely to play a confirmatory role in case decisions. Melanie 
an on-going treatment worker explains that supervision rather than the SDM offers 
her the direction for a case.  
M: Would you ever use this to help you make a decision about what 
you should do in your case? 
P: To some degree. 
M: Can you give me an example of a time where you’ve used it? 
P: Hmm. I can’t think of the last time.  Because really, I mean you’re 
not really  doing that risk assessment until you’re like finalizing 
your investigation. And most of the time you’ve already at least 
talked to your supervisor at least  once… 
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M: Okay. 
P:  …in supervision, about the direction you think the case is going. 
Melanie’s account embodies the disconnection between official language about the 
purpose and usefulness of the SDM and the effect that the SDM has in practice. She 
begins by reporting that the SDM is “somewhat” useful in decision-making but can’t 
remember a time that the SDM steered her towards a particular outcome. Unable to 
come up with a case example, Melanie switches her account to an explanation of 
how the tools actually play a relatively minor role in decision-making. Discussions 
with Melanie’s supervisor give her an initial idea for how the case should (and will) 
proceed. Beth concurs:  
B:  I mean, I guess it would be an interesting question to ask if 
supervisors  
actually looked through it or if they just approve it.  
E:  Something, I’m asking.  
B:  Yeah, because I’ve never had a supervisor come to me and say; I 
don’t agree with this. Not once has that ever happened. So it just 
gets filtered as like part of the documentation…. 
Because meetings where case trajectories get hammered out may not or do not 
include the SDM as resource or reference point, there is little reason for workers 
who do not discuss it as part of the case review to think that the outcome on any of 
the SDM tools matter for casework. The workflow patterns in State B offices 
indicate that tools requiring completion at the conclusion of a work process may 
mean that workers unintentionally develop work practices that exclude them from 
decision-making. 
According to the majority of workers, the SDM not only plays a relatively 
minor role in routine decision-making about cases, it also is not widely utilized to 
help figure out how to proceed in more complex situations. Lisa, like Melanie, sees 
supervision as the more appropriate venue to decide how to handle complicated 
  100 
issues. 
M: When you are on the fence about something what do you do? What 
do you use to figure out what you’ve ---? 
L: When I’m on the fence, me I kind of go with what I feel, with my 
gut and you  know, I’ll throw it at my supervisor.  Like I said he’s 
very receptive to what I need and what I need from him, and if I 
need to sort of throw something off him you know cause I’ll say I 
really go to him if I need to be told to do something.  It’s usually I 
kind of have a good idea, I put it all together, I’ll sometimes even 
write it up without us even conferencing it, and he’ll say if I have a 
question I’ll come see you about it, but for the most part he’s 
comfortable with it and I’m comfortable with it.  I’ll go to him when 
I’m kind of stuck or a little unsure about something and he’ll push 
me along kind of.  
 One clear rationale for using standardized tools is to eliminate or at least balance 
decision-making that comes from a strong emotional perspective. Lisa does not use 
the SDM as a double check for her feelings even though there is the opportunity to 
do so. Nor is Lisa solely reliant on “her gut” to determine what should be done, she 
makes sure to present her thinking about the case to her supervisor and uses this 
guidance to get unstuck. Curious about whether Lisa’s supervisor made use of the 
SDM as a reference point in either these exchanges or more routine conversations 
about case decision-making, I asked whether her supervisor incorporated review of 
the SDM tools into their case conferences. Lisa responded:  “I mean to some degree 
he does use it. I’ve never had him kick a case back to me saying ‘Lisa, the risk 
assessment is moderate why are we doing this you know?’.  
While discussions about the SDM can certainly be a part of larger 
conversations between supervisors and workers about the direction of a case, the 
tool’s informal lack of power becomes underscored when there is little disagreement 
or larger reflection about various scores on SDM assessments in supervision. 
Accepted uncritically, worker’s scores on the assessment become folded in with the 
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large volume of paperwork that accompanies any case. While there might be large 
back and forth discussions about case trajectories in conversation, perfunctory 
engagement with the SDM between supervisors and investigators signals its 
relatively low status for offering an important viewpoint on cases.  
Workers aren’t the only ones who feel that the SDM functions in a 
perfunctory fashion. Supervisors I interviewed tended to echo this understanding. 
Agnes, described the SDM in strikingly similar terms to Felicia and Christiana.  
Asking directly about the SDM led to the following exchange: 
E: What role does that tool [the Risk Reassessment and Reunification 
Assessment] specifically play in your decision-making? 
A: Well for me right now…the reality is it’s supposed to be that you’re 
looking at it and you’re really using it to help whether you’re gonna 
reunify someone.  So the reality is it plays a small role...  
[A follow-up question was asked later in the conversation] 
E:  ….Sure.  I just wanted to clarify:  By the time the worker gets to 
filling out the reunification…and the reassessment form, has the 
decision already been made?  
 A: Most of the time… 
E  …And then this [the Reassessment and Reunification tools] is sort 
of like a confirmation? 
A: Exactly. 
E:  Okay. 
A: More like a confirmation. And sometimes, I feel it’s like just being 
done because it’s due.  
Like the workers mentioned above, Agnes recognizes that there is a difference 
between how the SDM should be used (according to formal policy) and how it 
operates in the everyday routines of workers and their supervisors. Acting as 
“confirmation,” the SDM can provide insight into whether a worker’s and 
supervisor’s decision-making align with more standardized assessments. However, 
Agnes’s feeling that these assessments are often only used to meet a deadline 
somewhat undercuts this purpose. Agnes explained that time pressures interfere 
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with her ability to really review the SDM tools to inform decision-making:  
Right, right.  ‘Cause if we were able to actually look at what we’re 
documenting; like what we’re supposed to supervise; everything that’s 
documented on a case we’re supposed to look at.  If we actually had the 
luxury of looking at all that it might change the direction a case is going; it 
really might.  It might change it for the better, it might change it for the 
worse.  
For Agnes, the time and space to actually review every piece of documentation 
associated with a case is an unrealistic ‘luxury.’ Choosing to prioritize her time 
reviewing cases with workers orally, Agnes understands the SDM tools to be an 
extra step in supervision that is out of range for what is manageable on any given 
day. Agnostic about whether the SDM improves or impedes good decision-making, 
Agnes simply attributes their lack of use to lack of time. How workers understand 
tools to fit into their overall workplace demands may be a critical variable for 
understanding how structural and organizational factors impact their overall use. 
No matter how well a tool is constructed, if it does not fit in with an overall work 
plan or flow its uptake is likely to be limited.  
 Other supervisors also privileged conversational and reflective processes to 
inform decision-making. Ellen believes that discussions with her supervisees provide 
the most effective sources of information about a case: 
I mean I feel like, you know I do a lot of very, of supervision a lot with my 
workers, so we’re going through the case for the day and I only meet with 
them for 10, 15, 30, you know and I don’t do what other supervisors do 
because I want to be part of it and I’m owning the case too.  So I’m kind of 
feeling like where they’re at and I can help them figure out another way to 
go or something like that so I don’t feel like I need the paperwork.  
Its not the paperwork (and she includes the SDM in this category) that makes Ellen 
feel that she “owns” a case with a worker but her attention to the story of what is 
happening within it. This is an interesting distinction to make as one of Ellen’s 
primary tasks as a supervisor is to ensure that the documentation for a case has been 
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completed and turned in on time.  Such a distinction indicates that some supervisors 
may believe that tools like the SDM do little to add value to decision-making. Here, 
Ellen performs both her role as an expert and her authority by using clinical 
judgment to guide the investigator. 
In addition to discussions with their supervisors, workers in State B had 
access to additional methods for assessing cases. Teams composed of medical, legal, 
and psychological experts in specific areas such as trauma and domestic violence 
were readily available to consult with workers on how these issues might be 
impacting their cases. Workers initiated these consultations when they felt that 
their case required additional thinking or when it was complicated to understand 
how to proceed. Participants reported placing great weight on the information they 
received from these discussions. Further, a team of physicians, social workers, and 
psychologists regularly review the physical abuse cases appearing in the system. 
The end result is an organizational approach that structures regular opportunities 
for evaluating risk in multiple ways from the risk assessment itself to expert 
discussions. When there are other structural opportunities for thinking about the 
meaning of risk in a case, the SDM may become devalued.  
A Bureaucratic Tool For Management 
The process by which workers describe utilizing the SDM in their casework 
is indicative of the extent to which caseworkers in State B engage with the SDM as 
a bureaucratic tool. As discussed above, in the majority of interviews workers 
described filling out the structured decision-making assessments after a decision had 
been made as part of the paperwork required to finalize the opening, closing or 
transfer of a case. Workers reported experiencing the SDM as a part of the every 
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day paperwork required by her job. Pat recounts that: 
The SDM that at one point it was something that was coming down in 
LINK [the computer system in State B that tracks cases] and we were 
going to be expected to do it and then it was mandatory because now LINK 
won't let you sign off on a case unless you do it; it’ll jump you back.  
Presented as a rote task, the SDM is necessary only in that one has to be filled out 
before being able to simply submit work via the computer system.  When asked 
directly about the SDM, workers wondered aloud about its purpose. Pat finished her 
thoughts about the SDM with: “ So this tool, I don’t know what, this is just 
something I think managers need or something or agency; I don’t know who needs 
it.” Workers often were unclear on how the SDM fit in with the larger picture.  
Some workers hypothesized that the SDM’s function was really not for workers but 
for managers who needed to gather aggregate level information of cases. As Grace, a  
noted:  
With the SDM tools, I really honestly, I think it, those tools are really for 
numbers and management.  It's not something that helps us determine, us 
as workers, determine what needs to happen on a case.   
As an administrative imperative, SDM was not seen as being useful or important to 
individuals’ own work or decision-making processes. Instead, the SDM was 
conceptualized as something that management “did,” clearly demarcated from what 
frontline workers “do.” Investigators and on-going treatment workers in State B 
described a rigidly hierarchical environment where job title determined status, pay, 
duties performed on the job, and formal decision-making power. The sense that 
SDM was for management rather than for workers contributed to CPS workers’ 
conceptualization of SDM tools as not useful or a “real” part of their everyday work. 
SDM became categorized as solely an administrative function to reflect this division 
of labor.   
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Descriptions about SDM being “about the numbers” were folded into much 
broader complaints about the direction of caseworker experience in these two offices 
in general. Workers placed their critiques about the SDM within a larger context of 
casework driven by bureaucratic imperatives and measurements. Mike, an 
investigator, perhaps put it the most forcefully, but many other workers echoed his 
sentiments. 
M:         That's all it is, it's just paperwork after paperwork after paperwork, 
and I feel like sometimes my visits with families suffer, because you 
need to be in, be out, check you know the safety factors, make sure 
that the kids are, you know got food in the home, all utilities 
working and check the kid up and down to see if there's any marks, 
bruises, depending on what the case is.  And then it's bang, bang, 
bang, bang, I'm out and that's why I think a lot of clients are little 
bit resistant at first.  I try to spend more time with them, but then 
my written work suffers and here in this particular office I think it's 
all about numbers and it's all about you know getting our 
benchmarks on everything is kind of like, but obviously what the 
state wants, but one thing more that the managers care about, even 
though they say otherwise, I call BS on it. 
E:        They just want the numbers?   
M:         It's all about the numbers.   
E:         Which numbers? What are the ones that are really important to 
them?  
M:          It's the visitations, you know we have to achieve 85% of the 
benchmarks every month.  Yeah, I don't have any problem doing 
that, but God forbid you miss one you run the risk of getting 
written up.  
Mike makes the issues related to the use of the SDM wider than just these tools.  
Distinguishing what is important to management (numbers, benchmarks) and what 
is important to him (building a relationship with the family, spending time with 
them), Mike positions more quantitative measures as something different from the 
work that he believes is meaningful and reflective of his professional identity. 
Struggling with the competing demands imposed by two very different 
requirements of her job, Mike frames them in either/or terms.  It is quite possible 
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that worker perspectives on the SDM become folded into a larger contentious 
climate about administrative paperwork. Workers negative feelings about the 
bureaucratic imperatives they are required to follow may not be easily separated 
from their views on the SDM. These feelings are then overlaid by what they 
experience to be an unforgiving administrative environment. Mike indicates how 
punitively he feels the administrative parts of his job are and is aware that if he is 
late or misses anything that he “run[s] the risk of being written up” for not doing 
his job correctly. Penalizations for not completing written work further contribute 
to a sense that some types of work are for supervisors and managers and others are 
for workers rather than a shared experience toward a common goal. 
Agnes, a supervisor commented on how difficult such an environment can be:   
Sure.  People are very, very stressed by…I mean numbers, you have to 
make sure of your visits.  You have to make sure you’re visiting twice a 
month or you have to have a certain percentage of your narratives in. And 
so the workers will feel as though, “Well I’ve got all this work to do.  How 
can I possibly keep up?...”  So the numbers game is really stressful for 
people and you feel it.  
In State B, the paperwork, numbers, and stress are tightly connected to one another.  
As Mike put it later in the interview: “They think you're actually doing social work 
and I really, I think we do, we don't do much of it.  In response to my question  
“What do you do?” he answered: Paperwork.” Many workers like Mike, Grace, and 
Pat envision their real work as the tasks that call on their clinical judgment, 
professional expertise, and understanding. Paperwork is a necessary evil of the job, 
an evil that calls up a certain amount of resistance in order to hold onto a distinct 
feeling of professional authority. 
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A Paper Zoo 
As part of my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to observe workers making 
case decisions over a month period. Workers had folders filled with assessment 
instruments that they were encouraged to use when evaluating cases such as a 
specific inventory for the presence of domestic violence, another inventory for 
detecting depression, and other tools that had come in and out of fashion at different 
moments in state or office policy.  In the sea of paper, the cumulative effect was to 
render each tool meaningless and less likely to be used. As State B policy moved 
towards engaging families from a strengths-based perspective, even more tools were 
being added to partner with families during the child welfare investigation and 
treatment process. Whenever a new intervention was introduced to better facilitate 
the process, old interventions were not taken away. Workers described being 
overwhelmed by the number of interventions intended to facilitate better decision-
making and the sense I had was that they were surrounded by “paper tigers.” 
(Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  
It is important to note and reflect on the fact that some workers and 
supervisors did feel that the SDM was a useful tool for guiding case actions and 
utilized it as such.  Marie, who felt overwhelmed by the paperwork aspects of her job 
reported that she still used the SDM tools to inform case actions: “Yes.  It gives you 
the direction of a case and it helps you process, you know what the needs are, what 
the strengths are and in the direction of where it needs to go.” For Marie, the SDM 
assists in understanding the full range of issues in a case, which in turn facilitate 
critical thinking about how to proceed. Zana shared this perspective:  
M:       And what is particularly helpful about the risk reassessment?  
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P:         Well it helps you to determine if the case could be closed or not.  It 
give you the level of risk, maybe low, moderate or so on, and of 
course if it's moderate there is something that is missing, something 
that they need to address; maybe the parents are refusing, which 
there's nothing we can do or they still need to continue whatever 
services.  And it really determines what we should do with the case.   
Zana values the set of questions that the SDM asks as a way to organize her case 
thinking and she links this case thinking to case outcomes.  
Exceptions to the Rule, Here Too 
Marie and Zana represent the small number of workers I interviewed who 
utilized the SDM as intended. Their accounts of the SDM are positive and engaged. 
For these workers, the SDM functions as a source of valuable information rather 
than as a redundant clerical task. I also observed a Program Manager direct two 
investigators to use the risk assessment to determine whether the case should be 
substantiated and opened when they came to her for help in making a decision in a 
complex case.  Natasha also described using the SDM with her workers when she 
felt that their decisions were based in emotion rather than the facts of the case. She 
also regularly insisted that her workers use the SDM for determining case actions 
when decisions were unclear or there were disagreements about how to proceed. 
However, these approaches were very much in the minority in how the SDM was 
routinely applied to casework. As such, Marie, Zana and Natasha’s descriptions of 
the usefulness of the SDM exemplify individual variation in workers’ perspectives 
but do not provide insight into the normative culture surrounding these tools. 
Overall, both offices in State B developed an informal practice of utilizing the SDM 
for confirmation of an already made decision or folded it into administrative tasks 
that were required but were largely un-reflected and un-acted upon.   
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One of These Things is Not Like the Other: The Local Context of 
Standardization 
In this article, I have demonstrated that the Structured Decision-Making 
model is sensitive to organizational contexts. As a practice technology, the 
significance of the SDM becomes socially created in every setting in which it is 
deployed. Rather than standardizing work practices across all child welfare offices, 
how workers understand and then utilize the SDM reflects a variety of 
organizational factors and orientations. Among these factors are: (1) the weight 
given to the SDM in guiding specific outcomes for cases (e.g. opening or closing a 
case, level of substantiation or whether the alleged abuser is placed on the Central 
Registry for Abuse and Neglect);⁠1 (2) whether supervisors review caseworkers 
decisions in conjunction with the findings of the SDM; (3) how workers view the 
administrative response to the SDM; and (4) the informal culture for completing 
administrative work and making decisions in a protective services office.  
State policy structures how the SDM will be used in practice. The distinct 
constructions of the SDM by workers in State A and State B illustrate the intensely 
local nature of tools designed to be universal in their application. Investigators and 
treatment workers in State B report that the SDM plays a relatively minor role in 
their decision-making overall.  On the whole, workers in this state experience the 
SDM as an administrative procedure utilized by management for its ability to 
capture meta-data and aggregate trends of cases. The SDM represents one set of 
procedures to make the audit of performance possible (Power, 1997). While workers 
are required to complete each part of the SDM, the results do not have to be tightly 
correlated with the disposition of the case. In State B, the SDM functions more as a 
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suggestion for the direction of the case, weakening the connection between the 
meaningfulness of the information it provides and the decision-making the SDM is 
intended to direct. The looser the formal link, the less likely workers are to view the 
SDM as anything other than another part of their required documentation. A 
minority of workers and supervisors felt the SDM had tremendous value and used 
the tools to guide their decision-making. However, workers and supervisors who 
relied on the SDM to inform case thinking represented individual variation in 
approaches to casework rather than institutional norms to incorporate the SDM into 
decision-making processes. The presence of other avenues for case decision-making 
that involved consultation with experts as well as the sheer number of tools meant 
to facilitate accurate and empirically-based decision-making may decrease the 
importance of the SDM in practice.  
In contrast, the SDM in State A has been deeply institutionalized, shaping 
case outcomes and case trajectories. Scores on the risk assessment determine the 
intensity of services families will receive, the category at which a case is 
substantiated, and whether a family is placed on the state’s Central Registry for 
Abuse and Neglect. In some instances, the score on a risk assessment can even 
contribute to the decision to open a case that falls on the border for meeting the 
criteria for substantiation. Workers uniformly acknowledge the significance of the 
SDM for decision-making but vary in how they approach the tool. No matter what 
their personal orientation to the SDM, every worker I interviewed recognized and 
remarked on the formal power the SDM had to determine case trajectories. 
Differences between the implementation of the SDM in these states 
demonstrate that whether a standardized tool is understood to achieve a 
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standardizing function is not a consequence of the validity or reliability of the tool 
itself but the social and structural context in which a tool is introduced and utilized 
(Dixon-Woods, et al., 2011; Epstein, 2007; Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Espeland & 
Vannebo, 2007; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  
Often viewed as a natural, mechanistic process, the data presented here 
challenges the idea that standardization is anything but a social practice whose 
meaning is shaped by factors external to the tools themselves. A highly contingent 
phenomenon, the implementation of the SDM in State A and State B indicates that 
responses to standardization are shaped through a dialectical process. The 
introduction of formal policy related to the SDM sets the expectations for a set of 
work practices that are then renegotiated by workers and supervisors in their every 
day work routines. In turn, workers every day approaches to formal policy create an 
informal practice that guides the use of standardized tools. Once an informal 
approach has been established, this way of doing things rather than the formal 
policy becomes the normative and expected practice. The meaning and use of the 
SDM become ‘the way we do our work here.’  
This meaning and use is, as previously stated, highly contingent. Factors 
such as a change in workplace supervisors, upper-level administration, the addition 
of other policies, or a service ‘failure’ that becomes a public scandal—all have the 
possibility of changing workplace practices related to the SDM. 
Viewing standardization as a social process is critical to understanding the 
creation and implementation of interventions that are conceptualized as operating 
similarly across settings. Recognizing that standardized tools function differently in 
distinct organizational contexts raises questions about whether standardization 
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itself will erase or even mitigate the messiness of complex work. Further, in the 
child welfare literature, disparities in child welfare outcomes are often investigated 
and then addressed at the level of the individual worker. However, my research 
shows that variation in individual worker’s decision-making occurs within larger 
variation in work practices at the organizational level; variation that itself is nested 
within differences in policy across states and the federal government. In the cases 
that I present above, state policy changes the meaning of the SDM in each setting, 
which in turn shapes the meaning and use of the tool by individual workers. This 
article unpacks how variation in policy at the organizational level changes the 
meaning of the SDM on the ground in order to understand standardization as 
adaptive rather than technical work.  
The Goldilocks Problem: Adaptive vs. Restricted Implementation 
Implementation Science has emerged as a field to respond to the recognition 
that interventions with great internal validity will not necessarily translate into 
external validity in the settings in which they are deployed. Across the fields of 
medicine, psychology, and social work, research has drawn attention to the ways in 
which EBPs have gaps between the intervention as designed and the intervention as 
it is practiced (Westen, Novotny, and Thompson-Brenner 2004, 2005; Magill 2006; 
Howard et al. 2009; Yunong and Fengzhi 2009; Berger 2010). Implementation 
science seeks to identify the factors that will promote the successful deployment and 
sustainment of interventions. A major concern of the field is to develop systematic 
knowledge and strategies to address known challenges to translating EBPs into 
diverse practice settings. A number of studies investigating the implementation of 
Evidence-Based Practice interventions in medicine, psychology, and social work 
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have demonstrated that simply providing intensive training and education are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for the successful diffusion of an EBP.  
(Beidas & Kendall, 2010; Herschell, Kolko, Baumann, & Davis, 2010). Research 
suggests that for implementation efforts to succeed multiple variables need to be 
attended to in addition to adequate training and support such as the organizational 
culture and context, appropriate infrastructure and technological capacity, and 
leadership.   
Implementation science as a field assumes that with the right combination of 
variables and with careful enough attention to environmental, organizational, and 
individual factors then interventions will work as intended. The trick (and therefore 
the research agenda) is to uncover what those adjustments and variables need to be.  
Recognizing the importance of incorporating the organizational and cultural 
context in the implementation of interventions raises questions about whether an 
adaptive vs. restricted implementation strategy will be the most effective.   
However, it is not clear that such a task is even possible.  As this article 
demonstrates the implementation and organizational context will shape how an 
intervention is deployed in ways that shape the goals of or change the meaning of 
the intervention itself. Reviewing sociological work on standardization: 
Timmermans and Epstein state: 
As Wittgenstein (1953) and ethnomethodologists have noted (Heritage 
1984), no rule can adequately capture the requisite work of a prescribed 
action. On the ground, every standard is simultaneously over determined 
and incomplete. To coordinate diverse interests and activities, standards 
necessarily delegate some residual work that requires active participation 
and submission of people to the standard’s directives. Tinkering, repairing, 
subverting, or circumventing prescriptions of the standard are necessary to 
make standards work (Lampland & Star 2009, p. 4; Star 1995, pp. 100–104). 
Thus, a recurring surprising finding is that loose standards with great 
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adaptability may work better than rigidly defined standards (Timmermans 
& Epstein, 2010).  
An open question is what does “a loose standard with great adaptability” 
looks like in practice.  State B employs a loose standard with great adaptability by 
requiring the SDM to be part of the assessment process without formally linking it 
to case outcomes. This model allows for local culture and context to be taken into 
account but because workers and supervisors both are overwhelmed by paperwork 
and do not see value within the SDM itself. The very flexibility that might make the 
intervention successful ends up transforming the SDM into a bureaucratic exercise 
with little practical meaning. Timmerman’s and Epstein caution that standards 
cannot be so flexible that they lose all their meaning (Timmermans & Epstein, 
2010). 
Taken in isolation, analyzing the implementation of the SDM in State B and 
State A might lead to opposite conclusions. Theorizing about how to make the SDM 
a more utilized intervention in State B, one might suggest tying use of the SDM to 
case trajectories. In contrast examining the data in State A might lead to 
suggestions for policy improvement that would decouple the tight relationship 
between the score on the SDM and the trajectory of the case. However, when 
looking at both approaches together, it is unclear that either works as well as it 
should.  State B’s implementation approach is so adaptive that workers can choose to 
ignore the intervention completely, while State A’s approach is so restrictive that it 
is difficult to allow clinical judgment into the process. I have come to think of this as 
the Goldilocks problem. What is the right amount of adaptability vs. fidelity to the 
model that should inherently be part of the implementation process? When 
examining the list of factors that need to be attended to in successful 
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implementations is there anything that is not on the table? If so, how is it feasible to 
offer standardized processes that are realistically adaptable to every day life?    
A sociological understanding of standardization as both a social and technical 
process requires close attention to context for the successful deployment of an 
intervention into real world settings. But what does one do then with the 
understanding that policy, organizational, and environmental factors will influence 
the deployment of a new intervention? While there is growing recognition that a 
balance between flexibility and fidelity to models must be struck for interventions to 
be successful, implementation science has yet to provide sound or realistic models 
for what this mix of adaptive vs. restricted should be or how this understanding can 
be built into interventions.  The Practice-Based Evidence movement, which has 
emerged in response to the messiness of practice in the real world asserts: 
Greater attention to context may require novel uses of research approaches 
that are closer to the ground and better at capturing the nuances of client 
preferences and treatment contexts, or combining these methods in novel 
ways with highly controlled studies. Practice-based evidence, a movement 
that is developing in psychology, medicine, and education, treats “the 
multiplicity of variables as a resource to be used for deeper analysis rather 
than as a nemesis to be controlled” (Green 2006, 406), providing new 
possibilities for incorporating context into EBP research and knowledge 
(Green, 2006; Okpych & Yu, 2014). 
However, concrete examples or suggestions for what these new methods or novel 
forms of analysis are have yet to be fleshed out.   
In his examination of how state efforts to improve the human condition have 
failed, James C. Scott, a political scientist and anthropologist offers some insight into 
how we might conceptualize the relationship between the multiplicity of variables 
required for an intervention to be translated successfully into the construction of 
interventions themselves. Scott proposes that knowledge can be thought of in terms 
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of metis-“practical skills, common sense, experience, know how” and techne-
“technical knowledge in the form of hard and fast rules”(Scott, 1998). While metis is 
often considered suspect in a positivist paradigm, Scott demonstrates that 
incorporating metis with techne is essential to the success of modernist ideas and 
plans. Giving examples as varied as the failure and then revival of the planned city 
of Brasilia to the development of compulsory villages in Tanzania, Scott 
demonstrates that interventions solely relying on techne are likely to fail because 
they do not account for particularity, locality, or the complexity built into any set of 
circumstances.  “As Pascal wrote, the great failure of rationalism is ‘not its 
recognition of technical knowledge but its failure to recognize any other.” (Scott, 
1998, 340).  When interventions are all techne they are likely to fail precisely 
because they do not leave a way to address the unplanned and the unaccounted for. 
What appears straightforward in one setting or with one case might be difficult to 
decipher or implement in another. I only need to think to my own experiences 
following a plan to sleep train my twins to find the truth in this idea. On its face, 
sleep training required only techne in the form of a clear protocol for responding to 
night crying in progressive intervals. In practice, this required a great deal of metis 
as my husband and I tried to work through unplanned events: what should we do 
when my son peed through the bed? What should we do when his crying was for a 
short period of time? A standardized process required a certain degree of judgment 
within the protocol.   
As I have argued in the other work (Bosk, Same Difference: Standardized 
Decision-Making in Practice, In Progress), the Structured Decision-Making model 
might strike a better balance between metis and techne if there was space to 
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incorporate narrative reflections about a case alongside the tool itself.  A process 
that invites critical thinking within standardized criteria would create a standard 
way to think about cases rather than a standardized outcome for cases that might 
seem similar on their face but are actually quite different in reality. In doing so, 
workers in State B could not ignore the empirically based risk factors when 
evaluating their cases nor would workers in State A feel that they had to cast aside 
nuanced understandings of the dynamic circumstances that influenced the impact of 
the presence of these risk factors on the potential for further maltreatment.   
Creating a set of standards and a standardized process for approaching cases 
might make more sense then developing a tool around standardizing outcomes when 
such diversity and complexity exists within the cases themselves.  Standardized 
interventions must account for not only the diversity and complexity of the 
situations that they are intended to address but also for the diversity and complexity 
of all the contexts within which they are deployed.   
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1 Central Registries of Abuse and Neglect document perpetrators of serious child 
maltreatment.  Maintained at the state level, central registries prohibit those on it from 
working in jobs that come into contact with children (e.g. school bus driver, day care 
worker) and in some cases from attending any events at a school (such as a field trip or 
auction). The decision-making process for who is placed on a central registry varies by 
state.  As of 2008, 40 states had Central Registries 
 
2 Additionally, State B has several approaches to assessing and servicing families 
referred to the child welfare system. The Differential Response System (DRS) creates a 
different track for families that appear to be at lower risk for future child maltreatment or 
where the maltreatment being investigating is not considered to severe. The goal of the 
differential response system is to engage families in a process that is intended to be 
supportive and strengths-based  
3 Bolded items represent my emphasis. 
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Chapter 4  
What Counts? The Quantification of Child Welfare 
 
Introduction 
In the past decade, the child welfare system has seen the proliferation of 
actuarial based risk assessments designed to standardize decision-making by child 
welfare workers. These standardized assessments have emerged in response to an 
array of significant issues related to clinical decision-making such as the widespread 
variability in outcomes among child welfare workers evaluating the same case and 
the profound ethnic and racial disproportionality within the system (Gambrill & 
Shlonsky, 2000). Scandals playing out on the front page of newspapers related to the 
deaths of children who were either left with their parents when they should have 
been removed or who died in foster care have further highlighted the need for 
reform in how decisions are made. 
Reform efforts have focused around standardizing child welfare practices 
with the twin goals of (1) creating objective measures that will yield identical results 
for similar situations and (2) producing evidence that the child welfare system is 
working and cost effective. Funding priorities reflect these goals with heavy 
investments in the development and implementation of tools to systematize child 
welfare procedures and in advancing program evaluation to determine whether 
these efforts have been successful. As evidenced by its implementation in over 30 
states, the Structured Decision Making Model (SDM) has arguably been among the 
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most successful among these interventions. According to the Child Information 
Gateway, a clearinghouse for information on child welfare practice and policy, 
structured decision-making is:  
An approach to child protective services that uses clearly defined and 
consistently applied decision-making criteria for screening for investigation, 
determining response priority, identifying immediate threatened harm, and 
estimating the risk of future abuse and 
neglect.(http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/assessment/approaches
/decision.cfm) 
These assessments quantify the considerations that a Child Protective Service (CPS) 
worker will base her decision on, by providing a numerical score that among other 
things is representative of whether a child is safe, is able to remain within the home, 
is at risk for future harm, and the strengths of the family under investigation.  The 
Center for Children’s Research asserts this model improves the “effectiveness of the 
child welfare system by increasing the consistency and validity of decision-making 
(CRC, 1999).” 
The move from child welfare decision-making policies that value the 
individual judgment of the child welfare worker to ones that attempt to control for 
professional discretion is a prominent example of the commensuration of the child 
welfare system. Espeland and Stevens (1998) define commensuration as the 
“expression or measurement of characteristics normally represented by units 
according to a common metric.” Transforming values and ideological concepts such 
as safety, risk, and quality of care, into numerical scores (in the form of assessment 
tools) allows for the flattening of these dynamic concepts into comparable units.  A 
long historical association between rationality and processes of classification such as 
ordering and numbering highlights the appeal of commensuration within child 
welfare (Nussbaum, 1986). Policies that promote the standardization of complex 
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processes demonstrate that the system is organized in a rational way and operating 
effectively. 
 Espeland and Stevens argue that the attempt to introduce statistical 
concepts such as reliability, replication, consistency, and validity into the course of 
every day life is anything but a natural phenomenon. Rather, Structured Decision-
Making (SDM) and the Evidence-Based Practice (EBP) movement, of which it is a 
part, represent a sociological process of commensuration that requires further 
investigation (Espeland and Stevens, 1998). Espeland and Stevens have called for a 
sustained and critical examination of commensuration as it plays out across the 
social world because it is “symbolic, inherently interpretive, deeply political, and too 
important to be left implicit in sociological work” (Espeland and Stevens, 1998). To 
date, processes of commensuration have not been explicitly investigated as they 
unfold within the child welfare system.  
 This paper applies a sociological lens to analysis of the Structured-Decision-
Making (SDM) model in order to fill a gap in our knowledge about processes of 
commensuration within it.  I ask: What are the intended and unintended 
consequences of using actuarial-based risk assessments to frame decision-making in 
child welfare? How does state policy interact with the risk assessment to shape case 
trajectories? I argue that in the service of avoiding type 2 errors, type 1 errors may 
be more likely to occur. An investigation of the way that a ‘trust in numbers’ has 
come to organize how we approach social problems like child maltreatment (Porter, 
1995)  
In this paper, I briefly review the extant literature on commensuration and 
quantification. Following this, I examine the intended and unintended consequences 
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of transforming child welfare decision-making into an actuarial-based task in the 
state of State A.  This paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of this 
research for child welfare decision-making and proposes policy recommendations to 
improve practices related to utilizing actuarial-based risk assessments themselves. 
Commensuration as a Social Process ⁠1 
Constitutive and Powerful  
While a world driven by numbers (market values, market shares, statistics, 
prices, cost-benefit ratios, college rankings, pay) may seem natural and inevitable, 
sociologists who study commensuration understand this process to be a deliberate 
approach to the organization of social life (Espeland, 1997; Espeland & Stevens, 
1998; Espeland & Vannebo, 2007a; Porter, 1995; Radin, 1996; Zelizer, 1985). In fact, 
the way we arrange and interpret our world has become so defined by numbers that 
the values and social ideas embedded within these arrangements have become all but 
invisible (Espeland and Stevens, 1998). Espeland and Stevens (1998) give the 
following example of this taken for granted process noting “commodification has 
become so naturalized that it is hard to construe the value of some goods in forms 
apart from price” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998, pg. 5).  The more a commensurate 
process becomes integrated into every day life then the more unnoticed it is likely to 
become (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). As a result, investigating processes of 
commensuration is inherently a task of making the invisible visible, a process of 
uncovering how social concepts have come to be represented and contained within 
numerical ones.   
Commensuration acts in many ways: to simplify complex concepts so that 
they can be understandable; to constitute relationships between abstract ideas 
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and/or tangible objects; to create formal procedures for accountability; to produce 
efficient procedures and policies, and at its most abstract, to provide the contours 
that define states and their activities. One example of commensuration includes the 
process of transforming people from diverse countries with distinct sets of cultural 
identities and political histories into one category (Hispanic, Arab, or European). 
This act renders groups who understand themselves to be radically different from 
one another into a single entity, identifiable as the same (Porter, 1995). Another 
involves the development of physician and hospital report cards to create a common 
metric for evaluating abstract concepts like safety, value, and skill (Espeland & 
Vannebo, 2007b). Report cards are intended to make it easier for patients to make 
decisions about which doctors to seek care from while simultaneously holding the 
medical community accountable for patient safety and quality of care. A third 
example involves efforts to legitimatize the work of housewives by assigning value 
to their domestic efforts (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). Assigning economic values to 
housework is shorthand for communicating that this work is actual labor with a 
monetary benefit to the family. Through commensuration concepts that are thought 
to be intangible are given a concrete expression through numbers.  In the process, 
they may be granted new meaning (Espeland, 1997; Espeland & Stevens, 1998; 
Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Porter, 1995). 
 Commensurate processes have many benefits.  Giving complex concepts a 
shorthand is a way of simplifying difficult ideas, creating efficient paths for making 
decisions or responding to information that would otherwise be overwhelming. 
(Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Espeland and Vannebo; Stockey & Zeckhauser, 1978).  
Exhaustive research in cognitive science and psychology demonstrates how schemas 
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and strategies are necessary for managing and organizing multiple data points, 
without which it would be all but impossible to go through every day life (Espeland 
& Stevens, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 2002). By recasting complicated 
information into easily understandable units or numbers, processes of 
commensuration offer an important strategy for negotiating the world and focus our 
attention on the information that is important to consider while leaving out 
information that might be unnecessary. The technological advantages of the digital 
age align naturally with what is required to commensurate complex ideas with 
computers providing the means for analyzing any number of issues through 
complicated formulas and algorithms.    
Commensuration also has the potential to democratize (Espeland & Stevens, 
1998).  By counting, measuring, or depersonalizing the way information is handled 
and decisions are made, commensurate processes offer systematized and consistent 
ways for making sense of complicated or opaque processes. Using numbers whether 
in the form of statistics, prices, or other measures of comparable worth offers a way 
to make information accessible to the public and creates standardized ways for 
analyzing information and making judgments (Espeland and Stevens,1998). In this 
way, commensuration can install transparency and curtail decisions that are made 
based on subjective assessments, relationships, favors, or back room deals. By 
allowing the public to review and evaluate the decisions of those in power, common 
metrics create a mechanism by which the actions of those in a position of authority 
can be limited (Espeland, 1997; Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Espeland & Vannebo, 
2007b)  
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At the same time, standardized measures function to limit discretion and 
local knowledge by dictating the processes by which decisions are made, also 
making them appealing instruments for those in power to implement (Espeland, 
1997; Espeland & Stevens, 1998) Because commensuration can be used to both shore 
up and constrain authority, opposition to its practices can be found among both 
liberals and conservatives alike (Espeland, 1997; Porter, 1995).  
Commensuration can fundamentally alter the meaning of the things that 
they are trying to measure, standardize, evaluate, or compare (Espeland and 
Stevens, 1998).  Art given a high monetary value may draw people to a particular 
painting that they do not like but chose to buy anyway because of its worth, 
changing the relationship between personal taste and ownership or personal taste 
and value. The power of counting and measuring” can even create new social 
categories and relationships where they did not previously exist (Espeland, 1997; 
Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). Porter asserts that statistical 
concepts have not only defined the idea of society but also authored it. (Porter, 1995) 
As phenomena that were greater than individual acts such as suicides, birth rates, 
accidents, crimes, were able to be counted, patterned, and analyzed, new concepts 
were needed to understand them, giving rise to the identification of society itself 
(Porter, 1995, 1986; Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Durkheim, 1951; Hacking 1990).  
 As Porter, Espeland and Stevens all note “numbers become self-vindicating 
(Porter, 1995, p. 45). Their importance is reified as commensurate processes become 
institutionalized (Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Porter, 1995). Law school rankings 
have transformed not only which students are admitted to institutions but how the 
institutions themselves behave to compose their class giving out more merit based 
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scholarships to those with high LSAT scores or weighting LSAT scores higher than 
other criteria (Espeland & Vannebo, 2007b). Once a measure or metric is established 
as important, it then comes to define how people act in response. In turn, people’s 
behavior grants continued legitimacy to the commensurate process. 
Commensuration then is not just imposed on people, to hold power it must, at least 
partially, be accepted as a legitimate way to organize life (Espeland & Sauder, 2007).  
Accountability and Commensuration 
One way that commensuration produces new relationships is by linking 
quantified processes to the measurement and evaluation of performance (Power, 
1997; Porter, 1995; Ranson, 2003; Espeland and Vannebo, 2007). Indeed, the 
connection between accountability and commensuration cannot be overstated.  In 
the last 40 years, efforts to define outcomes and rate the quality and efficiency of 
performance have transformed the methods with which work is conducted (Espeland 
& Vannebo, 2007b; Porter, 1995; Power, 1997). Reliance on quantitative 
assessments to do and assess work, symbolizes the emergence of what Power has 
termed “the audit society’ (Power, 1997). Power understands the audit society to 
replace trust in professionals with trust in the procedures and organizations that 
monitor them (Power, 1997).   
Quantitative assessments have become predominant means by which 
professionals and institutions are held accountable. Porter conceptualizes this shift 
to one where work is guided by the predominance of “mechanical objectivity” 
(Porter, 1995).  Mechanical objectivity “is knowledge whose authority is based on 
compliance with explicit rules” (Espeland, 1997). In its formality, mechanical 
objectivity replaces personal knowledge and expertise with a “trust in numbers” 
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(Porter, 1997). Mechanical objectivity fills a need for creating procedures for 
decision-making that are depersonalized, able to be coordinated across multiple 
actors and domains, to be transparent, impersonal, clear, and fair. Numbers are seen 
as a neutral and therefore offer an ideal way to meet these criteria (Espeland, 1997; 
Espeland & Stevens, 1998). However, multiple theorists have documented how 
numbers are anything but impartial and objective in the way that they are employed 
and given meaning (Bowker & Starr, 1999; Epstein, 2007; Espeland, 1997; Espeland 
& Sauder, 2007; Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Espeland & Vannebo, 2007b; Hacking, 
1990; Lampland & Starr, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Porter, 1995; Timmermans 
& Epstein, 2010). Not only is effort required to determine how numbers and 
procedures will come to symbolize concepts but the processes by which they are 
given meaning are often obscured (Bowker & Starr, 1999; Espeland & Stevens, 1998; 
Lampland & Starr, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). 
 Porter argues that mechanical objectivity emerges under specific social 
conditions, particularly where trust is at issue (Porter, 1995). In the United 
Kingdom, nineteenth century actuaries resisted standardizing their methods, 
claiming that discretion was key to performing their role.  n contrast, after the 
Great Depression, American accountants adopted standardized practices when the 
political climate made anything but uniform methods untenable as a way of doing 
business (Porter, 1995). Distinct attempts to standardize the same phenomena and 
practices have unfolded differently in distinct contexts highlighting this process to 
be social rather than technical.  
Mechanical objectivity is most often valued when the public does not trust 
official decisions and those who make them, when there is conflict about what to do, 
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when decisions are open to review, and when a common language is needed to 
traverse social and physical distance (Porter, 1995, Espeland and Vannebo, 2007b).  
Decisions guided by quantitative processes, Porter asserts, are then most likely to be 
practiced by weak elites in political democracies (Porter, 1995). Mechanical 
objectivity satisfies the needs of bureaucrats who must defend their decision-making 
to others and who must demonstrate that their actions are fair and impersonal 
(Porter, 1995). As Espeland summarizes:   
This is why the United States, with its long tradition of distrusting elites 
and experts, relies so heavily on rules for constraining official discretion.  It 
also explains why the United States has led the way in producing and 
promoting such technologies as cost-benefit and risk analyses, educational 
and intelligence testing, opinion polling, survey research, and quantitative 
social science (Espeland, 1997). 
This historical and political moment, where quantified processes are the preferred 
method for decision-making and accountability is a particular one, guided by certain 
political realities and cultural norms. It is not the only or inevitable way to organize 
our approach but right now it is the dominant one.  
A Moral Process  
Not only is commensuration a political process, it is also a moral one 
(Strathern, 1996; Espeland and Vannebo, 2007b).  When numbers are used to 
determine the answers to complex social problems, they encode within them ethical 
judgments and values. Espeland and Vannebo (2007) detail how sentencing 
guidelines “mediate the distribution and meaning of punishment such that justice is 
rendered to abstract categories of persons rather than particular individuals” 
(Espeland and Vannebo, 2007). How justice is meted out, what crimes are considered 
worthy of more extensive punishment and then what happens as a result are issues 
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embedded within quantitative responses to social problems such as sentencing 
guidelines.  The difference in mandatory minimums for possession of crack/cocaine 
versus cocaine and the attendant consequences for who is incarcerated and for how 
long, exemplify the ways that social ideas about class and race can become obscured 
by numbers meant to be neutral. Even the desire itself to make processes efficient 
and decision-makers accountable reveals specific cultural mores (Espeland and 
Vannebo, 2007; Porter,1995).  
The Structured Decision-Making Model in State A 
Because commensurate processes contain within them moral and ethical 
values, they are particularly important to carefully unpack.  Deconstructing what is 
and is not emphasized within quantified or mechanized assessments offers clues as to 
how social problems are bounded, understood, and then ultimately dealt with. Such 
an understanding is an important and often overlooked part of social work research 
and child welfare practice. Without understanding the embedded values within 
structured decision-making practices (and other decision-making protocols), we 
cannot fully evaluate whether such a response makes sense. A sociological 
investigation of the Structure Decision Making model has the potential to reveal 
how SDM itself structures epistemological ideas about what constitutes 
maltreatment and the criteria for subsequent decisions throughout a child welfare 
case. 
  This article examines commensuration in the child welfare system by 
investigating the Structured Decision-Making Model as it is practiced in one state. 
A close reading of how one component of the SDM, the risk assessment, is 
constructed and then utilized offers insight into the consequences, both intended and 
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unintended, of quantifying the decision-making process within Child Protective 
Services (CPS).   
While there are multiple components to the SDM, this article only examines 
the construction and use of the risk assessment⁠2, which is arguably the most critical 
part of the SDM as it is practiced in a state that makes it central to child welfare 
cases. Tied to a number of decisions such as: the level at which a case is 
categorized; ⁠3 whether a parent or caregiver is placed on the Central Registry for 
Abuse and Neglect (a centralized list of offenders of child maltreatment searchable 
by employers and others); the intensity of services a family will receive and whether 
those services will be voluntary or mandated; and the frequency of contacts with the 
Child Protective Services; the risk assessment defines the shape a case will take and 
therefore exemplifies how a process of commensuration impacts child welfare 
decision-making. Use of the risk assessment is mandated by the state legislature 
further underscoring its importance 
The risk assessment 
In order to examine how the risk assessment is used in State A, an 
understanding of its components is required. Based on principles of actuarial risk 
assessment, this tool attempts to determine the likelihood that parent(s) or 
caregiver(s) will neglect or abuse their children in the future. The content of the risk 
assessment varies state by state but the format remains the same.  The risk 
assessment discussed in this paper contains two sets of inventories one for neglect 
and one for abuse.  Factors associated with abuse and neglect such as (but not 
limited to) parental history of abuse, history or presence of domestic violence, 
number of children in the house, age of caregiver, and previous involvement with 
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child protective services comprise the scales. Points are assigned to each item that 
the caseworker endorses.  For example, if a worker agreed with the statement that 
the “parent has a mental health problem,” one point would be assigned. Point values 
for each statement are weighted to reflect distinct levels of severity and impact. The 
statement: ‘Primary caretaker involved in harmful relationships’ contains one point 
for endorsing ‘harmful relationships and one domestic violent incident’ and two 
points for endorsing ‘multiple domestic violence incidents.’ At the completion of the 
assessment, the total points from the neglect inventory and the total points from the 
abuse inventory are calculated separately. The highest number from either 
inventory reflects the score used. A parent could score relatively low on the abuse 
inventory (3) but high on the neglect inventory (6) and the score for the parent 
would still be (6). The numerical value of the risk assessment represents whether a 
family is at an Intensive, High, Moderate, or Low risk for recurrence of abuse or 
neglect with higher numerical scores correlating with higher risk categories. A 
finding of Intensive on the risk assessment indicates the need for an immediate 
petition to the court for removal.   
Risk assessments are developed using validation studies to identify 
characteristics of families that indicate the potential for future maltreatment.  
Validation studies determine the most influential risk factors for maltreatment, the 
combination of factors that are most likely to contribute to abuse or neglect, and the 
appropriate statistical weights and measures necessary to create a risk profile for 
families using this information.  Measures for the validation studies are collected 
using CPS data about the characteristics of families who have been substantiated for 
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abuse and neglect as well as information about which families have been re-referred 
for child maltreatment after an initial investigation and/or substantiation. 
(http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/nc_risk_asst_vali
dation_final2009_2.pdf).  
The Children’s Research Center expresses enormous confidence in actuarial 
risk assessment noting “because these tools are products of research on the actual 
experience of families previously reported to the agency, it is possible to assess risk 
with a reasonably high degree of accuracy”(CRC, 2008). Distinguishing between the 
benefits of classification and predictive power, the Children’s Research Center 
carefully emphasizes that the risk assessment is not necessarily prognostic about 
whether families will maltreat their children in the future.  However, case actions 
are largely influenced by the potential for future harm as indicated by the risk level 
(CRC, 2008).   
Beyond providing information about the risk for on-going child 
maltreatment, the risk assessment also guides decision-making about whether a 
family would benefit from services if a case is substantiated and opened. Risk levels 
dictate the level of intervention and oversight necessary for families. Families with a 
low risk level have infrequent face to face contact with their caseworker (once a 
month) and caseworkers make similarly infrequent connections with providers (one 
collateral contact per month), while caseworkers will make four visits per month and 
four collateral contacts for families that are deemed to be high risk. 
Mandating the frequency of interactions that a family has with CPS based on 
their risk level is intended to distribute the time and attention of caseworkers 
according to the greatest need. Limited resources are then not spent on families who 
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are least likely to benefit from system engagement, leaving more opportunities to 
supervise families where the potential for continued or future maltreatment remains 
high (CRC, 2008).  
In State A, caseworkers and supervisors have the option to override a risk 
level that they believe does not represent the severity of a particular situation.  
There are two types of overrides: discretionary and mandatory. Discretionary 
overrides can be made by a worker to increase the risk level to a higher category 
with written justification and supervisor approval. These overrides can only be used 
to raise the risk level.  Mandatory overrides are policies that require the risk level to 
be raised to Intensive in the presence of certain conditions such as: a child with 
severe injuries resulting from the action or inaction of a parent, the death of a 
sibling from abuse or neglect by the shared caregiver, alleged sexual abuse when the 
accuser has access to the child, a child under the age of two with serious non-
accidental injuries, a parent who has had another child after having their parental 
rights terminated.  Once a case has been substantiated, the investigator has 30 days 
to complete the risk assessment.  If a case is denied, the risk assessment does not 
have to be filled out and is not used to inform decision-making.  
Research Methods 
Sample 
The data for the present study originates from in-depth qualitative 
interviews with 35 Child Protective Service (CPS) workers and close reading and 
analysis of primary source material about the Structured Decision-Making Model in 
State A. I recruited participants for the study using two related strategies. First, I 
presented the study and passed around a sign-up sheet for those were interested in 
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joining at continuing education trainings at a School of Social Work. I then followed 
up with these self-identified volunteers and scheduled interviews. Additionally, a 
director of a child welfare agency in introduced my research to his staff and passed 
around a sign-up sheet. Following an identical procedure, I contacted volunteers 
and scheduled interviews with those who demonstrated interest. At this area office, I 
also recruited participants using a snowball sample as other CPS workers heard 
about the study from colleagues and asked to join. Participants were offered a $25 
Visa gift card to compensate them for their time. 
 Interviewees ranged in age from 24-62. Participants were comprised of 17 
White women, 8 African-American women, and 6 White men. Workers interviewed 
had a variety of experience. 42 %(15 out of 35) had worked in their current position 
less than 2 years, 22% worked in their current position between 2-5 years (8 out of 
35), and 20% (7 out of 35) had over 5 years of experience on the job.  All participants 
were front line Child Protective Service workers tasked with either making 
decisions either about substantiation and severity of child maltreatment  
(Investigators) or, in the case of substantiated cases whether a family was complying 
with treatment and recommended services (Treatment Workers). For decisions 
about the latter group, Child Protective Service workers were responsible for either 
discharging or escalating cases as families wound their way through the child 
welfare system 
Interview Content 
The interview protocol for this study was designed to ground data about 
participants beliefs through their behaviors (Charmaz, 2006).  Semi- structured and 
open-ended, the protocol focused on eliciting information about their every day 
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work practice. I collected general information on what a typical day looked like, how 
a participant chose their profession, and the challenges of the job as well its 
pleasures. Following this initial discussion, I asked participants "to walk me 
through" a series of cases from the time they opened them to the time they closed or 
transferred them (Weiss, 1995).  These cases included their most recent neglect 
case, a challenging case, and a case that were they felt good about the decision they 
had come to.  By collecting data on cases across a continuum of affective states and 
challenges, I was able to get a rich sense of how a worker conceptualized their role, 
what strategies they regularly engaged in as child welfare workers, and what they 
understood to be ‘typical’, ‘hard’, and ‘easy’.  
After collecting these accounts, I turned the focus of the interview to the 
Structured Decision-Making (SDM) tools (if they had not yet mentioned them at 
other points in the interview). Once again, I collected information on attitudes 
through questions about behaviors. I asked workers how they used these tools in 
their every day practice and asked each worker to ‘walk me through’ through the 
Safety, Risk, or Reunification Assessments for any or all of the cases they described. 
These questions allowed me to collect data on the weight that these assessments 
were given in the final disposition of the case and how they influenced decision-
making about legal or social service involvement.  
Throughout the interview, I followed up every question with probes specific 
to the conversation. Common probes focused around further elucidating the logic at 
decision-making points and case detail. Interviews ranged from 60-180 minutes with 
a median interview time of 90-100 minutes. Interviews were audio taped and 
transcribed. I conducted interviews at neutral locations such as local libraries and a 
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community center with offices available for sign-out.  Interviews also took place in 
an available room at one area Child Protective Service office.  All names of offices, 
agencies, and people are pseudonyms. (Bosk, Same Difference: Standardized 
Decision-Making in Practice, In Progress) 
Data Analysis 
Following grounded theory protocols, I began analyzing data at the same 
time that I was collecting data(Charmaz, 2006). Using an iterative approach, I began 
coding interviews without any a priori ideas or assumptions about what themes 
were contained within them. This open coding strategy was first applied to 
individual interviews using Nvivo 10 qualitative data analysis software. (Emerson, 
Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). Codes were selected based on the emergence of patterned 
regularities in the transcripts. Once I identified core themes, I then coded interviews 
at the aggregate level. After a codebook had been developed, two Research 
Assistants analyzed the data deductively based on the themes and categories I 
initially identified to ensure inter-rater reliability. The data presented below 
represents larger themes found in the data, except where noted. Quotes from the 
data are edited for clarity (e.g. repeated "Ums" removed), but no words have been 
changed or re-ordered. 
Why Here  
State A offers an ideal site in which to conduct this research. Currently, State 
A's legislature mandates the use of the Structured Decision-Making Model (SDM) 
for child welfare decision-making in all casework. In addition to the SDM, State A 
has also adopted a category system where Child Protective Service workers are 
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required to rank a case based on level of severity from 1-5.  The ranking system 
further standardizes caseworker action and discretion by specifying the specific 
protocols that follow each ranking.  Case categories are explicitly linked to the risk 
assessment (RA) with scores on the RA correlating with the case category. The 
chart below outlines the category system and their connecting designations from the 
risk assessment: (Bosk, Same Difference: Standardized Decision-Making in Practice, 
In Progress) 
 State A Child Protective Services Category System 
Category V  Following a field investigation, the department determines 
that there is no evidence of child maltreatment or is unable 
to locate the family. No action taken. 
Category IV  Cases where there is no preponderance of evidence that 
neglect or abuse has occurred. If the risk assessment 
demonstrates any risk Voluntary Community Services 
are Recommended. 
Category III  A preponderance of evidence that child maltreatment has 
occurred. The risk assessment scores as low or moderate. If 
the family does not voluntarily participate in services or 
does not progress CPS may reclassify as a Category II. 
Community Services are Needed. Moderate Risk 
Category II A preponderance of evidence that abuse or neglect has 
occurred. There is a high level of risk for future harm as 
indicated by the risk assessment.  The perpetrator is listed 
on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect.  Child 
Protective Services are Required in Conjunction with 
Community Services. High Risk 
Category I  A preponderance of evidence that child maltreatment has 
occurred with the risk assessment scoring as high or 
intensive. Child Protective Services determine that a court 
petition is either needed or required. Perpetrator is listed 
on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect. CPS 
petitions for the immediate removal of child(ren). 
Services Provided by Child Protective Services or 
Foster Care in Conjunction with Community Services.  
Intensive Risk 
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Avoiding Type 2 Error leads to Type 1 Error 
 In State A, the policies related to the Structured Decision-Making model as 
well as the items on the risk assessment itself appear designed to avoid a Child 
Protective Service worker making a type 2 error: leaving a child in a home when 
s/he should have been removed. Discretionary overrides that permit a case worker 
to raise the risk level as well as mandatory policy overrides for specific situations 
function to ensure that there are multiple mechanisms that enable a removal to take 
place or dictate that it does when certain conditions are met.    
The fact that overrides can be made to raise but not lower the risk level 
signal the explicit concern for avoiding one set of errors in judgment: those that 
involve having a child remain in a situation that is unsafe. The consequences for 
making this kind of error cannot be overstated. Children have died when Child 
Protective Service workers have assessed a home to be safe when it is not.  The 
moral and organizational incentives to avoid a child suffering or dying as the result 
of a flawed assessment are clearly enormous. High profile fatalities often lead to very 
public excoriations of the Department of Health and Human Services in the forms of 
blistering media coverage, public outcries for change, and state hearings to uncover 
what went wrong. Indeed child welfare policy itself is enormously reactive to 
scandals that most often involve the death of children who have come into contact 
with the child welfare system(Gainsborough, 2010). Gainsborough has argued that 
responses to child fatalities are actually the single driving force for making changes 
to existing policies or creating new ones within the child welfare system 
(Gainsborough, 2010). It makes sense, then, that actuarial-based risk assessments as 
well as the policies surrounding their use would be designed to avoid making this 
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kind of error. However, it may be that in the desire to avoid committing a type 2 
error that the conditions arise under which more type 1 errors (removing a child 
from a home when they should have been able to remain in place) are made. I argue 
that a combination of prescribed actions from the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the construction of State A’s risk assessment make type 1 errors more 
common.  
 Removals when they are unwarranted can be absolutely devastating to 
children and their caregivers.  For young children, disruptions in care may 
profoundly alter relationships with life long consequences for their emotional, social, 
and cognitive development (Bowlby, 1973, 1979, 1980). For caregivers, extensive 
involvement with the child welfare system comes with costs related to time, money, 
energy, self-esteem, and wellbeing. Competent legal representation is often 
necessary to facilitate a reunification and access to these services may not be 
available to all who require it. Caregivers and their children, often obscured from 
the view of those who made the original decision, hold the burdens associated with 
an unwarranted removal. As a result there is not the same organizational incentives 
to limit these mistakes as they are not as visible to those who made them, the media 
or the public.  The consequences of type 1 errors make it equally important to 
understand how and when they are made within the decision-making process. 
For some parents and caregivers, risk assessments that are rated higher than 
they should be do not result in the removal of their children but do result in their 
placement on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect. The Central Registry for 
Abuse and Neglect is a state list of people who have had serious charges of child 
maltreatment substantiated against them.  This database is publicly searchable and 
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those who are placed on it are prohibited from holding a job in which they come into 
contact with children, from participating in activities in which multiple children are 
present (such as attending school functions or accompanying their children on field 
trips), or from having a child placed with them by Child Protective Services in the 
future. Many people who land on the registry are at risk for loosing their job so 
there are serious consequences that can last long after a maltreatment case has been 
concluded. This next section considers the ways in which the SDM risk assessment 
in State A may mean that in the service of avoiding a type 2 error, a type 1 error is 
more likely to be committed instead.  
Demographic Factors  
 The risk assessment contains a mix of demographic and dynamic factors 
related to risk for child maltreatment. Demographic factors include the number of 
children in the home as well as the age of the children.  Focus on demographic 
factors means that it is possible for a risk assessment to come out as high through 
the presence of static indicators rather than the behaviors of the caregiver in 
question. Angela describes how this can occur: 
A:  Well sometimes with the outcome of the risk assessment I don’t 
agree with; like ‘cause you know when it comes to high and it’s 
open, it’s gonna be a Category 2. And sometimes I feel like it 
shouldn’t be ‘cause sometimes it’s just for having four or more kids 
in the home… 
E: So like that might be something that throws it over the edge? 
A: That throws it over the edge and it shouldn’t; like or either there’ll 
be like there were four or more kids in the home and they had…and 
the children had mental health issues.  Then that throws it over the 
edge to make them be a Category 2 and put them on the unfit list; 
even when it’s like a first-time offense.   
E: What do you do in those situations?  ‘Cause it sounds like… 
A: There’s nothing you can do  
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Cases that are categorized as 2 or higher mean an automatic placement on central 
registry for the parent or caregiver under investigation.  As it is currently 
constructed, the State A risk assessment weights having more than 2 children, 
children under the age of 7 and a previous child maltreatment complaint (not 
necessarily a substantiation) as factors that will raise the risk level for a family.  
Questions about the number of children in the home are asked twice (once on the 
neglect inventory and once on the abuse inventory) with the risk level being raised 
for more than three children on the neglect side. Workers report that families have 
often been penalized for having young children or more children rather than on 
relational factors or behavioral factors related to the complaint.   
Demographic items that seem fairly straightforward on their face and 
without any controversy as to their relationship to child maltreatment such as N2. 
Number of prior assigned neglect complaints and/or findings and A2. Number of prior 
assigned abuse complaints and/or findings can be more problematic in practice. The 
assumption behind including them in the risk assessment is that prior history is a 
predictor of future behavior. The more complaints a parent or caregiver have had 
against them in the past, the more risky the current situation is likely to be and the 
greater the probability of future maltreatment. By collecting measures on the 
number of complaints rather than on the number of substantiated complaints, the 
risk assessment treats the suspicion of maltreatment by others and the presence of 
confirmed incidents of maltreatment as the same event or at least as events that 
predict the same amount of risk.  
Investigators report that the reasons for multiple complaints vary and are 
not necessarily indicative of the parent or caregiver’s past actions. Parents engaging 
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in custody battles can use the Child Protective Service System as a way to bolster 
their case for receiving custody.  Filing an anonymous complaint with CPS is also a 
way of settling scores between neighbors, acquaintances and of exacting revenge 
when relationships between parents change (separation, breakups, divorce) and 
when new people (girlfriends, boyfriends, biological parents of half siblings) enter 
the picture.  During my fieldwork, investigators estimated that somewhere between 
50- 80% of their caseload was dedicated to evaluating reports that were clearly false 
and personal in nature. Of these false complaints, investigators estimated that 
almost half of these risk assessments scored as high. 
Because unsubstantiated complaints are treated the same as substantiated 
ones in child maltreatment investigations, they can and do inflate the risk score. As 
Ashley describes: 
…You’ll have some families that the neighbors will continually call on them 
or there’ll be like one RP [Reporting Person] that continually calls on them 
and makes up a new allegation every time and we have to go out and 
investigate and deny the case repeatedly.  But let’s say they have four kids 
and one’s young. So then they got a bunch of previous CPS history, the 
young kid and the four kids in the home, they’re already at a very high-risk 
level.  So even if it’s a small issue because of all those risk points, there’s a 
very good chance they’ll be put on Central Registry and Cat 2. I think that’s 
one issue I do have with the abuse assessment is those three categories. See 
the previous CPS history, it should be not just assigned cases but 
substantiated cases.  
Similarly, Diane observes that just the presence of previous complaints is enough to 
move the risk assessment from low to moderate:  
I mean I think sometimes when there’s prior history, you know you have to 
put in prior history, and sometimes that can elevate it more than it would 
need to be, because maybe the situation that you have right now isn’t 
severe, but because of the history it’s, you know it will elevate the risk 
assessment.  So those times, you know you would maybe have a disparity 
between the two; like this really doesn’t warrant a high risk level, but it’s 
coming out high because they’ve had two prior cases.   
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Literature has demonstrated that CPS allegations and investigations occur not just 
at the individual level but at the neighborhood level as well (Claudia J. Coulton, 
Korbin, & Su, 1999; C. J. Coulton, Korbin, Su, & Chow, 1995; Garbarino & Crouter, 
1978; Garbarino & Kostelny, 1992; Garbarino & Sherman, 1980; Zuravin, 1989).  
Communities where most residents are of low socio-economic status as well as 
communities of color are more likely to come under the official scrutiny of Child 
Protective Services than those of high socio-economic status and those that are 
mostly white. Research on disproportionality in the child welfare system has 
demonstrated that maltreatment is not more likely to occur in communities that 
receive more scrutiny but that the surveillance itself predicts involvement with the 
child welfare system (Fluke, Yuan, Hedderson, & Curtis, 2003). These issues come 
to a head in questions designed to capture suspicion of families rather than actual 
incidents of maltreatment.  In cases where maltreatment is substantiated, previous 
scrutiny by the child welfare system, even when it was unfounded, can be counted 
against a parent. The risk assessment encodes the idea that contacts with the child 
welfare system in any form raise the likelihood of future maltreatment.  
The Presence of the Past: How Personal History Impacts Current Assessments  
 Playing out within the risk assessment form are larger discussions about the 
role that a parent’s experience of maltreatment has to the current complaint. 
Question A5 asks workers to record whether either caretaker was abused or 
neglected as a child. If the question is endorsed 2 points are added to the risk 
assessment. Workers assert that in combination with other demographic factors 
such as age of the child and number of children in the house that adding past history 
into the mix can be enough to move caregivers into a High risk category and on to 
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the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect without regard to other factors that 
should influence the case such as such as the severity of the substantiated 
maltreatment and how those under investigation understand and are addressing the 
problem. Jennifer asserts: 
I mean there's cases all the time that score out as high, you have parents 
participating throughout the whole thing… You know one of the biggest 
questions we have to ask in policy is; does the family... have you ever been 
abused or neglected as a child?  They self report that.  Well again, if you 
clicked yes, parent self reports they were sexually abused as a minor, you 
know again that just raised their risk level, but that doesn't mean that 
they’re at [risk]... it could've been over something of a dirty house you 
know. 
Jennifer notes that history of parental maltreatment might not impact the current 
complaint in a meaningful way.  However, as the item is currently written, there is 
no way to have a more sophisticated understanding of how a parental history of 
maltreatment as a child affects the current situation.   
 It is reasonable to assume that rather than affecting all families in the same 
way (raising the likelihood that a caregiver will maltreat a child) that there are 
multiple ways that a history of maltreatment could impact caregiving. A parent 
could construct her approach to child rearing in opposition to what she herself 
experienced or a parent could repeat what she herself had learned. The experience of 
child maltreatment itself is suggestive and likely impacts how a parent parents but it 
is not determinative in any particular direction. Further, this question, as it is 
phrased, does not distinguish between caregivers who have received treatment for 
the negative effects of maltreatment and those who have not. In doing so, the 
inventory understands a history of maltreatment uniformly to be both negative and 
static, collapsing events that are dynamic and multilayered into a singular meaning.  
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 Questions about the past whether related to a parent’s experience of 
maltreatment, previous complaints, or past incidents of maltreatment are phrased 
only to capture the existence of these events rather than determine their meaning in 
the present. In this way, events that are dynamic and multi-layered are smoothed 
into a singular and flat occurrence. 
Lauren recounts how a risk assessment scored as high even when her 
investigation revealed no risk to the children: 
  There was a family who had previous CPS history a lot of it, which bumps 
it up on the risk scale.  You know here was previous domestic violence, 
previous substance abuse, and the father I think was abused or neglected as 
a child.  So the risk level kind of scored through the roof, but the allegations 
we got were that the children they didn’t have food or clothing. And I went 
to the house and everything was perfect. All the kids, they didn’t disclose 
anything concerning and there was plenty of food; they had tons of clothes.  
So it was kind of bogus allegations I think, so obviously I wasn’t going to 
substantiate the family, but the risk level did score through the roof because 
of everything that had happened in the past...(short laugh)…so and you 
can’t bump it down a risk level, you can only bump it up so in those cases 
you just got to leave it as a high risk and deny it.  
While a negative outcome for the family is prevented from occurring because the 
case was denied, the family would have had a very different outcome if Lauren had 
found cause for maltreatment that needed to be addressed but was not severe. This 
leaves little room for workers to address a maltreatment complaint that they might 
need to substantiate but where the severity of maltreatment does not match the risk 
assessment.  
While there is a clear link between a parents’ history of maltreatment and 
maltreatment of their children, it is by no means a fixed one Not all people who were 
maltreated as children go on to maltreat their own children.  In fact, studies had 
shown that transmission of abusive behaviors varies between 18-40% for all abuse 
types (Gara et.Al. 2000; Pears & Capaldi, 2001; Elwell, & Ephross, 1987; Kelly, 
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1990, Newberger, Gremy, Waternaux, & Newberger, 1993; Oates, et al., 1998).  
Emphasis on the past without the ability to consider its meaning in the present takes 
a determinative view of the relationship between events, embedding theories about 
the cycle of violence within the risk assessment itself.     
When analyzed collectively, one of the main critiques that Child Protective 
Service workers in State A have about the risk assessment is the way that it can 
penalize caregivers for being ‘a victim of circumstance.’ Because caregivers can end 
up as a high-risk case simply from a combination of demographic and historical 
factors, investigators report that, at times, cases escalate when they could be 
handled in other ways. Demographic items that document facts or events are seen 
differently by workers than those that encode agency or behaviors. The former are 
viewed to be more ‘unfair’ by workers because they may or may not be related to 
whether the substantiated charge merits the actions that occur as a result. Child 
Protective Service workers assert that having little room for both interpretation on 
the risk assessment and then the resulting case actions means that sometimes cases 
unfold in ways that they feel are unjustified.    
Casey explains how the presence of a certain amount of risk factors 
unmediated by more nuanced reflections on the impact these risk factors are having 
on a case can lead to situations were workers are required to file petitions to remove 
children when they do not believe this action is warranted:  
It was a neglect case and that’s one of the ones I ended up having to do in-
home ward with the courts.  Mom is, I believe between 24 and 26 and she 
has mental health issues of her own, and she comes from a very difficult 
relationship with her parents; a difficult relationship with her family.  I 
think her mother is also undiagnosed bi-polar so I can only imagine how 
bad they, you know don’t get along.And she has 3 children; an 8-year-old, a 
5-year-old and a 1-year-old, I think she’s like 13 months.  And she was 
living with the father of the two youngest and for some reason she decided 
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to let the oldest boy live with her parents and so she was only living with 
the two youngest and the father.   
And it was a domestic violence relationship and the house was in disarray 
partially because the landlord hadn’t cared for, like the water main broke.  
So between that and a little bit of them knocking around and throwing 
things and her being, her mental health issues.  When the police came out 
for a domestic violence incident they filed because the house was dirty.   
I came out and she ended up getting evicted from the house within a couple 
of weeks because they weren’t paying rent, I guess because the landlord 
wasn’t fixing the issues.  And when, you know I looked at the case because 
of mom’s mental health issues, because she has three children and one of, 
her youngest baby was special needs.  She was in a domestic violence victim, 
she had CPS history as a victim; all of these things made her have a high 
risk and made us have to go to the point where we had to file in-home.   
But she was completely willing to work with services.  She was so happy to 
have someone to help her get out of the domestic violence situation.  To 
help her get her own housing because she’s always relied on her mom or a 
man and this was her first opportunity to support herself and we were 
helping her and she went to counseling and you know, she went with 
Families First and this was all before we filed.   And just because her risk 
assessment was so high; we had to file.  
In this case, Casey believes that while multiple risk factors (the mother’s mental 
health, the domestic violence, housing situation) are risk factors that need to be 
addressed, the outcome for the case is unnecessarily punitive. The risk assessment 
does not take into account the relationship between the risk factors at hand and the 
behavior of the parent under investigation. Casey observes that the mother in this 
case is working hard to attend to the range of issues that have brought her to the 
attention of the child welfare system. In her estimation, these efforts are enough to 
mitigate the higher risk assessed by the risk assessment. Casey sums up:  
And I totally agreed with the allegations and that somebody needed to you 
know address her mental health, address why she is doing this, and give her 
parenting classes to address the fact that she can’t parent her kid and she 
just wants to medicate them to deal with them.   
But I didn’t think that it was to the level that we had to take her job away 
and make it so she couldn’t care for her four children, because then if she 
can’t, you know that’s just going to make the whole situation worse.  And, I 
mean, I don’t know I just felt that the way that, if she is a risk to children I 
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feel like she should be a risk to children because of the actions and decisions 
she made, not because of the things that happened to her 
By tying the trajectory of the case solely to the presence of risk factors themselves, 
without taking into account how the parent is responding to them may create the 
conditions under which more severe outcomes are likely to occur. Even worse, by 
jeopardizing the employment situation of this mother, placement on the Central 
Registry might actually make it more likely that child maltreatment will occur in 
the future by creating the conditions for physical neglect.    
Keeping it Simple Is Not Less Complicated 
Kelly finds that the lack of nuance that Casey refers to on the risk assessment 
makes it difficult to complete it accurately:  
It’s either – it is this or it isn’t this.  There’s no grey area you know, so it’s 
like, and that’s what makes it hard going through this. You know it’s like; 
am I gonna want to put another thing on the risk assessment or is it not to 
that point where I really need to put it on the risk assessment? Its just not 
so straightforward, you know…  
Like all standardized assessments, the risk assessment in State A is actually 
designed to mediate the gray areas of cases. By using the presence or absence of 
identified risk factors to sort families into assigned categories, cases that are not 
straightforward are intended to be made more so. One of the goals of the risk 
assessment is to create a more objective reading of the facts of the case. Quantifying 
the number of risk factors and then assigning each of these a weighted score 
explicitly removes the context that accompanies every situation. The intent is to 
make decisions fairer by grounding judgments in the latest research and eliminating 
the subjective elements of decision-making. Ironically, taking away the potential for 
contextual assessment also contains the potential to make decisions more unfair.  
Without the opportunity to account for nuance or complexity, cases that are 
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fundamentally unalike are treated as the same. William describes how flattening the 
complexity of cases can actually invite more complication:  
We have kids that beat up their parents. I know we’re here to protect the 
kids, but we, when I in foster care we had kids that were [in] 7 and 8 old in 
residential placements. They come back to the community they’re out of 
control. They’re parents are sitting on them holding their hands down 
because they’ve busted everything up and they’re hurting everyone in the 
house, and they don’t know what else to do, and the child may have a bruise 
on his wrist from being held down. That’s a bruise, that’s substantiation.  
That again, we’re humans there is not anything that fits perfectly. Those 
are the things we can’t change.  I can’t [change] the fact this kid has a 
bruise. Just because of that, it’s going to be open, period. We need the 
discretion to say; how did that bruise get there? Was mom protecting the 
child? Was mom protecting another child from a child? Those things go on.  
William asserts cases that may seem straightforward on their face (e.g. corporal 
punishment by a parent that results in a mark, which is not only grounds for a 
mandatory substantiation but also against the law) in practice are anything but 
clear. Processes of commensuration often treat discretion as suspect. An unintended 
consequence of abstracting concepts into numerical forms can be an outcome that 
violates the principle of the rule.   
While the risk assessment is designed to protect families from the harmful 
consequences of subjective assessments that are incorrect, rooted in bias, or based on 
erroneous beliefs; the flip side of removing discretion from casework is that when 
the assigned case trajectory does not match the case dynamics, caseworkers have 
almost no recourse to redress the situation. Kelly sums it up:  
And that’s where the whole grey area, you know it’s for a question like that, 
it depends on the family.  Because like I said you could walk into a 
home…and it’s exactly as it appears [on the allegations].  They are 
absolutely not willing to take care of anything.  But here’s a mom that loves 
her child more than anything and here’s a daughter that loves her mom you 
know, but one bad thing happened and it snowballed into a mess.  And it’s 
just an unfortunate situation for everyone.   
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Kelly is discussing a case where the actuarial risk assessment suggests one course of 
action but where its context invites a very different conclusion than the numbers 
draw. As Kelly notes, the meaning of any item on the risk assessment really depends 
on the family.   
  Lack of nuance begins on the risk assessment itself, in the way that questions 
are phrased, and continues through how State A) ties policy to the outcome of the 
risk assessment. By correlating the result of the risk assessment with the case 
category, State A does not see a role for assessment outside of the form once a case 
has been substantiated. When it comes to cases that require an immediate petition 
for removal, failures of the risk assessment are assumed to occasionally occur. The 
mandatory overrides are meant to account for situations where the risk assessment 
does not capture the full meaning of a case. Yet, no such accounting is made for 
scenarios where the risk assessment understands the situation to be more severe 
than a caseworker believes it to be.  In this way, state policy views the risk 
assessment to be infallible when it comes to overestimating risk and fallible when it 
comes to underestimating it.   
Two Sides to Every Story: Intimate Partner Violence and the risk assessment  
The items on the risk assessment simplify not only the complexity that 
emerges from evaluating the ecological context of cases but also the complexity that 
emerges from debates in the field about what constitutes risk and how risk should be 
understood. Both the presence of questions related to intimate partner violence and 
the way these items are scored represent one way of understanding the impact of 
domestic violence on child welfare. The presence of intimate partner violence is 
accounted for in two different ways on the risk assessment, making it one of the 
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most heavily weighted factors to be evaluated during the investigative process. Kate 
believes that the risk assessment can come out as higher than it should be (in her 
estimation) simply because of the way domestic violence is understood within the 
risk assessment:  
Like there’s a lot of times like I'm surprised like when it comes out as high.  
I think that it’s not so accurate ‘cause there’s two different questions 
regarding domestic violence; one if there’s a history; one if the person’s in a 
harmful relationship.  So if there’s any domestic violence they’re scored 
negatively on two areas, whereas everything else is just one question.  So I 
feel like it’s a little skewed when it comes to that.  And I don’t really know 
how I feel that if somebody had domestic violence in a relationship five 
years ago, how that affects their current you know ability to parent and 
their current relationship if there isn’t any domestic violence. I don’t 
necessarily feel like they should be penalized for that you know. So 
sometimes I think it’s a little higher than it should be. 
Kate points out that because the risk assessment has two items related to domestic 
violence (N8 Primary Caretaker involved in harmful relationships and A8 Either 
caretaker has current or a history of domestic violence) that families are evaluated twice 
for the same phenomenon, automatically raising the risk level. As such, the presence 
of domestic violence, whether in the past or present, could be considered to be one of 
the areas of greatest concern to Child Protective Services. Adding multiple points to 
the risk assessment, involvement in a relationship with intimate partner violence 
might be enough to place a parent on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect as 
Ashley describes: 
A:   So now we have referred her to domestic violence resources, but 
she’s out of county now, she’s actually moved into Redford.  So 
we’re gonna open the case.  Unfortunately we have to put her on 
Central Registry due to the fact that there was neglect going on 
because she was exposing her child continually to this DV 
[domestic violence] relationship.  This one, I don’t feel good about 
putting her on Central Registry, but we have to open the case to 
provide a more continuing services. 
 E: Was there any possibility of putting her at a Cat 3…? 
 A: We don’t make the decision, the computer does, so I put in,  
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you know all the stuff that’s going on and unfortunately it came out 
as high risk level so that’s that and she’s on Central Registry. But 
we will continue to service the family.  We’ve referred her to 
getting a PPO. That was our first suggestion and luckily her mom’s 
doors are barred so he can’t kick those down so that’s actually a big 
plus.  And we’re just gonna go from there. 
The risk assessment captures one way of thinking about the meaning of 
domestic violence within Child Protective Services: that exposure to domestic 
violence is an unqualified risk to children. It is important to note that ample 
empirical evidence supports this claim (Fantuzzo & Lindquist, 1989; Jaffe, Wolfe, & 
Wilson, 1990; Kolbo, Blakely& Engleman, 1996; Margolin & Gordis, 2000; Wolak & 
Finkelhor,1998 (Levendosky, Huth-Bocks, Shapiro, & Semel, 2003). However, the 
certainty of the risk assessment also obscures an ongoing debate among researchers 
and practitioners who work on issues related to intimate partner violence about 
whether charging women with failure to protect in child welfare investigations is 
itself a process of blaming the victim (Rivett & Kelly, 2006; Rogerson, 2012).  
This issue has not reached an empirical or policy consensus, making it far 
from settled.  Workers like Kate and Ashley who take a position that punitive 
consequences in these cases are unjustified, feel that their hands are tied when 
caregivers are placed on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect or when 
petitions are filed solely based on the presence of intimate partner violence. While 
Kate and Ashley’s position has support from some researchers and advocates, their 
understanding of cases involving intimate partner violence goes unexplored because 
of the way the risk assessment is structured and because state policy does not allow 
a space for workers to lower the case category.    
The way intimate partner violence is captured on the risk assessment may 
actually serve to create confusion about how to evaluate the role of intimate partner 
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violence in a case. As Kate explains, official policy for the substantiation of cases is 
supposed to take a more nuanced view of failure to protect cases that incorporates 
current debate about the issue:  
And one thing that we always like get caught up on is the sexual abuse 
cases and whether or not it’s you know someone failed to protect or it’s a 
mandatory petition.  So those are things that we went around with. We had 
like three cases in a row, so we were talking about that a lot.  And domestic 
violence is another one.  I mean there’s a couple pages of very specific things 
and how you can’t substantiate a parent.  Like if there’s domestic violence, a 
lot of people don’t realize like if Mom’s allowing the dad to beat her instead 
of the children, that’s a protecting measure and you can’t substantiate Mom 
for that.  She’s doing what she can within her means to protect the kids.  So 
you know what I mean?  A lot of people interpret that differently because 
obviously you’re still exposing your child to domestic violence, but that’s an 
effort that she’s making to protect them.  
The static wording of the questions related to intimate partner violence along with 
confusion among workers about how to evaluate it means that in practice only one 
side of the debate is recognized in assessments of domestic violence. Issues that are 
still being negotiated in practice are reified as having reached an expert consensus 
on the risk assessment itself.    
Neglecting Emotional Neglect and Abuse 
While some items on the risk assessment are heavily weighted both in terms 
of number of questions and scoring, others are functionally left out of the 
assessment process despite their official presence on the risk assessment. One such 
item is emotional abuse and neglect.  This form of maltreatment is explicitly 
represented on the risk assessment through the following question: A1: Current 
complaint and/or finding includes mental injury.  State A’s policy regarding mental 
injury is that only a mental health professional can identify it. Workers report that 
this requirement means that they rarely, if ever, endorse a finding of mental injury, 
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answering the question negatively as a matter of routine.  Casey and Monica detail 
this process 
 
M:   Mental injury; No. I don't think I've ever marked that one. 
C:    And so for the other one mental injury.  Mental injury, we don’t 
assess that it’s kind of going be assessed by psychiatrist, yeah and so 
anytime we have an allegation of mental injury we have to send 
them for an assessment and we wait for their [evaluation]… so I 
almost always hit zero on this one. 
The majority of workers understand this policy to be an unequivocally positive 
approach, asserting that cases involving emotional neglect or abuse are more likely 
to be subject to personal judgments rather than objective criteria. Leaving the 
determination of emotional abuse and neglect to experts protects families from the 
whims of protective service workers as Casey articulates:  
E: What do you think about sort of assessing emotional abuse and only 
having a psychiatrist assess that? 
C: I don’t think that we should be able to assess that…I’m not 
qualified to make that assessment so I wouldn’t think that I should.  
And I think that we, I don’t know that we don’t even know some of 
the things that might, different people or act differently and cope 
differently to different situations.  So things that we might know,  
like oh, that probably isn’t that big a deal; other peoples coping 
mechanisms may not be as great you know for certain kids and that 
it is actually mental injury.  So I definitely think that we should 
refer it out to other people.   
However, workers also report that they almost never actually seek out a psychiatrist 
to do this assessment.  Assessments of mental injury are omitted from regular 
consideration during the investigative process even though their inclusion on the 
risk assessment asks workers to attend to its presence or absence. This means that 
emotional neglect and abuse are rarely substantiated or addressed by Child 
Protective Services in State A.  
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William is one of the few workers who objects to having a mental health 
professional assess the presence of mental injury because he believes that lack of 
ability to do so functionally ignores the presence of emotional maltreatment. Below, 
William describes a case where he disagrees with his supervisor about whether 
mental injury is occurring: 
Mental injury has to be confirmed by a therapist or a doctor. Okay. Case in 
particular. Two opposing thoughts; me and my supervisor.  A case where 
the mother, I think as part of discipline to get her kids in line, “I’m sending 
you back to foster care and I’m never taking care of you again, and you’re 
never gonna see me again.” That’s mental injury. I also think that that’s a 
poor use of discipline to try to get her kids in line. Right?  
[The supervisor says:] ‘No, that’s not inappropriate discipline and I can’t 
call it mental Injury because it’s gotta be substantiated by a therapist, who 
says this particular thing has really made this child emotionally unstable. 
All these kids aren’t even in therapy for the most part. Why do they have 
mental injury? Call it something else’. 
 I think it’s mental injury, they’re [DHHS administrators are]saying no, 
you can’t use it.  And I’m like, when a kid hears I’m going to foster care, I’m 
going to foster care and has experience in foster care, that maybe wasn’t so 
good what else could it be? Do I really need a therapist to confirm that?  
Ultimately unable to convince his supervisor of the presence mental injury in this 
case, it goes unaccounted for and unaddressed. The policy of permitting only a 
mental health professional to endorse the presence of mental injury and the 
subsequent reaction of caseworkers to rarely seek out a professional evaluation 
represents an incomplete process of quantification for emotional maltreatment.  
While mental injury remains formally represented on the risk assessment, 
informally it is still viewed as being too subjective for caseworkers to verify. Left out 
of the assessment process in practice, mental injury remains able to be quantified 
only in theory. 
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Subjectivity within Mechanical Objectivity 
 Issues related to the best way to handle items that could be subjectively 
interpreted are a general concern in the construction of actuarial-based risk 
assessments. N11. Primary caretaker able to push child needs ahead of own  is one such 
question whose interpretation remains open and which requirse a different level of 
skill in scoring than a demographic question such as A2. Number of prior assigned 
abuse complaints and/or findings.  Questions that are open to interpretation could lead 
to exactly what the risk assessment is designed to avoid: disparate assessments of 
the same case by different workers.  In this way, risk assessments may not be as 
unifying or standardizing in practice as they are considered to be in theory.   
In order to manage issues of subjectivity as they relate to scoring the risk 
assessment, State A has created a policy manual that outlines exactly how questions 
should be interpreted and what criteria should be used in answering each question.  
Policy manuals are accessible by clicking on a question when a worker is filling out 
the risk assessment and through the iPhones that workers carry with them during 
the workday. Even with these measures, some workers report that they do not ever 
consult the policy manual, leaving a wide range of responses to the risk assessment 
open. Workers who do consult the policy manual also recognize that there are 
individual level differences in how workers respond to questions that can impact 
whether they are truly standardized instruments. When asking Justine to review 
how she completed a risk assessment for a particular case, she noted how she 
struggles to square the complexity of the case with the concreteness of the 
questions. 
  163 
I mean its how you interpret that question you know.  Like 
impulses[Primary caretaker is unable/unwilling to control impulses]; you 
know my thing here would be she didn’t control her impulses to drink, but 
another worker might not use drinking as, to answer that question.  You 
know it’s so I mean yeah like these two questions here…You know like 
“primary caretaker puts child’s needs ahead of her own”.  That night she 
didn’t but say two days later she’s saying all the right things and she’s 
showing, she’s willing to put her kids above others.  I don't know a worker 
might say ‘okay, she’s willing to do what she did but that one instance she 
didn’t so’; it’s kind of like depending on how the worker interprets it all.  
All risk assessment questions are cross sectional data points, recording information 
about a caregiver at one moment in time. Workers who attempt to carefully 
complete the risk assessment can struggle with how to endorse items where the 
caregiver has behaved differently throughout the investigation. Lila describes the 
dilemma:  
L: I think you have a lot more like, I think an ability to use your own 
opinion with the risk assessment versus the safety, that’s kind of 
more cut and dry.  But I put no [to whether the caregiver has a 
substance abuse problem]. 
E: Okay, you seem embarrassed? 
L:  Right, well I don’t know because I’m like thinking to my supervisor 
should it be like, you know she tested positive?  Like I know, but I 
tested her again and she tested  negative so I don’t think she has a 
problem because if she did she would’ve tested [positive]… 
Lila wants to be as accurate as possible in her assessment but there is no way to 
record the varied nature of the caregiver’s engagement with substances during the 
course of the investigation. Whether the caregiver has a substance abuse problem is 
open to some amount of discretion, with some workers using the evidence of a single 
positive drug screen to confirm and others using the evidence of a single negative 
drug screen to deny a finding of substance abuse.   
 The risk assessment encodes a binary understanding of mental health, 
domestic violence, substance abuse and other phenomena by asking workers to 
endorse yes/no questions about conditions or states that research has shown to take 
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place on a continuum and which change over time. Issues that are fluid in nature are 
encoded linearly and statically. Linking these conditions to a single moment in time, 
the risk assessment invites interpretation by forcing workers to definitively state the 
presence or absence of a condition.   
Other workers view the risk assessment as entirely open to interpretation 
and approach it as a way to document their decision-making rather than uncover 
how cases should be managed. Jennifer does not buy that the risk assessment is a 
neutral object:  
 No, I get that this is numerically based. But, clearly you can manipulate it.  
And some things, I mean, I've seen people get a high risk level that you 
wouldn't think; and then I've seen low risk levels where you're like, what? ( 
Matt explains how manipulating the risk assessment is possible:  
I will change the risk assessment ‘cause I will go through it again and say, 
you know what that might have been a problem, but it’s not that big of a 
problem.  Or I will change category 4 to category 3 or category 3 to a 2.  I’ll 
adjust it that way. 
Workers who understand the risk assessment to capture subjective assessments and 
who do not view it to be an accurate tool, purposefully fill it out in such a way that it 
reflects how they would like a case to proceed. For a fuller discussion of how and 
why workers approach the risk assessment in practice see “Same Difference: 
Standardized Decision-Making in Child Welfare Practice (Bosk, Same Difference: 
Standardized Decision-Making in Practice, In Progress). Whether workers 
consciously or unconsciously use subjective judgments when filling out the risk 
assessment, the binary phrasing of questions forces workers to make determinative 
evaluations about phenomena that may be more squishy than concrete.  In this way, 
subjective processes are invited into how the risk assessment is completed. Yet, 
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these processes remain unacknowledged in the construction of policies related to 
how the risk assessment is used to determine the trajectory for cases.   
Conclusion 
Quantifying child welfare decisions through the use of an actuarial-based risk 
assessment attempts to address a long history of low reliability decision-making in 
child protective services.  Utilizing actuarial-based risk assessments is intended to 
make decisions both more fair and less biased by basing decisions on empirical 
research and applying the same standardized criteria to every case. While actuarial-
based assessments are considered to be more objective than clinical decision-making, 
sociological work on commensuration demonstrates that the process of 
quantification is not entirely a neutral one.  Numbers are not completely detached 
from the social phenomena that organize their use.  This paper examines one risk 
assessment to understand how phenomena related to maltreatment are constituted 
on the risk assessment and how this organization becomes translated in relationship 
state policy as cases play out on the ground.  
I argue that the organizational and moral imperatives to avoid making a type 
2 error may lead to more incidents of type 1 error. The interaction between how risk 
is constituted on the risk assessment itself and the policies governing its use, may 
mean that risk is more likely to be overestimated, subjecting families to 
consequences that are inappropriately punitive as a result.  I argue there are two 
factors that contribute to the likely overestimation of risk: (1) state policy that 
explicitly ties the score on the risk assessment to a case’s trajectory without any 
formal procedures to lower the risk score and (2) the collection of information only 
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on the presence or absence of risk factors without a more dynamic understanding of 
the relationship these factors have to the presenting complaint.   
State policy that prohibits workers from lowering a risk score, while building 
in procedures to raise it, reflects the organizational and moral costs of making a type 
1 error. In State A, professional expertise is valued when it raises the risk level but 
the very real costs related to a risk score that is erroneously lowered leaves little 
structural incentives to permit clinical judgments that de-escalate cases. Certain 
types of clinical judgments then are not only seen as less effective than actuarial-
based tools but also as dangerous. In practice, policies designed to exclude any 
clinical judgment from the decision-making process runs counter to the Structured 
Decision-Making model’s original design. The Children’s Research Center states: 
The assessment tools are not intended to make case decisions for direct 
service workers. Staff still need to exercise professional judgment. But the 
various tools help to structure decisions by bringing objective information 
to bear on these critical questions(CRC, 2008).  
Gambrill and Shlonsky (2001), advocates for the introduction of Evidence-Based 
Practices in child welfare decision-making acknowledges that  
Use of risk assessment measures may introduce errors, and these should be 
addressed. For example, workers may rely solely on the instrument and 
ignore other relevant evidence that the instrument does not address. Family 
strengths may be ignored if the tool is deficit-based. A tool cannot cover 
everything and a worker and/or supervisor should be able to override it for 
good cause (Gambrill & Shlonsky, 2001). 
 State A’s current policies around the risk assessment do not acknowledge that 
exclusively using the risk assessment to make case decisions might also create the 
conditions for errors in judgment. Actuarial-based tools contain important 
information but they are not able to account for all the complexity present in any 
case. Policies to prohibit caseworker discretion about certain aspects of cases, reflect 
the power of tropes about quantification, commensuration, and evidence-based 
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practice at this cultural moment. The very real need for accountability, to reduce the 
risk of making an incorrect decision, and to address the variability of authority-
based decisions facilitates not only the adoption of actuarial-based tools but also 
policies that limit ecological evaluation of cases. Use of actuarial-based risk 
assessments without a dynamic evaluation of case context may cause preventable 
errors as well as reduce them. Such an approach reflects an over determined 
understanding of both the benefits of actuarial-based risk assessments as well as the 
weaknesses of clinical decision-making.   
 Collecting information only on the presence or absence of risk factors 
without a more dynamic understanding of the relationship these factors have to the 
presenting complaint creates a structural mechanism by which risk can be 
overestimated. Phrasing questions in binary terms does not capture the nonlinear 
nature of many issues that contribute to child maltreatment such as intimate partner 
violence, mental illness, and substance abuse.  Empirical evidence clearly connects 
all the items on the risk assessment to child maltreatment.  Empirical evidence also 
suggests ways in which their risk can be mitigated (e.g. through psychological 
treatment, social support etc.). Yet, the risk assessment itself does not distinguish 
between risk factors with and without mitigating circumstances (e.g. a parent that is 
addressing substance abuse issues vs. one that is not; or a caregiver that was abused 
as a child and has received treatment for this experience vs. one who has not). It is 
possible that this more limited conceptualization of risk makes the risk assessment 
less sensitive in its ability to distinguish between low, moderate and high-risk cases.   
A non-relational inclusion of risk factors on the risk assessment reflects the 
prominence of ‘cycle of violence’ theories in American culture, which emphasize the 
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tendency of those who have been exposed to a violent and traumatic behavior to 
repeat it. From an academic perspective, we can understand the call to ‘break the 
cycle of abuse’ to be a shorthand for a set of cultural beliefs about the origins of 
maltreatment (socially learned) that are then responded to in the form of public 
policies (in this case tying the score on the risk assessment which uses information 
about past behavior to predict the likelihood of future maltreatment). While the risk 
assessment is intended to be probabilistic and not predictive, policies that explicitly 
tie the risk assessment to case trajectories without mechanisms to adjust their 
results to account for context conflate the two.  
The cultural emphasis on ‘the cycle of abuse’ can be easily accused of burying 
the lead. The much larger story is how relatively few children go on to repeat the 
brutality of their parents. Examining the etiology of child maltreatment, Kaufman 
and Zigler (1987) call for the childhood myth [of abuse] to be put aside” due to 
these relatively low documented rates of transmission. A more nuanced 
understanding of risk and protective factors as they relate to the transmission of 
abuse is called for. Risk factors that evaluate the relationship between the existence 
of past abuse and the likelihood for future maltreatment include: the parent’s level of 
traumatic symptoms, level of dissociation, ability to separate from the child, the 
severity of past trauma, parental representations, parental representations of the 
child, and fighting-and frightened interactions with the child. Each of these factors 
have been identified as placing abused children at higher risk for becoming abusive 
themselves (). Looking at risk factors in a relational way distinguishes between just 
their presence (which might lead to caregivers inappropriately being placed in 
higher categories) and their effect on the current charge of maltreatment. While 
  169 
relational risk factors may be more accurate than the ones currently included on 
actuarial-based risk assessments, they are also unlikely to be adapted in future 
iterations. Relational risk factors require an enormous amount of time to detect and 
a high degree of training to understand. Actuarial-based risk assessments are meant 
to simplify the evaluation process and revising risk factors so that they are more 
sensitive may undercut this goal.   
In its current form, the risk assessment only collects and evaluates negative 
information about the family, potentially weighting scores on the risk assessment to 
overestimate the likelihood of future maltreatment. Protective factors that have been 
shown to ameliorate the impact of childhood abuse include social support, strong 
spousal relationships, and positive experiences in therapy. While the Structured 
Decision-Making model includes an assessment of family strengths through the 
Family Strengths and Needs Assessment, strengths or experiences that mediate risk 
factors are not evaluated in relationship to case trajectories. Instead, when cases are 
opened for services, the Family Strengths and Needs Assessment decides which 
needs are the three highest priorities to be addressed. Cases presented in this article 
demonstrate that there are multiple instances where family strengths or mitigating 
circumstance are not able to be taken into account in case decision-making.   
Gambrill & Shlonsky (2001) argue that because actuarial assessments are 
able to attend to risk in a multiplicative rather than additive way through complex 
modeling and formulas, they are best positioned to deal with how risk and protective 
factors interact.  I would stipulate that this is only true when risk factors are 
understood relationally rather than statically. Workers in this article detail the 
many ways that the risk assessment in State A is ill equipped to understand 
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complicated interactions between risk factors, protective factors and the larger 
environment. 
Understanding how risk comes to be quantified on a risk assessment and 
what is privileged and left out as a result is critical to understanding how the risk 
assessment handles complex and complicated cases. Theory matters because when 
there is debate about what the meaning of the facts of a case are and how to 
approach a messy situation, the risk assessment’s viewpoint will often settle the 
debate.  In the case where William and his supervisor disagreed about the presence 
of mental injury, the policy requiring a therapist to indicate its presence functionally 
meant that William did not determine that mental injury took place. A risk 
assessment that adds considerable weight to just the presence of intimate partner 
violence likely influences cases trajectories when there are conflicting opinions about 
how to proceed.  
Throughout case descriptions, workers repeatedly raise concerns about the 
meaning of policies and instruments that might overestimate case severity and risk. 
They highlight the serious consequences for families when a caregiver is 
substantiated for maltreatment at a category that may be inflated. These 
consequences include job loss, inability to care for grandchildren or relatives at a 
later time (if their children or relatives are substantiated for maltreatment), and 
prohibitions from participating in their children’s daily lives in the form of field 
trips. There is a high cost not only to families but also to the child welfare system 
when families are incorrectly sorted into categories. Intensive services for high-risk 
families are costly and time consuming. Caseworker time may be inapproriately 
spent attending to needs that do not require such a high level of services.  These 
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consequences undermine the system as a whole as well as one of the primary goals 
of the Structured Decision-Making model: accurate classification of cases (Dorsey et. 
Al., 2008).    
Workers reported that approximately 50% of their denied cases score as high 
risk, raising significant questions not only about the sensitivity of the risk 
assessment but also the social justice implications of the instrument. If so many 
denied cases would be treated as some of the most severe in the system if they were 
substantiated, what does that say about the ability of the risk assessment to 
distinguish among families? Does the risk assessment simply reflect and refract the 
disproportionality in the child welfare system that accompanies neighborhood 
effects or does it contribute to creating these effects when risk in cases are 
overestimated? Conversely, workers in State A may be more likely to deny cases 
that should be substantiated because they are working to protect families from 
facing the most severe consequences of being categorized at a high level. If this is 
the case, the risk assessment could inadvertently contribute to cases of maltreatment 
going unaddressed or unacknowledged. More work is needed to examine the 
relationship between overestimation of risk, disproportionality, state policy and the 
risk assessment itself.   
I make several policy recommendations based on the findings presented 
above. First, I recommend that workers should be permitted to both raise and lower 
the risk level of a case. Overrides in either direction incorporate an ecological 
framework into case decision-making and address concerns by workers that they are 
not able to account for contextual factors when making case decisions. I do not mean 
to suggest that workers disagreements with the risk assessment are always correct. 
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In some cases they may not be.  Rather, I suggest that there should be a formal 
process for resolving issues where caseworker judgments conflict with those on the 
actuarial-based risk assessment.   
I recommend that these formal procedures include requiring workers to 
make a clinical formulation about the case in relationship to the risk assessment. 
Clinical formulations would ask workers to integrate and make explicit sense of how 
the risk factors on the risk assessment impact all the evidence gathered during the 
investigative process. These formulations could be combined with the formal 
narrative that caseworkers are already required to submit as part of their 
administrative tasks. Reflective supervision about cases would help workers to sort 
out how their own , values, biases, and beliefs influence their interpretations of 
evidence and their recommendations for a case. A committee composed of 
supervisors, administrators, and specialists in areas that child welfare cases most 
often involve (intimate partner violence, mental health, substance abuse, trauma, 
poverty) could review override requests to ensure that neither overestimation or 
underestimation of risk occurred as the result of implementing an override.  
I recommend adjustments not just to policy in relationship to the risk 
assessment but also to the risk assessment itself.  The risk assessment should be 
updated to collect information not just on the presence or absence of risk factors but 
also on their relationship to the current complaint. While the most sensitive risk 
factors might be difficult to collect as child protective services work is currently 
organized, the phrasing of questions could be altered to be more dynamic. For 
example, questions on the presence of substance abuse could be reframed from 
binary to reflective of a continuum. Some possibilities for revisions include: (1) 
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Primary caretaker has had a positive substance abuse screening during the course of the 
investigation (with points given to reflect the number of positive screenings)  (2) 
Primary caretaker is currently in treatment to address substance abuse treatment. (2b) If 
Primary caretaker is not currently in treatment to address substance abuse, primary caretaker 
is willing to participate in services.   
 Demographic questions could also be reformulated to contextualize the 
presence or absence of documented risk factors within the current case. For 
example, questions about the number of children in the house could be revised as 
follows:  There are more than three children in the house Y/N. If Y, Primary caretaker is 
overwhelmed by meeting the needs of all the children. Phrasing questions in this way has 
the potential to make the presence or absence of risk factors directly relate to the 
current complaint and the assessment process. A larger issue for the field is how to 
include the risk factors that require more expert judgment such as those related to 
parental mental representations and parent-child relationships in the risk 
assessment process. Just because this would be difficult to do does not mean that it 
should not be done. What is the purpose of actuarial-based risk assessments if they 
do not collect the most accurate information or information that is most relevant to 
determining the likelihood of future risk of maltreatment?  
The State A risk assessment has not been revised since 2008.  If the goals of 
risk assessments are to link child welfare decision-making to the latest empirical 
research then regular revision, updates, and reviews to the risk assessment itself are 
required.  My final recommendation is that the risk assessment be revised every 5-
10 years to reflect the latest findings in the field and revisit theoretical debates in 
the field. Part of the work of revising the risk assessment is not just updating 
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statistical models to integrate new research and understanding but also a deeper 
assessment of the epistemological foundations of the actuarial-based risk assessment 
in use in relationship to child protective service work.  During periods of revision, 
explicitly talking with workers about how the risk assessment informs their work, 
when they disagree with the risk assessment itself, and how they are utilizing it in 
practice has the potential to reveal how processes of commensuration are working as 
intended and unintended.   
In this paper, I have demonstrated that the development and use of actuarial-
based risk assessments are part of a process of quantifying child welfare decision-
making. Quantifying decision-making in child welfare embeds specific values within 
the risk assessment process itself. While the State A risk assessment attempts to 
make child welfare decisions more fair, less biased, and more accurate it also may 
have the unintended consequence of overestimating risk for certain populations 
based on how the questions are phrased and interpreted on the risk assessment itself 
in combination with the policies related to its use.    
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Footnotes 
 
1 Heading taken from title of Espeland and Stevens Annual Review of 
Sociology article by the same name. 
2 In State A, the Structured Decision-Making model is compromised of a 
series of actuarial-based risk assessments including: (1) an initial intake assessment 
that decides which calls will be investigated; (2) a safety assessment that determines 
whether it is safe for a child to remain in the home during the course of the 
investigation; (3) the risk assessment which dictates the trajectory of a substantiated 
case; (4) the family strengths and needs assessment and (5) the child strength and 
needs assessment which prioritize the services families and children who are being 
serviced by the child welfare system will receive; (6) a risk reassessment with 
considers whether the risk level for an active case has changed; and (7) the 
reunification assessment which analyzes whether children who have been removed 
should return home. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation explores how actuarial-based risk assessments are 
implemented to facilitate child welfare decision-making. I examine the intended and 
unintended consequences of locating decision-making about child welfare in 
actuarial-based tools at three different levels of analysis: individual worker, agency, 
and the risk assessment itself. Despite the widespread diffusion of actuarial-based 
assessments to frame child welfare decision-making, we have little understanding of 
how these technologies are implemented on the ground and under what conditions 
differences in organizations, individuals, and models influence their use. Limited 
work in this area suggests that workers ignore actuarial-based risk assessments in 
favor of clinical judgment or engage in actuarial-based decision-making as a strategy 
for negotiating bureaucratic policies and rules (Hilton & Simmons, 2001; Krysik & 
LeCroy, 2002; Lyle & Graham, 2000).  
While questions about the role risk assessments have in informing decision-
making can seem dryly theoretical in nature, the consequences for how we create, 
organize, and implement policies related to child welfare decision-making are 
anything but academic to the children the child welfare system is intended to protect 
and the families it is charged to serve.  
Using a three article format, I asked the following questions: 1) How do 
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structured decision-making aids influence decision-making in the context of every 
day work routines? (2) How do standardized tools function across practice settings? 
And (3) What are the consequences for how one state’s risk assessment currently 
quantifies risk? Grounding my analysis of the empirical data within sociological 
theories of power and privilege, commensuration, and organizational theory, I 
understand the construction, experience, and every day use of the actuarial-based 
risk assessment to be both a technical and social process. The meaning(s) and 
expression of the actuarial-based risk assessment take form dialectically. State and 
organizational policy dictate how the tool should be understood, deployed, and 
utilized in every day work, which in turn, shapes and is shaped by, individual 
responses and informal work practices. 
This research seeks to contribute to sociological and social work theory by 
shifting discussion about the use of clinical judgment and evidence-based practice 
from a dichotomous framework to an integrative one. Interrogating the polarization 
of these concepts as they play out on the ground reveals a false split. In reality, when 
organizations and individuals use the actuarial-based risk assessment they are acting 
from both models simultaneously, complicating discussions about the utility and 
drawbacks of employing empirical or clinical approaches in an exclusive way. My 
work attempts to trace out how workers and organizations contend with the 
messiness of competing paradigms. These paradigms are framed within policy as 
separate from one another but are intersecting, complementary, and competing on 
the ground. Each paper examines how this is done differently:  
 In Chapter 2, I explore how workers contend with Structured Decision-Making 
model within a tightly controlled decision-making environment. Rather than having 
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a uniform response to the Structured Decision-Making model, the extent to which 
workers follow the model varies widely. I find that power and privilege influences 
which workers feel that they can flout formal policy and rules and which workers 
feel constrained to follow policy even when they strenuously disagree with it. How 
workers conceptualize the actuarial-based risk assessment also informs how they 
apply it to their casework. When workers understand the risk assessment to be 
unsuccessful in achieving a standardizing function, they feel that they are not doing 
anything differently than their colleagues when they explicitly adjust their formal 
responses to questions to get the outcome they desire. Conversely, workers who 
believe the risk assessment to be successful in constraining individual subjectivity 
and bias use it enthusiastically and unquestioningly. Finally, I observe that all 
workers utilize discretion at some point in their casework, regardless of how they 
conceptualize the risk assessment. Workers report that they use the substantiation 
process to exercise their professional authority and judgment. In this way, discretion 
does not disappear from the process, it just changes form (Espeland & Vannebo, 
2007).  
Chapter 3 examines how the Structured Decision-Making model is implemented 
in two different states. Comparing the use of the risk assessment in a tightly 
controlled decision-making environment to a loosely controlled one, I contend that 
the organizational context in which it is utilized shapes the meaning of the tool 
itself. By demonstrating that State B policy creates a loose connection between the 
risk assessment and case trajectories, making it functionally meaningless and that 
State A policy creates a tight connection between the risk assessment and case 
trajectories that often excludes environmental context into case decision-making, I 
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highlight the difficulties with both implementation strategies.  These case studies 
offer empirical examples of how evidence-based practices are not self-actuating and 
complicate the discussion of how to adapt a tool to the local context.   
In Chapter 4, I look at how the State A risk assessment itself structures risk. 
Policies that emphasize avoiding errors where a child is mistakenly left in the home 
may then underemphasize the serious implications for inaccurately classifying 
families as high risk. Without formal procedures to de-escalate cases, workers report 
that families can be treated punitively based on having the wrong mix of 
demographic factors present in a case.  
 
Key Themes and Implications for Social Work Research and Practice  
 Considering these chapters together provides the opportunity to draw out and 
synthesis the key themes that run across them. These themes command sustained 
discussion in their own right and this next section analyzes what we learn from 
thinking about this work as a whole.  
One of the analytic strengths of this research lies in comparing how policies and 
practices related to the Structured Decision-Making Model differ across states. The 
striking contrasts in the weight the SDM is given in decision-making in State A and 
State B highlight the need for contextualizing all discussions about evidence-based 
practice. How an intervention works, whether it works and why it works are as 
much a function of the social context of the intervention as the intervention 
itself. The differences between State A and State B flow from how use of the SDM 
is connected to organizational policy and how this policy became translated into 
practice. The incredibly local nature of child welfare policy makes it unlikely that 
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any intervention intended to unify child welfare practice across settings will be able 
to do so. Researchers and practitioners need to expect that interventions will change 
when they are deployed and that these changes may differ from setting to setting. 
Instead of framing the multiplicity of factors that influence the meaning of an 
intervention in a particular context as something to always be controlled and 
managed, a starting point for implementation science should be to develop theory 
about how to begin to understand interventions in relationship to the settings in 
which they will be deployed and what the consequences of this relationship may be. 
Dealing with the messy and ephemeral parts of translation offers opportunities to 
re-conceptualize how we think about interventions themselves. The Practice-Based 
Evidence Movement and research on the common factors of interventions is moving 
in this direction but has not yet fleshed out what this looks like in practice (Fox, 
2003; Okpych & Yu, 2014).   
The standardizing function of the SDM is related to both organizational 
imperatives and individual approaches. The SDM is designed to limit the role 
that social identity, social context, and organizational policy play in case outcomes.  
My findings show that in a loosely implemented setting (State B) that the SDM may 
indeed have standardized how workers approached the risk assessment but not in 
the way intended. Because the risk assessment did not carry much weight in the 
final outcome of the decision, workers did not need to develop strategies about what 
to do when they disagreed with its result, they just simply ignored it. The less the 
SDM was emphasized, the more likely it was to offer an assessment of the case 
without conscious adjustment of the worker (ironically standardizing how workers 
utilized it). However, this standardization becomes meaningless because the very 
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thing that allows workers to fill the risk assessment out freely (its lack of formal 
decision-making power) is also the thing that allows workers to ignore the risk 
assessment in their decision-making. 
 Conversely, the more power policy gave to the SDM in decision-making, the 
more individual expressions of authority began to operate in how some workers 
approached the SDM and the less standardized worker’s approach to it became. The 
effectiveness of policy in tying case outcomes to the SDM opened the door to some 
workers finding other ways to influence case outcomes.   
Its not whether there is discretion in standardized processes but how, in 
what form, and with what consequences. Discretion was practiced differently by 
different workers and organized and controlled differently by different agencies.  
Discretion was present in the most tightly controlled implementation of the SDM 
and some elements of standardization were present in the loosest. While workers 
might not have used much discretion in the way they filled out the SDM in State B, 
they did use an enormous amount of discretion in how they approached and 
arbitrated their cases. Despite the presences of variation in how workers approached 
the SDM in State A, there was less opportunity to exercise discretion in case 
decision-making overall and expressions of discretion that ran counter to policy 
were limited to a select population of workers.  
These results highlight that discretion operates on a continuum across and 
within settings. This fact is rarely reflected either in social work theory or in 
practice. Instead, discretion is often presented, debated, and examined as an all or 
nothing practice. Our theory badly needs to catch up with the differential ways that 
discretion operates organizationally and individually within attempts to constrain it. 
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The continual presence of discretion in varied forms represents one of the most 
robust findings from this research that is likely generalizable across fields such as 
medicine, education, and law where actuarial-based assessments are used to define 
work practices. Understanding where and when discretion is utilized would help 
untangle how expert judgment and actuarial-based or empirical technologies work 
alongside each other. Further, this work highlights that even within an 
organization, responses to an intervention are not homogenous but heterogeneous. 
Research needs to be more sensitive to this fact.  
Power and privilege may become reproduced in how discretion is 
expressed and by whom it is performed, when policies are developed to 
constrain it. This research raises questions about how issues of power and privilege 
become produced and reproduced within contexts intended to limit individual 
judgment. Because the practice of discretion is so deeply connected to the 
performance of authority, it makes sense that when discretion is constrained, that 
people who are used to having a voice will work to find a way to have one again.  
Because the expectation of having an individual voice is often related to being in a 
position of social privilege, finding ways to maintain discretion may reproduce 
existing power relations in aggregate. Throughout my research, those who actively 
resisted organizational attempts to limit their subjective readings of the facts of the 
case came up with successful strategies to influence case trajectories. Conversely, 
those who were not used to having a voice did not expect this to be a part of their 
work, no matter how negatively they felt about the processes in which they were 
engaging. People who actively resisted constraining policies tended to have a 
combination of social status characteristics associated with privilege, suggesting 
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that even within policies meant to flatten social difference, that power differentials 
can and do operate in ways that may not be noticed by individuals themselves or the 
larger system as a whole.    
At the same time, systems that openly leave a space for individual discretion may 
not avoid reproducing power and privilege differentials that emerge from peoples’ 
social locations either.  In fact, we have lots of research from many different fields to 
suggest that it does not. It is not clear from the data presented here, in what way, if 
any, power and privilege influenced how individuals approached their work in State 
B.  The focus of my study was not to investigate how these concepts operated so I 
was not able to collect data that might have revealed them. However, this does not 
mean that powerful social inequalities were not reproduced in other ways in the 
organizational environment and/or with regards to case decision-making. I would 
like to leave open the possibility that power and privilege influenced how decisions 
were made and what those decisions were in State B in ways that this work was not 
able to detect.  
Power and privilege are central organizing concepts in social life. They are 
present in almost every social situation and work implicitly and explicitly to shape 
individual and collective experiences and approaches. The SDM represents one 
attempt to even the playing field for families and for workers. It is also a profoundly 
logical one. By raising the ways in which power and privilege come into play in 
people’s response to the SDM, I do not mean to suggest that the SDM is completely 
ineffective at constraining them. Instead, I hope to highlight the ways in which 
power and privilege emerge in unexpected ways. I think this speaks to the force of 
power and privilege as organizing social concepts. Across interventions, social work 
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researchers must be alert to the ways in which social inequalities and more subtle 
expressions of social difference play out. In medicine, law, social work, education, we 
should expect and assume that power and privilege will be in effect in some capacity 
even as we work to limit their impact. Theoretically, empirically, and practically, we 
must remain conscious and curious about the ways in which power and privilege 
become produced and reproduced within the interventions and policies meant to 
flatten them.  
Practices intended to simplify make other things complicated. As with all 
processes of commensuration, the use of actuarial-based assessments in child welfare 
decision-making is partially intended to simplify an extremely complex process.  
While the actuarial-based risk assessment simplifies some aspects of decision-
making (e.g. How to think about the meaning of the presence of specific risk factors 
related to future maltreatment), this process also complicates others. Choices 
organizations make about how the tool will be deployed combined with decisions 
about how to constitute the risk assessment itself shape what parts of decision-
making become simplified and what become complicated. 
  For example, State A policy requiring a mental health professional to verify the 
presence of mental injury is intended to simplify the assessment process for 
emotional maltreatment. Instead of introducing the difficulties that accompany 
having Child Protective Services (CPS) workers make a judgment about such a 
subjective phenomena, policy has been developed to streamline the process. 
Functionally, this process of simplification complicates the ability for Child 
Protective Services) in State A to detect or deal with emotional maltreatment when 
it does occur. Workers almost uniformly reported that the trouble (in all senses of 
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the world) related to getting a mental health professional to verify this diagnosis 
means that they essentially ignore the question. As a result, emotional maltreatment 
may not be effectively counted, assessed, or intervened with when it is a part of child 
welfare cases.   
What becomes complicated through processes of simplification is often obscured. 
As social work researchers develop, deploy, and evaluate interventions, attention 
must be paid to not just to whether an intervention is working but also to how the 
intervention has changed work processes and what these changes have meant for 
how problems or issues are understood and managed. We should expect that 
simplifying some things is likely to have the unintended consequence of 
complicating others.  
Standardized processes do not allow for informal solutions to problems. 
The Structured Decision-Making model is designed to unify how work is done and 
what the outcomes of that work are among Child Protective Service workers. The 
formal rules and regulations related to ensuring that all complaints are handled in 
the same way serve multiple purposes: to provide mechanisms for accountability, to 
create efficiency, to develop objective criteria for decisions, ground decisions in 
empirical evidence, reduce error, fill gaps in the training and skill of workers, and 
ensure that blatant bias does not enter into the decision-making process. At the 
same time these formal rules and procedures prohibit workers from managing issues 
in ways that are counter to the way procedure dictates but nevertheless may be 
appropriate.  
Workers in State A report that at least half their caseload involves investigating 
bogus complaints that are vengeful in nature. Investigators told me about cases 
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where they were receiving weekly reports about a family, which they knew to be 
unfounded.  Standardized procedures prohibited investigators from handling these 
cases any differently than they would other complaints. Yet, without the ability to 
either forgo some aspects of the investigation or come up with another way to 
approach the case, CPS workers must proceed in a manner that does not make much 
sense. In these cases, following procedure may cause unintended harm when 
children are repeatedly asked questions they have already answered and the 
(unlawful) behavior of the reporting person is continually reinforced. Cases 
involving multi-generational families that must be separated due to a complaint 
against one of the caregivers but not any of the others, represent another area where 
workers believe they could solve the issue more efficiently, more fairly, and with less 
cost to the system then policy allows. A consequence of standardizing procedures 
then is the inability to respond logically to situations that are not anticipated in 
formal procedures but nonetheless emerge and must be managed.  
One way that actuarial-based assessments function are to clarify the 
parameters for decisions. As a result, actuarial-based tools reify singular 
understandings of particular issues. In doing so, they settle issues that are 
unsettled in theory and in practice. Workers reported confusion and 
disagreement over how cases involving intimate partner violence are captured and 
assessed on the risk assessment in State A. This confusion mirrors on-going debates 
in the field about how to think about, and what to do about, children’s exposure to 
child maltreatment. The empirical literature is clear that exposure to intimate 
partner violence can have negative socio-emotional impacts on children (Fantuzzo & 
Lindquist, 1989; Jaffe, Wolfe, & Wilson, 1990; Kolbo, Blakely& Engleman, 1996; 
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Levendosky, Huth-Bocks, Shapiro, & Semel, 2003; Margolin & Gordis, 2000; Wolak 
& Finkelhor,1998). However, advocates point out that women may have little choice 
but to remain in violent relationships and that it is unjust to penalize women with 
involvement in the child welfare system (Rivett & Kelly, 2006; Rogerson, 2012).  
.  Even though State A policy takes a more expansive view on the decision to 
substantiate for exposure to child maltreatment, the risk assessment itself weights 
exposure to intimate partner violence heavily. Cases that receive a substantiation 
where intimate partner violence is present are likely to be quickly escalated through 
the child welfare system. In this way, the risk assessment obscures practice debates 
and State A policy offers no procedures for resolving disagreements when the risk 
assessment considers a case to be more severe than the worker. Current policy does 
not acknowledge that the risk assessment may capture a definitive view of an in 
issue that remains unresolved as a whole. New procedures must be developed to 
address such moments. 
 Without regular updating of actuarial-based assessments, outdated 
social work approaches or major shifts in the field may not be captured for 
long periods of time. As knowledge is created, as new debates emerge, as practice 
changes, so to do our understandings of what creates risk and how risk should be 
evaluated. Of course, formal design of the Structured Decision-Making Model 
includes regularly revision to the model itself to capture new information in the 
field. It is one thing to say the SDM should be updated regularly and another to do 
it. Going through the process of revision involves managing bureaucratic 
requirements, funding an expensive task or simply making time for an intensive 
process in a crisis driven field.  In short, there are significant barriers to regularly 
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revising the risk assessment. This raises questions about how to structure or require 
formal revisions or updates in the field. Is it realistic to expect that states will invest 
the time to do so?  If not, how much weight can be given to the risk assessment and 
for how long? These are open questions that need to be carefully answered.  
It is also important to acknowledge that change presents costs to the system as 
well. Workers in State B shared that the regular changes in policies and procedures 
made it hard to take any new system or idea seriously. Many workers engaged a 
strategy of just ‘waiting it out’ when they did not want to adopt a new approach to 
their work with the confidence that the rules would change soon enough. As a 
whole, researchers must think about the time frame for continual updating of 
interventions. What is the happy medium between change that is not too much or 
too little?   
Finally, this research calls attention to the fact that resistance to evidence-
based practice, at times, is grounded in real critiques of the intervention.  The 
implementation science literature often understands resistance to the adoption of 
interventions to be a flaw in individual workers that must be fixed. The prevailing 
wisdom goes that with the right amount of education workers will understand the 
necessity for Evidence-Based Practice and will make the appropriate changes to 
their practice. This understanding of resistance to Evidence-Based Practices 
overlooks the possibility that refusal to accept new interventions may be grounded 
in very real critiques of them. Workers critiques of the SDM in both states revealed 
serious tensions between the theory and implementation of the SDM, tensions that 
were likely unanticipated by those not in the field. As we evaluate interventions or 
consider the ways in which implementation falls short of our expectations, we must 
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invite the voices of those on the front lines into the discussion. What can we learn 
about the relationship between theory and practice from those that struggle with 
adapting an intervention from the ideal to the real?   
Joining the Clinical with the Empirical: A Both/And Not an Either/Or  
The data presented throughout the dissertation gives life to Timmerman’s and 
Epstein’s assertion that “on the ground, every standard is simultaneously over 
determined and incomplete”(Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).” Without flexible ways 
to respond to the SDM and the policies structuring its use, workers are left with 
several choices when encountering a situation for which policy is over determined: 
(1) bend policy to address a situation that is not covered in formal procedures; (2) 
endorse a decision which they feel is not supported by the facts of the case or with 
which they disagree; (3) deny a case that should be substantiated out of concern for 
how the case would necessarily unfold. When the nuances of a case do not align with 
policy, we can understand that policy to be incomplete as any one rule cannot 
possibly take into account all the contingencies and complications that characterize 
a messy world. When workers have a difficult time making sense of the evidence 
before them or the case itself, it may be because they do not have a clear way to 
integrate the complexities of a case with policy as it is written.  
How are we to reconcile and address the ways in which all standards are 
simultaneously over determined and incomplete? I believe one way this can be done 
is by joining technologies to standardize clinical judgment with reflective practices. 
Throughout this work, I have shown that clinical judgment already exists alongside 
and within procedures to constrain discretion. Given this fact, it makes sense to 
formalize the integration of discretion into standardized processes. Doing so would 
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offer a way for the exercise of discretion to support the goals of Evidence-Based 
Practice rather than subvert them. Analyzing the strengths and drawbacks of the 
Structured Decision-Making Model’s implementation in both states reveals that for 
interventions to be maximally successful, they need to combine opportunities to 
exercise expert judgment and express disagreement within standardized processes 
for decision-making. Building in spaces for the expression of expert judgment and 
dissent create a formal mechanism by which organizations and individual workers 
can resolve moments in which policies are over determined and/or incomplete. I 
have recommended several ways for this integration of reflective and standardize 
processes to take place. In summary they are:  
Require a narrative component to accompany the risk assessment or 
any other parts of the SDM that are foundational for decision-making.  
Including a narrative portion of the risk assessment offers a space for workers to 
formally agree or contest the final score in relationship to the empirical evidence 
considered on the risk assessment. Through a narrative, workers would have the 
space to offer alternate explanations and highlight the ways in which the nuances of 
the case counter the finding of the risk assessment or, alternatively, endorse the 
results.  This process would engage all workers at all levels of skill. It would 
formalize a space for workers who expect to have a voice to offer their opinions and 
it would invite workers to offer their insights who do not feel entitled to do so.   
Literature on procedural fairness in psychology and law illustrates the 
importance of incorporating reflective processes into decision-making. Porcedural 
fairness can be glibly summed up as: when people feel the procedure is fair, they are 
likely to feel good (or at least better) about the result, even when the outcome does 
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not go their way (Folger, 1977; Sedikides, Hart, & De Cremer, 2008; van den Bos, 
Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). Rigid implementation of actuarial-based risk assessments 
(which runs counter to the original design) does not create a space for people’s views 
to be heard. A narrative component of the risk assessment or the SDM would 
provide a mechanism for procedural fairness to take place by giving workers a 
chance to confirm or challenge the official narrative of a case with their own view.  
This does not mean that workers assessments would override the ones on the risk 
assessment, only that there would be a formal place to capture a workers 
understanding of the case. Integrating narrative and actuarial processes might 
improve decision-making across contexts. In places with a loose implementation like 
State B, where child welfare workers do not regularly take the score on the risk 
assessment into account when making case decisions, requiring a narrative 
component would force them to do contend with this information and apply it to 
their recommendation. Finally, including narrative components on the risk 
assessment also offers a way to create narrative coherence between the official 
narrative of a case and the workers personal one. Even if these narratives differ, the 
worker herself would have a formal space to wrestle with the ways in which they 
clash and in doing so create a way for these narratives to exist together in the 
official record. 
Formal procedures should be designed to allow workers to escalate and 
de-escalate cases. Formal procedures that would allow workers to escalate and de-
escalate cases would enhance their ability to take into account all the ecological 
factors present in cases. Informal solutions to problems could be more easily 
pursued if workers are allowed overrides in both directions. A careful process would 
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need to be constructed to manage the risk that de-escalating a case entails. I suggest 
that a committee composed of supervisors, administrators, and specialists in areas 
that child welfare cases most often involve (intimate partner violence, mental health, 
substance abuse, trauma, poverty) review override requests to ensure that neither 
overestimation nor underestimation of risk occurs as the result of implementing an 
override. The override process itself would call for formal reflection about the ways 
in which the actuarial-based assessment understands the case and why this 
understanding differs from the worker’s or organization’s perspective.  
Limitations of the Study  
This research is limited in several important ways. First, as a qualitative study 
built upon an interpretivist epistemology, its results are not generalizable beyond 
the sample reported. The diffuse nature of child welfare policy makes it difficult to 
extend conclusions beyond the states discussed here. Instead, these results are 
suggestive of avenues for future research, raise complications to prevailing wisdom, 
and empirically flesh out issues that so far have only been contended with at a 
theoretical level.    
My positionality as a young, white woman, pursuing my Ph.D. may have 
influenced the responses to questions in ways that I am unaware. It is possible that 
workers in State A that I typed as restricted in their decision-making where actually 
more autonomous but did not feel free to tell me about the ways in which they 
altered their judgments on risk assessments because of a fear of judgment or 
retaliation. Conversely, it is also possible that workers I typed as autonomous 
engaged in a form of braggadocio that was unreflective of their actual practices 
when they told me that they manipulated the risk assessment to reflect a judgment 
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that they had already made. In State B, I was introduced to study participants 
through agency directors. This official tie may have made some people reluctant to 
tell me the full story of how they approached their work if they feared that my 
promises of confidentiality would not be fully honored. I have no way of knowing if 
any of these limitations were issues. 
Throughout this work, I investigate the ways in which power and privilege play 
out in contexts were policies and procedures are designed to limit their expression. 
These concepts require investigation in other settings, using much larger samples, 
to see if these findings can be applied more broadly.   
Although I hope that this has been clear throughout this dissertation, one point 
bears repeating here: This work is not an evaluation of whether the SDM works nor 
is it a study of its effectiveness. I make no claims about the overall validation of the 
SDM in State A and State B. By restricting my analysis to how the SDM is used in 
practice, I hope to fill a gap in our understanding of what happens when this model 
is used on the ground to frame child welfare decision-making. 
Directions for Future Research  
The work that I have presented here suggests several avenues for further 
inquiry. I have suggested that processes of reflective functioning be integrated with 
standardized assessments to explicitly incorporate the hidden ways that discretion 
can operate in decision-making processes. Empirical work is needed to develop and 
test interventions using this model to evaluate whether such integration makes 
sense.  Just as I have asked here: What are the intended and unintended 
consequences of pursuing this strategy? What gets left in and what gets left out of 
decision-making that uses an integrated model to facilitate child welfare decision-
  196 
making? What becomes simplified and what becomes complicated as a result?    
 Research in the field of infant mental health highlights how processes of 
mentalization and reflective functioning are key to negotiating trauma and  
improving parent-child relationships (Fonagy, Steele, & Steele, 1991; Fonagy, 
Steele, Steele, Moran, & Higgit, 1991; Lieberman, Van Horn, & Ippen, 2005; Slade, 
2005). In this work, I have extended these concepts to apply to child welfare 
decision-making and the utilization of actuarial-based risk assessments. At the 
moment, discussions about mentalization and reflective functioning are restricted to 
the individual or to dyadic relationships. However, I believe that there could be 
great power in applying these ideas to the level of systems. What would it look like 
to have systems like child welfare be more reflective about their processes as whole?  
How could we move these discussions up a level theoretically and empirically? Why 
not use some of the most promising interventions in the field to the systems that 
struggle with some of the same problems as families? These are questions that I 
have only begun to grapple with but this research indicates that there are many 
unexplored possibilities here.  
Finally, this work suggests that relational and contextual concepts need 
attention within actuarial-based assessments. Traumatic events are currently 
constituted on State A’s risk assessment in a flat way that workers report often 
penalizes the person who experienced them. This view reflects an empirical 
understanding of the lasting psychological impacts of trauma and its 
multigenerational effects. How might assessments of trauma and mental health be 
captured on risk assessments in particular and/or in the child welfare system in 
general that honor their very real impact but also does not pathologize or penalize?  
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What would a trauma informed child welfare risk assessment look like? How can the 
organizational imperative of child welfare agencies to mitigate risk be balanced with 
the social imperative to help families that are struggling? Answering these questions 
are essential to having a fair and just child welfare system.  
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